Jones v. Warden
Decision Date | 10 January 2018 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:17-CV-192 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Parties | DELSHJUAN JONES, a.k.a. Delshaun Jones, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, SOUTHERN OHIO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Respondent. |
Petitioner, a state prisoner, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court on the Petition, Respondent's Return of Writ, Petitioner's Traverse, and the exhibits of the parties. For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED.
The Franklin County (Ohio) Court of Common Pleas summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Entry (Doc. 6-1, PAGEID ##123-124). Petitioner was indicted by the January 10, 2014, term of the Franklin County grand jury on one count of felonious assault in violation of O.R.C. § 2903.11. (Id. at PAGEID #46). After the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motions to suppress evidence, Petitioner entered a no contest plea. (Id. at PAGEID #150). On November 21, 2014, the trial court imposed a sentence of seven years of incarceration plus three years of post-release control. (Id. at PAGEID ##170-171). Represented by new counsel, Petitioner pursued a timely appeal. He raised the following assignments of error:
State v. Jones, No. 14AP-1050, 2015 WL 7902800, at *1 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. Dec. 3, 2015). On December 3, 2015, the appellate court sustained Petitioner's third assignment of error, as the parties agreed "that the judgment entry signed by the trial court judge is incorrect when it states that Delshjaun Jones was convicted following a guilty plea" and remanded the case to the trial court to journalize a nunc pro tunc entry reflecting that Petitioner was found guilty following aplea of "no contest." Id. The appellate court otherwise affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. On May 4, 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. State v. Jones, 145 Ohio St.3d 1458 (2016). On December 11, 2015, the trial court issued the Amended Judgment Entry. (Id. at PAGEID #316).
On March 6, 2017, Petitioner filed this pro se § 2254 Petition.1 He asserts that he was denied a fair trial due to admission of identification testimony obtained through the use of an unduly suggestive photo array conducted in violation of state law (claim one); and that his statements were admitted in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (claim two). Respondent contends that Petitioner's claims lack merit.
Petitioner seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") sets forth standards governing this Court's review of state-court determinations. The United State Supreme Court described AEDPA as "a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court" and emphasized that courts must not "lightly conclude that a State's criminal justice system has experienced the 'extreme malfunction' for which federal habeas relief is the remedy." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)); see also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) ( ).
The factual findings of the state appellate court are presumed to be correct. Section 2254(e)(1) provides as follows:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
"Under AEDPA, a writ of habeas corpus should be denied unless the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state courts." Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741, 748 (6th Cir.) (citing Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 513 (6th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied sub. nom Coley v. Robinson, 134 S. Ct. 513 (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) ( ). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained these standards as follows:
A state court's decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if (1) "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law[,]" or (2) "the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives" at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405[] (2000). A state court's decision is an "unreasonable application" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) if it "identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... case" or either unreasonably extends or unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context. Id. at 407[].
Coley, 706 F.3d at 748-49. The burden of satisfying the standards set forth in § 2254 rests with the petitioner. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.170, 181 (2011).
"In order for a federal court to find a state court's application of [Supreme Court precedent] unreasonable, . . . [t]he state court's application must have been objectively unreasonable," not merely "incorrect or erroneous." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) ); see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 778 ()(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In considering claims of "unreasonable application" under § 2254(d)(1), courts must focus on the reasonableness of the result, not on the reasonableness of the state court's analysis. Holder v. Palmer, 588 F.3d 328, 341 (6th Cir. 2009) () (quoting Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied sub. nom. Neal v. Epps, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003)); see also Nicely v. Mills, 521 F. App'x 398, 403 (6th Cir. 2013) ( ). Relatedly, in evaluating the reasonableness of a state court's ultimate legal conclusion under § 2254(d)(1), a court must review the state court's decision based solely on the record that was before it at the time it rendered its decision. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. Put simply, "review under § 2254(d)(1) focuses on what a state court knew and did." Id. at 182.
In claim one, Petitioner asserts that police failed to follow the procedures required under state law when obtaining a photo identification of him from the alleged victim Samuel Lacy, resulting in an unduly suggestive identification. According to Petitioner, Lacy's identification of him was unreliable, as Lacy had little to no opportunity to view his assailant at the time of the offense, paid limited attention, provided a vague description of the perpetrator to police, and was uncertain of his identification of Petitioner. The state appellate court rejected this claim as follows:
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