Jones v. Zollicoffer

• Decision Date: 31 July 1817
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAM JONES AND OTHERS v. ZOLLICOFFER.—TERM, 212.*

4 N.C. 645

WILLIAM JONES AND OTHERS

v.ZOLLICOFFER.—TERM, 212.*

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JULY TERM, 1817

1. A court of equity will not compel a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, to part with any legal advantage he has over his adversary, although he may have obtained it accidentally or improperly; nor will it compel him to discover his title, or title deeds or boundaries, nor to surrender title deeds, nor suffer testimony to be perpetrated against him, because a court of law would do none of these things. But where nothing is asked of him but what a court of law would compel him to perform, equity affords him no protection, and does not allow him to withhold the property of another.

2. When a bill is filed by one who has the legal title, but under such circumstances that he cannot be completely redressed at law, it is no defense for the purchaser to plead that he purchased for a valuable consideration without notice. Such plea will only protect the honest purchaser after he has got the legal title.

3. It is the province of a jury in an equity suit to try only such disputed facts as the parties by the bill and answer submit to them; but to find that a sale is justifiable is a conclusion of law, not submitted to them.

5. A junior equity can in no case prevail over an older one, unless it has power as executrix over the property bequeathed thenceforward ceases; her assent operates for the benefit of the ulterior remaindermen, and converts their equitable into a legal estate.

5. A younger equity can in no case prevail over an older one, but where it has also the law; for the rule is that where there is equity on both sides, the law shall prevail.

THE complainants, claiming as legatees and next of kin to William Jones, instituted a suit in equity against Zollicoffer, in which the bill stated that William Jones died in 1758, having first made his will,which, amongst others, contained the following clause: "I give to my wife, Sarah Jones, the use of a negro fellow named Ben, another named Sam, and three wenches named Sal, Nan, Doll, as also my stock of goods, chattels, etc., and parts and parcels of my estate during her life, then to be equally divided among my children, by my executors." He appointed his wife and his son William his executors.

That part of the negroes so bequeathed are in the possession of Zollicoffer, who pretends a title to them under a purchase, made either by himself or his father from Sarah, the widow, who alone took upon herself the burden of executrix, and who, before the period of such purchase, had paid all the debts due from the testator's estate, and had elected to hold the negroes as legatee, and had actually so held them for many years.

The said Zollicoffer was acquainted with all the circumstances, and purchased from the widow as legatee only, and paid a consideration proportionate only to her life estate, and applied the money paid, or knew of its application, to the discharge of the widow's proper debts. The bill then prays a discovery of the names and increase of the negroes, and of the profits received from their labor, and a decree for the respective shares of the complainants.

The answer of Zollicoffer admits the purchase of a negro named Beck from the widow and three of the legatees, who assured him that they could or would make a good title to her; that he has understood that the girl was sold to pay a debt contracted for the support of the family.

April Term, 1798. To this answer a replication was filed, and the court directed five issues to be made up, the only one of which necessary to be here stated was as follows: "Whether the sale to Zollicoffer was for the purpose of paying the debts and expenses of the testator's estate, or the necessary expenses towards maintaining the children, or

young negroes belonging to the testator, or for the benefit of the widow only. And whether the said Zollicoffer had notice of the equitable claim set forth in the bill, when he purchased."

October Term, 1800. On this issue the jury found that the sale of the negro Beck was justifiable, and for a valuable consideration, and that the defendant purchased without notice.

JOHNSTON, J. The court then decreed that the complainants should pay to Zollicoffer his costs.

October Term, 1805. The complainants afterwards filed a bill of review, in which they made the following assignment of errors, viz.:

1. No such issue as that above stated ought to have been submitted to the jury, it being perfectly immaterial as to the claim of the complainants whether the said negro Beck was sold by the widow who held her as a legatee for life for any of the purposes mentioned in the said issue or not.

2. Such issue ought not to have embraced any other causes for the sale than that expressed in the answer, viz., "to pay a debt contracted for the support of the family," which could not, were it true, enable the widow, a legatee for life only, to sell the said negro absolutely and forever, and so as to divest the property of the complainants.

3. The jury have not specified the cause or purpose for which the said sale was made, nor have they said it was for any of the purposes contained in the said issue.

4. That the court should have pronounced a decree for the complainants against the said Zollicoffer for all the descendants of Beck, which were or had been in his possession, or in other words, for the complainant's shares of all the said negroes.

October Term, 1811. To this bill of review Zollicoffer demurred, and upon argument the opinion of the Court was pronounced by

HENDERSON, J. It is a maxim in equity that where equity is equal, the law shall prevail. Under a mistaken application of this principle the original bill was dismissed as to the defendant Zollicoffer. To reverse that decree is the object of the present bill.

A purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, has an equity equal to that of any one; and if he has any advantage at law over his adversary, a court of equity will not deprive him of it, although he may have obtained it accidentally, or even improperly. It will not

compel him to discover his title, or his title deeds, the boundaries of his lands, to surrender up title deeds, although improperly obtained, or suffer testimony to be perpetrated against him, because a court of law would do none of these things. But when he is not called on to surrender any of these advantages, when nothing is asked of him but what a court of law would compel him to perform, it affords him no protection; and when he withholds from another his property, he shall be compelled to restore it, the court taking care that he shall not be deprived of any of his legal advantages. Collett v. De Gols, Cases Temp. Talbot, 65, so much relied on by the defendant's counsel, fully supports this opinion. A similar plea to the present protected Ward and his trustee, as to all the estates of the bankrupt, which the bankrupt had mortgaged prior to the bankruptcy, and which by assignment had come to Ward or to his trustee before the commission was sued out; for as to them Ward had a legal advantage; he had the legal estate, and nothing but equities of redemption remained in the bankrupt at the time of his bankruptcy to forfeit by the act of bankruptcy for the benefit of his creditors; and when the assignee came into a court of equity to redeem the mortgaged estates, Ward's equity being equal to his, and he having the estate at law, it was decreed that the assignee should redeem, upon paying not only the money for which the estates were originally mortgaged, but also the money paid by Ward to the bankrupt for a release of the equities of redemption, although the equities were purchased after the act of bankruptcy committed, and when the bankrupt had nothing which he could sell. For Ward had the legal estate. An equity of redemptionis unknown at law, and cannot be enforced in the courts of law.

And but for the interposition of a court of equity the mortgaged estate, after default in the mortgagor, would remain forever in the mortgagee, Ward's equity, therefore, protected him in a court of equity, as he would have been protected in a court of law; and the truth of his plea was ordered to be ascertained.

But as to that property derived immediately from the bankrupt after his bankruptcy, and before commission sued out, the court directed Ward to account, regardless of the truth or falsity of his plea; for as to that he had no legal advantage.

It is deemed unnecessary to examine further the cases cited in the argument, or to notice some expressions of the chancellors, such as that a court of equity has no jurisdiction against a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, and...