Jones v. Tyre, 51534

Decision Date12 February 1976
Docket NumberNo. 51534,No. 2,51534,2
Citation224 S.E.2d 512,137 Ga.App. 572
PartiesJ. A. JONES v. R. D. TYRE
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Zorn & Royal, William A. Zorn, John R. Johnson, Jesup, for appellant.

Thomas & Howard, W. Glover Housman, Hubert H. Howard, Jesup, for appellee.

MARSHALL Judge.

This appeal is from a verdict and monetary judgment a favor of the appellee-defendant below, Tyre, based upon his cross-complaint. The case originated in an automobile collision at an intersection between two cars operated by appellant Jones and appellee Tyre in Jesup, Georgia. Jones pulled into a main thoroughfare from an intersecting side street and stopped, blocking a traffic lane. Tyre crashed into the side of Jones' vehicle. Applying the doctrine of comparative negligence, the jury found for Tyre and assessed damages in the amount of $1,500. Jones brings this appeal enumerating as error three portions of the charge of the trial court. Held:

1. In his first enumeration appellant complains the trial court presented an improper basis for recovery of damages by Tyre by authorizing the jury to find property damages, whereas Tyre in his cross-complaint had asked only for damages arising out of pain and suffering.

On the question of damages, the trial judge first gave a general introductory instruction covering both parties to the trial. Plaintiff Jones was seeking damages for personal injuries, loss of wages, property damage, and pain and suffering. Defendant in his cross-complaint sought only damages for pain and suffering. Faced with these differing pleadings, the court prefaced its charge on damages by stating, 'If the jury finds that either the petitioner or defendant on his cross bill is entitled to recover on account of damage to his property or himself, it would be the duty of the jury to determine the amount of damage in either case.' Immediately after this general statement, the court correctly stated exactly what damages Jones sought by his complaint, stating the amount thereof and the various kinds of damages involved. He then limited the defendant's claim for damages to the stated amount and based solely upon pain and suffering. The court then isolated by definition each of the types of damage claimed by Jones, requiring the jury to find such an injury and that each, individually, was the proximate result of the act of negligence of the defendant, Tyre. Thus, the trial court charged jointly as to the two parties where common principles of law applied, but carefully separated the legal contentions and applicable law where they were different.

Where a charge as a whole substantially presents issues in such a way as is not likely to confuse the jury even though a portion of the charge may not be as clear and precise as could be desired, a reviewing court will not disturb a verdict amply authorized by the evidence. Todd v. Fellows, 107 Ga.App. 783, 131 S.E.2d 577. Thus, we find no error where it is unlikely that the instructions considered as a whole would mislead a jury of ordinary intelligence. Thomas v. Barnett, 107 Ga.App. 717(5), 131 S.E.2d 818. While the specific portion of the charge of which complaint is made when torn asunder and considered as a disjointed fragment may be objectionable, when put together and considered as a whole, we find this portion of the charge to be perfectly sound. Mendel v. Pinkard, 108 Ga.App. 128, 134, 132 S.E.2d 217.

2. In his second enumeration of error, appellant Jones complains that the trial court erred in refusing to charge, upon request, on the impact of intoxication upon the issue of Tyre's negligence. Jones had not alleged intoxication as a ground of Tyre's negligence in his complaint, though he did specify four other grounds of negligence. Cf. Southern R. Co. v. Lomax, 109 Ga.App. 484, 487(3), 136 S.E.2d 485. Evidence of the...

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17 cases
  • Bradham v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 14, 1978
    ...and considered as a whole, the charge is perfectly sound. Mendel v. Pinkard, 108 Ga.App. 128, 134, 132 S.E.2d 217; Jones v. Tyre, 137 Ga.App. 572, 574, 224 S.E.2d 512; Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 5 Cir., 471 F.2d 894. See Womack v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 131 Ga.App. 63, 205 ......
  • Bickford v. Nolen
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 27, 1977
    ...not error. Welsh v. Fowler, 124 Ga.App. 369(5), 183 S.E.2d 574; Hardwick v. Price, 114 Ga.App. 817(3), 152 S.E.2d 905." Jones v. Tyre, 137 Ga.App. 572(3), 224 S.E.2d 512. 7. Appellant asserts error in the court's refusal to charge the jury that "plaintiff in this case is innocent of all neg......
  • Johnson v. State, 56929
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 15, 1979
    ...and considered as a whole, the charge is perfectly sound. Mendel v. Pinkard, 108 Ga.App. 128, 134, 132 S.E.2d 217; Jones v. Tyre, 137 Ga.App. 572, 574, 224 S.E.2d 512; Geter v. State, 219 Ga. 125, 134, 132 S.E.2d 30. We find no prejudice to appellant's substantial rights in the questioned c......
  • Collins v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 16, 1978
    ...and considered as a whole, the charge is perfectly sound. Mendel v. Pinkard, 108 Ga.App. 128, 134, 132 S.E.2d 217; Jones v. Tyre, 137 Ga.App. 572, 574, 224 S.E.2d 512; Geter v. State, 219 Ga. 125, 134, 132 S.E.2d 30. We find no prejudice to appellant's substantial rights in the questioned c......
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