Evans v. Cain

• Decision Date: 04 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-30861.,07-30861.
• Citation: 577 F.3d 620
• Parties: Walter J. EVANS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

577 F.3d 620

Walter J. EVANS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-30861.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

August 4, 2009.

Walter J. Evans, Angola, LA, pro se.

Andrea F. Long, Gretna, LA, for Cain.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner-Appellant Walter J. Evans ("Evans") is a Louisiana State Penitentiary inmate who seeks to reverse the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition and requests immediate release from incarceration. For the reasons set forth below, we deny relief and affirm the district court.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Evans was indicted by a Louisiana grand jury on two counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and one count of armed robbery. He was found guilty on all charges. On August 9, 2002, the trial court signed an ex parte order granting Evans a new trial but also orally denied his motion for a new trial. The docket notes that the motion was denied and granted on the same day without indicating which came first. Evans stipulates, and the State does not dispute, that the order was faxed to the trial court which signed it and returned it within minutes. Later that day, at the sentencing hearing and apparently unaware that the motion had already been signed, Evans's counsel brought the motion to the court's attention. The trial court denied the motion. On August 30, 2002, at a second sentencing hearing, the trial court reiterated its denial of the motion for a new trial. The parties agree that the trial court intended to deny Evans's motion for a new trial but disagree with respect to whether the trial court was merely remedying a clerical error in doing so or re-evaluating a prior determination. Evans was sentenced to life imprisonment for the aggravated rape counts, sixty-five years at hard labor for the attempted aggravated rape count, and sixty years at hard labor for the aggravated robbery count, all to be served concurrently.

A series of state court postconviction and habeas corpus petitions followed. All were denied. Evans then filed a petition for habeas relief in federal court, raising four grounds of error. The district court denied the petition. Evans sought a certificate of appealability ("COA") from this court which was granted on the sole issue of whether the Louisiana trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him after it had granted his motion for a new trial. Shortly thereafter, Evans filed a "Motion For Order Staying Pending Appeal."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In a habeas corpus appeal, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and review its conclusions of law de novo, applying the same standard of review to the state court's decision as the district court." Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 805 (5th Cir.1998)). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), habeas relief challenging a judgment of a state court may only be granted if "the adjudication ... (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court ...; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

DISCUSSION

1. Motion to Stay

In his Motion to Stay, Evans urges that we stay the determination of his remaining claim while he seeks re-review of his original claims in the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal according to the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Cordero, 993 So.2d 203 (La.2008). We deny his motion.

In Cordero, the Louisiana Supreme Court remedied a deficiency in the Louisiana Fifth Circuit's process of reviewing pro se, postconviction applications for supervisory writs, a process that fell short of the state constitution's requirements. 993 So.2d at 204-05. Specifically, from February 8, 1994, to May 21, 2007, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit assigned a single judge to review all pro se writ applications while the state's constitution required that the court of appeal "sit in panels of at least three judges." LA. CONST. art. V, § 8(A); see also Johnson v. Jefferson, No. 09-2516, 2009 WL 1808718, at *1 (E.D.La. June 19, 2009) (detailing how this revelation came to light). The Louisiana Supreme Court resolved to remand all successive writ applications alleging this deficiency during the relevant period to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit for a properly conducted re-review. See Cordero, 993 So.2d at 204-05; see also State ex rel. Cushinello v. State, 7 So.3d 1176 (La.2009) (remanding for re-review a successive writ application filed after Cordero but making the same arguments). A brief glance at our docket reveals many petitioners whose successive state writs were remanded for re-review by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Cordero. Evans intends to seek this re-review and urges that we stay his federal habeas proceedings pending its outcome.

Our denial of Evans's request is guided by Supreme Court precedent. In Rhines v. Weber, the Supreme Court held that federal district courts retain their discretion to stay federal habeas proceedings but warned that too frequently staying federal habeas proceedings "has the potential to undermine [AEDPA's] twin purposes" of comity and finality. 544 U.S. 269, 277, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005). There, the Court indicated that a stay is not justified where it will only result in further delay. See id. at 277-78, 125 S.Ct. 1528 (stating that "petitioners could frustrate AEDPA's goal of finality by dragging out indefinitely their federal habeas review"). A stay may be justified, however, when a petitioner "run[s] the risk of forever losing [his] opportunity for any federal review of [his] unexhausted claims." Id. at 275, 125 S.Ct. 1528. Thus, the Eighth Circuit erred in holding that granting a motion to stay is always impermissible, and the Court remanded for the determination of whether the district court abused its discretion in staying the proceedings. Id. at 279, 125 S.Ct. 1528.

Here, the circumstances of Evans's case do not justify a stay.¹ First, Evans does not argue that he will be barred from obtaining re-review in the state court by our continued review and disposition of his habeas case. Second, no party here argues that Evans's remaining claim is unexhausted. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court has reviewed that claim and denied his application for a supervisory writ. See State ex rel. Evans v. State, 904 So.2d 684 (La.2005); cf. Cordero, 993 So.2d at 214 (Kimball, J., concurring) ("Many of these cases have, in fact, ... been reviewed on post conviction by the seven justices of this court in earlier proceedings."). Third, it is apparent that all Evans stands to gain from a stay is further delay of his already three-year-long federal habeas proceedings. We are at the final stage of those proceedings, and the issues for review have been pared down to the single, uncomplicated question of whether the state trial court had jurisdiction to sentence Evans.² In light of the circumstances of Evans's case and in consideration of AEDPA's purposes, Evans's motion to stay is denied.

II. Jurisdictional Challenge

Evans argues that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by sentencing him because, from the time the court signed the order granting a new trial, it was divested of authority under the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, Evans asserts that the signed order should prevail over the subsequent verbal order denying him a new trial. Evans maintains that because his Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were consequently violated, he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus and immediate release.³

The district court determined that Evans's jurisdictional complaint was one of state procedure and did not entitle him to federal habeas relief. Accordingly, it deferred to the state courts' handling of the matter—which had previously denied Evans's request for relief. Finding no unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial and nothing contrary to or involving an unreasonable application of federal law, the district court further noted that the trial court's error was purely ministerial and did not affect the fundamental fairness of Evans's trial.

This court has consistently demonstrated deference to state court determinations of state law, including jurisdictional determinations based on state law. This deference is illustrated in our decisions involving challenges to the sufficiency of a state indictment. There, we have emphasized that "[i]t is settled in this Circuit that the sufficiency of a state indictment is not a matter for federal habeas corpus relief unless it can be shown that the indictment is so defective that the convicting court had no jurisdiction." Branch v. Estelle, 631 F.2d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980) (emphasis added); see also McKay v. Collins, 12 F.3d 66, 68 (5th Cir.1994) (same). In this regard, "[a]n absence of jurisdiction in the convicting court is ... a basis for federal habeas corpus relief cognizable under the due process clause." Lowery v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 333, 337 (5th Cir.1983). But "[w]here the state courts have held that an indictment is sufficient under state law, a federal court need not address that issue." McKay, 12 F.3d at 68. In other words, "`[w]hen it appears ... that the sufficiency of the indictment was squarely presented to the highest court of the state on appeal, and that court held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case,'" Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d 595, 598 (5th Cir.1985) (alterations in original) (quoting Liner v. Phelps, 731 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir.1984)),...