Jones v. United States
Decision Date | 22 October 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 84-315.,84-315. |
Citation | 516 A.2d 513 |
Parties | Irving J. JONES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Timothy B. Walthall, Washington, D.C., appointed by the court, for appellant.
Curtis E. Hall, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., and Michael W. Farrell, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and Edward J. Agee, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellee.
Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BELSON, Associate Judge, and BURGESS, Associate
Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.1
After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of armed robbery in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-2901, -3202 (1981 & 1985 Supp.), and sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of six to eighteen years. On appeal, appellant claims that the trial judge erred in limiting cross-examination of a government witness, admitting testimony corroborating out-of-court identifications of appellant made by several complaining witnesses, refusing to limit the government's use, for impeachment purposes, of appellant's prior convictions, and limiting defense counsel's closing argument. Finding these claims to be without merit, we affirm.
I On March 13, 1982, shortly before 4:00 a.m., Forrest Jackson was standing near a bus stop located at the corner of 8th and H Streets, N.E., just in front of a Seven-Eleven convenience store. Michelle Brown and James Moore, along with several other individuals, were sitting on a bench inside the sheltered bus stop, and Charles Price and Charlene Bray were inside the Seven-Eleven store.
At approximately 4:00 a.m., appellant walked up to Jackson and asked him if he knew "where any marijuana was." When Jackson responded negatively, appellant walked away. Jackson testified that he immediately recognized appellant, who was wearing a beige jacket and a blue shirt, because he had "seen him" on three or four prior occasions.
Several minutes later, another man, later identified as Leonard Briscoe walked up to Jackson and pointed a silver pistol at him. As Michelle Brown, James Moore, and Charles Price watched, appellant approached Jackson from behind, reached into his pants pocket, and removed his blue leather wallet. After Briscoe had searched Jackson's wallet and belongings, he demanded that Jackson give him and appellant three gold chains that Jackson was wearing around his neck. Jackson refused and appellant punched him in the face. Jackson then broke free from the robbers and ran toward the nearby Seven-Eleven.
As Jackson ran toward the store, appellant ran down the street and away from the robbery scene. Leonard Briscoe then proceeded to rob Michelle Brown, James Moore, and Charlene Bray, who had returned to the bus stop from the Seven-Eleven as appellant ran away.
Meanwhile, Forrest Jackson and Charles Price had run into the Seven-Eleven and told Donald Bell, who was working behind the counter, about the robbery. Bell, an off-duty Metropolitan Police Officer, telephoned the police. After hearing a gunshot, Bell drew his service revolver and walked out of the Seven-Eleven toward the bus stop, where he saw Leonard Briscoe kneeling in front of Michelle Brown, James Moore, Charlene Bray and the other bus patrons. Bell ordered Briscoe to "freeze" but Briscoe turned toward him as if to fire his weapon. Bell then fired his service revolver, hitting Briscoe in the neck and Briscoe fled as the two men exchanged gunfire.
On G Street, between 7th and 8th, Leonard Briscoe fell against the rear portion of a light-colored, four-door, Chevrolet automobile parked in front of an alley. Bell noticed that there were two people inside the Chevrolet, one of whom helped Leonard Briscoe into the car. After Leonard Briscoe entered, the Chevrolet drove away at a high rate of speed. Bell returned to the Seven-Eleven, and reported the description of the car to the police.
Police Officer Frederick Lewis heard a "lookout" for a four-door Chevrolet automobile occupied by three robbery suspects shortly after 4:00 a.m. Upon hearing the lookout, Lewis drove to Capitol Hill Hospital on 8th Street to see if anybody had been admitted with a gunshot wound. Upon arriving, Lewis found a four-door Chevrolet automobile parked in front of the entrance to the emergency room. Lewis noticed a large amount of blood on the rear seat and floorboard of the car and a trail of blood leading from the car to the emergency room entrance. As Lewis began to follow the trail of blood, two men—appellant and Maurice Briscoe, Leonard Briscoe's brother and appellant's codefendant—came out of the hospital at a "hurried pace." After brief questioning, appellant and Maurice Briscoe were placed under arrest.
Police Officer Michael McGraw and Sergeant Charles Bailey of the Metropolitan Police Department arrived at Capitol Hill Hospital several minutes later. The officers found a beige jacket lying on the back seat of the Chevrolet. Inside the pocket of the jacket was Forrest Jackson's blue leather wallet and a card that had been inside the wallet taken from Jackson. Also found in the car were Jackson's blue dufflebag, containing his clothing, toiletry items, and several photographs. A .32 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver was found in the middle of 8th Street, approximately two hundred feet from the hospital.2
Appellant and Maurice Briscoe were brought back to the scene of the robberies where a series of "show-up" identifications were conducted. None of the witnesses identified Maurice Briscoe. At the show-up, however, Forrest Jackson positively identified appellant as the man who had taken his wallet and punched him in the face. Michelle Brown and James Moore both stated that appellant "look[ed] like" one of the two men who had robbed Jackson, and Charlene Bray stated that appellant was the same height as the man who had run from the scene as she walked out of the Seven-Eleven. At trial, both Forrest Jackson and Charles Price positively identified appellant as the man in the beige jacket who, along with Leonard Briscoe, had robbed Jackson.
II
Appellant's first claim on appeal is that his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated by a ruling of the trial judge limiting cross-examination of Forrest Jackson on the issue of bias. We disagree.
During cross-examination of Forrest Jackson, appellant's counsel asked Jackson if he ever smoked marijuana. Upon gaining an admission that he had, defense counsel then asked, "And it's also a fact that on occasion you have also sold marijuana, isn't that correct?" The prosecutor objected to the question, and at an ensuing bench conference, the court asked defense counsel to proffer a basis for the question. The following colloquy occurred:
The right to cross-examine the government's witnesses is inherent in a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). While it is recognized that "[The] extent of cross-examination [of a witness] with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court," Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 220, 75 L.Ed.2d 624 (1931); see also In re C.B.N, 499 A.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. 1985); Flecher v. United States, 358 A.2d 322, 323 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977, 97 S.Ct. 486, 50 L.Ed.2d 585 (1976); we have repeatedly stated that "bias is always a proper subject of cross-examination." Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 855 (D.C. 1978) (quoting Hyman v. United States, 342 A.2d 43, 44 (D.C. 1975)); see also Villaroman v. United States, 87 U.S. App.D.C. 240, 241, 184 F.2d 261, 262 (1950) ( ); Tompkins v. United States, 236 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. 1967) (same). Still, cross-examination of a government witness on the subject of bias must proceed in accordance with established evidentiary rules of procedure. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Thus, to survive objection, the questioner must proffer "some facts which support a genuine belief" that the witness is biased in the manner asserted. United States v. Fowler, 151 U.S.App. D.C. 79, 81, 465 F.2d 664, 666 (1972); see also Hazel v. United States, 319 A.2d 136, 140 (D.C. 1974) ( ). In addition, the attorney must proffer facts sufficient to permit the trial judge to evaluate whether the proposed question is probative of bias. See Best v. United States, 328 A.2d 378, 381-82 (D.C. 1974); see also Hawkins v. United States, 461 A.2d 1025, 1034 (D.C. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1052, 104 S.Ct. 734, 79 L.Ed.2d 193 (1984); Flecher v. United States, supra, 358 A.2d at 324.
On appeal, appellant explains that the theory of bias he sought to pursue in his questioning of Forrest Jackson was that "Jackson wanted to retaliate...
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