Jones v. Vannoy
| Decision Date | 28 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-cv-1548 |
| Parties | MARION DALE JONES #94795 v. DARREL VANNOY |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
A Bossier Parish jury convicted Marion Dale Jones (“Petitioner”) of aggravated rape, and he received a mandatory life sentence. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Jones, 188 So.3d 268 (La.App. 2d Cir. 2016), writ denied, 220 So.3d 742 (La. 2017). Petitioner also pursued a post-conviction application in state court, and all claims were denied. He now presents a federal habeas corpus petition that asks for relief on several grounds. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the petition be denied. Relevant Facts
R.W age 11, was asleep on the couch in her mother's house when she awoke to find a man on top of her. The man pulled her shirt up and licked her breast, then pulled her shorts and underwear down and licked her vagina area. R.W., who was 18 by the time of trial, testified that she asked the man who he was, and he said, “You know me, your momma know me too.” R.W. got away and ran to her older sister's room. The man peeked in the room and asked her why she would not come back, but R.W. did not answer. The man left the house.
At the time of the incident, R.W. and her sister, Y.W., were alone in the house with two younger cousins. Their mother had gone to a friend's house. The girls called the police and their grandmother, who lived several houses down the street.
R.W and Y.W. identified Terrence Lattin, their neighbor who lived across the street, as the suspect. The girls told police that the suspect was a black male who was wearing a red hat and a white t-shirt. Police spoke to Lattin, who said he had been in his house the entire evening. Police searched his home and found a white t-shirt between a wall and the bed, and a red hat was found in another room on top of a trash bag. A detective drove Lattin to the victim's house in the back of her patrol unit, and both R.W. and Y.W. identified Lattin as the suspect. Lattin was arrested and held in jail for about three months, but he was released after DNA testing of saliva from the victim excluded Lattin as the perpetrator.
Lattin told police and testified at trial that, on the evening of the crime, he was home with his girlfriend when a man wearing a red hat and white t-shirt, driving a white SUV, knocked on his door and asked for a woman whose name started with a D. Lattin told the man that the woman did not live there, and the man left. A few minutes later, he saw police lights, opened the door, and found himself arrested for aggravated rape. Lattin testified that he had been to the victim's house earlier that day, and he smoked marijuana with her mother, but he said it was his first time in the house and he was not even aware that young girls lived there.
Petitioner lived a few blocks down the street from R.W., and he drove a white SUV. The DNA candidate sample was placed in the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), and it returned as a match for Petitioner. Petitioner submitted to DNA testing in an interview. He said he did not know why his DNA was found on the victim. Sgt. James Stewart, who participated in the interview, testified that Petitioner said, “I'm not denying it; I'm not saying I didn't do it; I'm just not going to talk about that.” Petitioner opted not to give a recorded statement.
R.W. admitted that she identified Lattin as the attacker on the night of the incident, but she said she didn't get a clear look at him because it was dark in the house. R.W. said that Lattin had been at her house earlier that day with her mother. Y.W. gave similar testimony about the mistaken identification of Lattin.
DNA analyst Lauren Arihood, a former employee of the North Louisiana Crime Lab, was not available to testify at trial because she had moved to Washington D.C. to work for the FBI. A transcript of her testimony from a prior hearing was read by Michelle Vrana, the DNA supervisor for the crime lab. Arihood testified about her testing that implicated Petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime. Her crime lab report was admitted into evidence. The jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Petitioner argued throughout his state court proceedings that the record did not adequately reflect that his indictment was returned in open court as required by a state statute. The state court held a hearing to explore the grand jury proceedings and ordered that the minutes be supplemented to reflect that the grand jury was empaneled and returned a proper indictment. Petitioner argued on direct appeal that his motion to quash the indictment should have been granted. The state appellate court thoroughly explored the evidence and arguments and concluded that the record revealed “that the bill of indictment was in proper form” and signed by the foreman. That, together with other evidence, resulted in a finding “that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that the bill of indictment was not returned by the grand jury in open court.” State v. Jones, 188 So.3d at 275-77. Petitioner argues in his habeas petition that the absence of a minute entry indicating that a grand jury convened and returned an indictment against him is fatal to the proceedings.
Petitioner's arguments on this issue are based entirely on whether the grand jury proceedings complied with state law. The habeas statute provides that a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Supreme Court has “stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861 (2011). Thus, habeas relief is not available even if Petitioner is correct on his state law arguments.
Furthermore, the sufficiency of a state indictment or bill of information is not a matter for federal habeas corpus relief unless it can be shown that the charging instrument “is so defective that the convicting court had no jurisdiction.” Morlett v. Lynaugh, 851 F.2d 1521, 1523 (5th Cir. 1988). State law is the reference for determining sufficiency and if the issue “is presented to the highest state court of appeals, then consideration of the question is foreclosed in federal habeas corpus proceedings.” Morlett, supra. See also Wood v. Quarterman, 503 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2007); McKay v. Collins, 12 F.3d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1994). And “[a]n issue may be squarely presented to and decided by the state's highest court when the petitioner presents the argument in his application for postconviction relief and the state's highest court denies that application without written order.” Evans v. Cain, 577 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 2009). The arguments about the charging instrument in this case were presented to the state's highest court (Tr. 1229, 123839), so there is no basis for habeas relief with respect to this issue.
The defense obtained a pretrial ruling that prohibited any reference to CODIS, which could prejudice the defendant by suggesting he had a criminal history. The testimony of DNA expert Lauren Arihood described entering sample information into CODIS, and a crime lab DNA report was published to the jury in connection with her testimony. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the suggestion of other crimes prejudiced the defense. The prosecutor responded that the report said that data was entered into the CODIS system but it did not specifically say that Petitioner was in CODIS. Defense counsel responded that the implication of such was made. Tr. 655-58.
The trial judge noted that the only potentially applicable grounds for mistrial under state law were a legal defect in the proceedings that would make any judgment entered on the verdict reversible as a matter of law, or if it was a physical impossibility to proceed with the trial in conformity with law. The judge found neither was applicable and denied the motion for mistrial. He said that he made the pretrial ruling to make sure there was no improper reference to other crimes, but “I doubt any of these people up here, unless they had went to, you know, BPCC in criminal justice, have any idea what CODIS is to begin with.” He found no prejudice in the context of what happened and denied the motion for mistrial. Tr. 658-60.
Petitioner renewed this claim on direct appeal. The state appellate court reviewed the record and Louisiana law regarding the inadmissibility of other crimes evidence, which is reviewed for harmless error. State law requires that the remark must unmistakably point to evidence of another crime, and ambiguous or obscure references do not prejudice the defense. The court found that “the defendant failed to show that he was substantially prejudiced by the obscure reference to CODIS in the crime lab report, or that such reference made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial.” State v. Jones, 188 So.3d at 277-78.
Federal courts do not grant habeas relief based on mere errors in the application of state evidentiary rules or even consider it relevant whether state evidentiary rules were satisfied. Only federal constitutional errors that satisfy the demanding standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 merit habeas relief. The Due Process Clause provides a mechanism for relief when a state court wrongfully admits evidence, but only if the evidence is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. Bigby v. Cockrell, 340 F.3d 259, 271-72 (5th Cir. 2003), citing Dawson v....
To continue reading
Request your trial