Jones v. Westside-Urban Health Center, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 490-229.
• Citation: 760 F. Supp. 1575
• Parties: Marvin P. JONES, M.D., Plaintiff, v. WESTSIDE-URBAN HEALTH CENTER, INC., Curtis W. Cooper, individually and as Executive Director, and William J. Milton, individually and as Medical Director, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

760 F. Supp. 1575

Marvin P. JONES, M.D., Plaintiff, v. WESTSIDE-URBAN HEALTH CENTER, INC., Curtis W. Cooper, individually and as Executive Director, and William J. Milton, individually and as Medical Director, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 490-229.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division.

April 8, 1991.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gregory G. Johnson, East Orange, N.J., Gregory V. Sapp, Savannah, Ga., Charles R. Floyd, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

Malcolm R. Maclean, and Wade W. Herring, II, Savannah, Ga., for defendants.

ORDER

ALAIMO, District Judge.

This is a discrimination suit filed pursuant to the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 215(a)(3). Plaintiff, a male physician, claims that because of his sex he was paid less money than a female physician. Plaintiff also claims that he was wrongly terminated from his job in retaliation for complaining about the unequal wages. Defendants contend that the female physician received a higher salary only because of her superior level of education and her vast prior work experience. Defendants further allege that plaintiff was fired for excessive absenteeism and that his wage protests were irrelevant to the decision to terminate him.

This case is presently before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment and defendants' motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As discussed below, all three motions must be denied.

FACTS

The Court begins by recounting those facts which are undisputed. Defendant, Westside-Urban Health Center, Inc. ("Westside"), is a federally supported health care organization located in Savannah, Georgia. Plaintiff, Dr. Marvin P. Jones, was a participant in the National Health Service Corps Scholarship program in which he agreed to work at a selected medical site, such as Westside, from July 1987 until July 1991 in exchange for the government forgiving all of his loan obligations. Westside hired Jones on July 8, 1987, as a staff physician in internal medicine. When Jones was hired, he had just completed his residency program and was not certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine. To determine the starting salaries of all physicians, Westside uses a written compensation plan. Under the plan, Jones received $54,485.89 annual compensation. In October of 1989, Jones' supervisor, Dr. William Milton, evaluated his performance. Milton described Jones as an excellent physician who was an asset to Westside.

Westside hired Dr. Greer Larned, a female pediatrician, in 1986 as a staff physician. Larned came to Westside with 12 years of experience as a practicing pediatrician. In addition, she was certified by the American Board of Pediatrics. Prior to her employment with Westside, she earned $69,500 a year. Under Westside's compensation plan, her starting salary was $59,538.20.

As staff physicians, both Jones and Larned had the same job description and each was required to have the same minimum qualifications. The Westside position description bulletin specifies that each staff physician must be a graduate of a medical school of recognized standing who has served for one year as an intern in a recognized general hospital and has obtained a license to practice medicine in the State of Georgia. Although Jones and Larned had different specialties, each treated patients —occasionally treating each other's patients — and performed hospital visitation duties.

In April 1990, Jones became aware that Larned was receiving a higher salary than he was. As of that time, Jones received $57,802 annually, and Larned received $66,319 annually. Jones complained about the discrepancy to Drs. William Milton and Curtis Cooper, his supervisors. Cooper maintained that Larned's superior experience and education justified the salary discrepancy. Jones requested a grievance hearing concerning the salary dispute. The request was denied and five days later, on June 8, 1990, Jones was fired.

Several facts are vehemently contested. Jones contends that, in April of 1989, Dr. Milton made him a Medical Director with supervisory responsibilities over all medical staff, including Larned. Jones further contends that he had more patient encounters than Larned did and generated more revenue for Westside than she did. Defendants acknowledge that Jones had the authority to approve leave requests for the medical staff, including Larned, but deny that Jones was ever made a Medical Director. Defendants argue that the only reason Jones was given the additional duties of approving leave requests was to make him more aware of the impact of absences, thereby, perhaps, causing him to improve his own poor attendance record.

The parties hotly dispute Jones' attendance record. Defendants argue that Jones was fired due to his excessive absences from work. Jones argues that he had a better attendance record than Larned did, and also contends that his time sheets have been altered to make it appear that he missed more work than he actually did. Westside's bookkeeper, Alyce Martin, stated that Jones' time sheets do appear to have been altered in some way. These material factual discrepancies make summary judgment improper.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

In order to succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must show that there are no genuine issues of material fact, so that a judgment can be rendered in the movant's favor as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). A party seeking summary judgment bears "the exacting burden of demonstrating that there is no dispute as to any material fact in the case." Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co., Inc. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.1983). The evidence and any inferences that may be drawn from it should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Mercantile Bank & Trust Co., Ltd. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir.1985). Moreover, a court must proceed with caution when disposing of an employment discrimination case by summary judgment, given the heavily factual nature of the cause of action. Robertson v. Georgia Dep't of Corrections, 725 F.Supp. 533, 535 (S.D.Ga. 1989). In the present case, summary judgment is inappropriate, for several questions of material fact remain in dispute.

II. Equal Pay Act

In order to establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must show "that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes `for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.'" Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974), quoting Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); see also Schwartz v. Florida Board of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 907 (11th Cir.1987); Brock v. Georgia Southwestern College, 765 F.2d 1026, 1032 (11th Cir.1985). The jobs held by the employees of opposite sexes need not be identical; rather, they need only be substantially equal. Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 203-04, 94 S.Ct. at 2232-33. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by comparing the jobs held by the female and male employees and showing that those jobs are substantially equal, not by comparing the skills and qualifications of the individual employees holding those jobs. Brock, 765 F.2d at 1032; Hein v. Oregon College of Educ., 718 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir.1983). Because at this stage the jobs and not the employees are compared, only the skills and qualifications actually needed to perform the jobs are considered. The inquiry focuses on the primary duties of each job, not those which are incidental or insubstantial. Any extra duties that might be used to distinguish two jobs may not be tasks that are typically performed by other personnel at lower pay. Goodrich v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 815 F.2d 1519, 1524 (D.C.Cir.1987).

In the present case, plaintiff has established a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act. First, plaintiff has established that he makes less money than Larned, a female physician. Second, he has shown that both he and Larned are staff physicians. As Westside's job description bulletin makes clear, the skills and qualifications necessary for each of them to obtain the position of staff physician are identical. Both doctors had to have completed an internship and obtained a medical degree and a license to practice medicine in the State of Georgia. Both were responsible for patient treatment and hospital visitations. They even treated the same patients occasionally. Thus, plaintiff has met his burden of proving that Westside paid different wages to him and Larned for equal work on substantially equal jobs.

In arguing that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case, defendants rely on the facts that Larned is more experienced than Jones and Larned alone is board certified. Such an argument exhibits a misunderstanding of the pleading burdens and elements of a prima facie case in an Equal Pay Act claim.¹ It is a basic and fundamental principle of Equal Pay Act claims that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by comparing the jobs held by the female and male employees and showing that those jobs are substantially equal, not by comparing the skills and qualifications of the individual employees holding those jobs.²

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the wage differential is justified under one of the Equal Pay Act's four exceptions. It is at this stage that individual skills and qualifications become relevant. The Act provides that unequal pay to members of the opposite sex is permitted when the inequality arises "pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures...