Jones-El v. Wallace, 4:13-CV-85-SPM
| Decision Date | 31 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:13-CV-85-SPM,4:13-CV-85-SPM |
| Parties | EUGENE KENNETH JONES-EL, Petitioner, v. IAN WALLACE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Missouri state prisoner Eugene Kenneth Jones-El's1 ("Petitioner's") pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 8). For the following reasons, the petition will be denied.
In 2001, the State charged Petitioner with robbery in the first degree, armed criminal action, and unlawful use of a weapon (exhibiting), based on an incident in which Petitioner was part of a group of four people that pulled a gun on a woman, took money from her, and waved a gun at another individual. Resp't Ex. B. Petitioner was tried before a jury, was convicted of all three offenses, and was sentenced to 20 years for robbery, 5 years for armed criminal action, and 5 years for unlawful use of a weapon, with the sentences to run consecutively. Resp't Ex. C. In February 2011, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's issuance of a conditional writ of habeas corpus vacating Petitioner's convictions based on the state court's violation ofPetitioner's right to represent himself. Jones v. Norman, 633 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011). The Eighth Circuit required the State to give Petitioner a new trial. Id.
When Petitioner's case was returned to state court, he was represented by Mary Fox of the Missouri State Public Defender between May 5, 2011, and July 11, 2011. However, on July 11, 2011, Petitioner waived his right to counsel, and Ms. Fox withdrew. Resp't Ex. A, G, H, & J. The trial court initially appointed Ms. Fox as standby counsel but later granted her motion to withdraw as standby counsel. Resp't Ex. I, K, & N.
On July 14 and 29, 2011, Petitioner filed motions asking for funding for depositions, investigative services, expert assistance, and other preparatory services. Resp't Ex. L & O; Doc. 17-2, at 3. The trial court denied that request in light of the availability of the prior trial transcript. See Doc. 17-2, at 5. The case was set for trial on August 1, 2011. Resp't Ex. A. On August 1, Petitioner entered an Alford plea of guilty to robbery in the first degree, armed criminal action, and unlawful use of a weapon Resp't Ex. A, S, Y, & Z. Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years for robbery, 3 years for armed criminal action, and 4 years for unlawful use of a weapon, with the sentences to run concurrently. Resp't Ex. Z.
On December 15, 2011, again acting pro se, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief. Resp't Ex. HH. He raised thirteen claims, designated Grounds A through M. Id. The motion court denied each of his claims on the merits. Resp't Ex. FF & HH. On June 28, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Resp't Ex. KK. On August 6, 2012, the Missouri Court of Appeals informed Petitioner that he needed to file the record on appeal by August 10, 2012. Resp't Ex. LL. Petitioner sought and obtained two extensions of time to file the record on appeal, which expired October 9, 2012. Resp't Ex. MM, OO, & PP. The record shows that between June and September 2012, Petitioner sent multiple letters and filed multiple motions in the plea courtrequesting that the plea court provide him with a copy of the record on appeal. Resp't Ex. JJ. Although he received a partial record, he never received a full record. Id. After the expiration of his deadline on October 9, 2012, Petitioner took no further action, and on November 9, 2012, the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's case for failure to comply with Missouri Supreme Court rules requiring the filing of a record on appeal. Resp't Ex. QQ & RR.
On January 14, 2013, Petitioner filed his pro se petition in the instant action. Reading the petition and attachments to the petition broadly, Petitioner appears to be asserting fourteen claims: the thirteen claims he raised in his pro se motion for post-conviction relief (designated Grounds A through M), and another claim he designates "Ground 14." Doc. 1 at 19-80; Doc. 1-1, at 1-10 & 94-95.2
Federal habeas review exists only "as 'a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.'" Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011)). Accordingly, "[i]n the habeas setting, a federal court is bound by AEDPA [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] to exercise only limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions." Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant relief to a state prisoner with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of a claim "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the SupremeCourt of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Id. at 407-08; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "Finally, a state court decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006) () (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
Respondent first argues that this Court should not consider any of Petitioner's claims, because they have all been procedurally defaulted. The Court will consider the procedural default issue separately for Grounds A through M and Ground 14.
Respondent argues that Ground A through M have been procedurally defaulted, because although Petitioner attempted to raise them in the appeal from the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief, the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed that appeal on state procedural grounds. The Court agrees.
Federal courts may generally not grant habeas relief where a prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an adequate and independent state procedural rule. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 50 (1991). See also Wooten v. Norris, 578 F.3d 767, 777 (8th Cir. 2009) (); Collier v. Norris, 485 F.3d 415, 425 (8th Cir. 2007) () (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30). To be adequate and independent, "[t]he procedural rule relied upon by the state court must be 'firmly established, regularly followed and readily ascertainable when it was applied.'" Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. Vasquez, 138 F.3d. 711, 717 (8th Cir. 1998)).
There is no dispute here that the state court declined to address Petitioner's claims in Grounds A through M based on Petitioner's failure to follow state procedural requirements. In its ruling, the Missouri Court of Appeals clearly stated that it was dismissing these claims due to Petitioner's failure to comply with Missouri Supreme Court rules requiring the appellant to cause the record on appeal to be prepared and filed with the clerk of the proper appellate court. See Resp't Ex. QQ & RR (citing Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 81.12(d), 81.18, & 84.08); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 81.12(d)("Within the time prescribed by Rule 81.19, the appellant shall cause the record on appeal to be prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Rule 81 and to be filed with the clerk of the proper appellate court . . ."). Petitioner does not dispute that this rule is firmly established, is regularly followed, and was readily ascertainable when applied. See Garris v. State, 389 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Mo. 2012) () (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Dunn, 817 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Mo. 1991) (). See also Lynn v. Lombardi, No. 4:14 CV 428 CDP, 2015 WL 7180500, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2015) ().
The federal...
To continue reading
Request your trial