Jones v. Warden
| Decision Date | 21 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:09cv158 |
| Parties | Jason Jones, Petitioner, v. Warden, Ross Correctional Institution, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
ORDER
Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Timothy S. Hogan's May 21, 2010, Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (Doc. 20). The R&R addresses Petitioner Jason Jones's petition for writ of habeas corpus (Docs. 2, 3) brought under 28 U.S.C. §2254. Petitioner filed timely objections to the R&R (Doc. 28).
The Court has reviewed the comprehensive findings of the magistrate judge and considered de novo all filings in this matter. For the reasons provided below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Following a jury verdict finding Petitioner guilty of involuntary manslaughter, Petitioner was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment. With the assistance of counsel, Petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals of Ohio, First Appellate District. On October 12, 2007, the Ohio Court of Appeals overruled Petitioner's seven assignments of error and affirmed the trial court's judgment. State v. Jones, No. C-060512, 2007 WL 2965341, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2007). On March 12, 2008, Petitioner's appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was subsequently dismissed as not involving any substantial constitutional question. State v. Jones, 117 Ohio St.3d 1425 (Ohio 2008).
Petitioner filed this federal habeas action pro se on March 6, 2009. (Docs. 2, 3.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion to stay his pending habeas petition (Doc. 7) followed by a motion to amend the motion to stay (Doc. 9). A Report and Recommendation recommended that both motions be denied. (Doc. 12.) Petitioner objected (Doc. 14), but on March 26, 2010, this Court adopted that Report and Recommendation thereby denying Petitioner's motions (Doc. 15). This Court issued a subsequent Order (Doc. 18) denying Petitioner's motion for reconsideration (Doc. 17).
Petitioner asserts seven grounds for relief: (1) the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) the trial court erred by overruling Petitioner's motion for acquittal under Ohio Criminal Procedure Rule 29; (4) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to present evidence of Petitioner's previous arrest, allegedly in violation of Ohio Evidence Rule 404(B); (5) prosecutorial misconduct; (6) the trial court erred when it failed to suppress the identification evidence of Petitioner; and (7) the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. (Doc. 20, 6-7; Doc. 2.) Petitioner objects to the R&R based on Grounds One through Six. (See Doc. 28.)
The R&R found that Petitioner's claims lack merit or are otherwise not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding and, therefore, that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommends that: (1) Petitioner'spetition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied with prejudice; (2) a certificate of appealability should not issue; and (3) Petitioner should be denied leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. In his objections, Petitioner essentially repeats the arguments considered and rejected by the magistrate judge.
III. ANALYSIS
On federal habeas review, the factual findings of the state appellate court are entitled to a presumption of correctness in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F.3d 487, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, state-court adjudications are binding on this Court unless those decisions are contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1998). However, if the state court does not articulate the reasoning behind its decision or fails to adjudicate the constitutional issues, the deferential standard of review in § 2254(d) does not apply. Id. In such a situation, the constitutional claim is reviewed de novo and the Court considers "the totality of the evidence—'both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceedings.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536 (2003) (emphasis in original) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 (2000)); see also Clinkscale v. Carter, 375 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 2004).
Regarding objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation on a non-dispositive matter, the assigned district judge can modify or set aside the findings if they are clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). However, when objections are received on a dispositive matter, the district judge "must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to."Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After review, the district judge "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id.
Before addressing the Grounds in Petitioner's habeas petition, this Court will briefly address Petitioner's first "objection" to the magistrate judge's R&R. In this objection, Petitioner is actually objecting to this Court's previous Order denying Petitioner's motion and amended motion to stay his habeas petition (Doc. 15), as well as this Court's subsequent Order denying Petitioner's motion for reconsideration (Doc. 18). Petitioner argues that this Court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner's motions. However, Petitioner does not provide any new information or evidence beyond that already provided in his previous motions. This Court twice ruled on Petitioner's motions, providing sound reasoning to support the denial of his motions in each Order. (See Docs. 15, 18.) Because neither the relevant facts nor circumstances have changed in Petitioner's favor since the filing of those Orders, this Court will not further address Petitioner's argument regarding his motion to stay. The Court rejects Petitioner's objection regarding his continued request for a stay of his habeas petition.
Petitioner contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, arguing that the only evidence linking Petitioner to the crime was the testimony of two "self-serving" individuals who, in return, hoped to receive lighter sentences for their involvement in the same incident. In support of his argument, Petitioner contends that there was no physical evidence linking him to the crime.
Sufficient evidence supports a conviction if, "'after viewing the evidence in thelight most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" White v. Steele, 602 F.3d 707, 709 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 560 (1979)). Moreover, the trier of fact is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, weighing evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from the basic facts to the ultimate facts. Id. at 318-19. On habeas corpus review, although the federal court conducts an independent review of the state-court record in analyzing a petitioner's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, Nash v. Eberlin, 437 F.3d 519, 525 (6th Cir. 2006), the Court "does not reweigh the evidence or redetermine the credibility of the witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the trial court." Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)). "Jackson makes clear that 'a federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.'" O'Hara v. Brigano, 499 F.3d 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979)). Finally, in considering a sufficiency claim, "circumstantial evidence is entitled to equal weight as direct evidence." Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 449 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Farley, 2 F.3d 645, 650 (6th Cir. 1993)).
The magistrate judge agreed with the findings of the Ohio Court of Appeals that the evidence supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In addressing the merits of Petitioner's insufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, the Ohio Court of Appeals found the following: {¶ 26} Jones was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter is defined in R.C. 2903.04(A) as "[n]o person shall cause the death of another * * * as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a felony." In this case, the state alleged that Jones had caused the death of Sublett while committing or attempting to commit the offense of trafficking in drugs. The jury was instructed that, to find that Jones had committed or attempted to commit drug trafficking, it had to find that Jones had knowingly sold or offered to sell marijuana.
{¶ 27} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the jury could reasonably have found that Jones had caused the death of Sublett while trafficking in drugs, specifically while offering to sell marijuana. Regarding the trafficking in drugs, both Randy Washington and DeAngelo Tait testified that Tait had arranged for a sale of marijuana from Marshall to Washington and Sublett. The jury was presented with evidence that Jones had arrived with Marshall to conduct the sale. Washington further testified that he had seen the marijuana before the sale or robbery occurred, and that he had removed two bags of marijuana from Sublett's body. Officer Peterson saw a scattered pile of marijuana on the ground near Sublett. Moreover, 429 pounds of marijuana were found in a home shared by Jones and ...
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