Jonielunas v. City of Worcester Police Dept.

• Citation: 338 F.Supp.2d 173
• Decision Date: 01 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.00-40211-NMG.,CIV.A.00-40211-NMG.
• Parties: Neil JONIELUNAS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WORCESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT, Edward Gardella, in his capacity as Police Chief, Jennifer Humphrey and David G. Decelles, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

338 F.Supp.2d 173

Neil JONIELUNAS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WORCESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT, Edward Gardella, in his capacity as Police Chief, Jennifer Humphrey and David G. Decelles, Defendants.

No. CIV.A.00-40211-NMG.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts, Central Division.

June 1, 2004.

Andrew M. Fischer, Janan E Fischer, Boston, MA, for plaintiff.

Janet McGuigsan, City Hall, Worcester, MA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, District Judge.

As this Gordian knot persists into the post-trial stage, the remaining individual and municipal defendants renew their Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Not to be outdone, Plaintiff Neil Jonielunas ("Jonielunas") moves for attorney's fees and related costs to which the Defendants counter with a vigorously contested Motion to Strike.

I. Factual Background

By way of a complaint filed in Worcester Superior Court and removed to this Court in November, 2000, Jonielunas alleged various intentional torts and violations of his state and federal civil rights by the City of Worcester ("the City") and certain members of its police department.

Jonielunas was employed by the City as a police officer from July 1977 until a 1980 motorcycle accident forced his eventual retirement from the police department in 1990. Following his retirement, Jonielunas worked as a licensed firearms salesman, most recently at the Village Gun Shop in Northboro.

In August 1994, Jonielunas filed a complaint for, and eventually obtained, a divorce from his wife, Nancy Jonielunas, who has since remarried and become Nancy Dube ("Dube"). At the time of their divorce, the Jonielunases had two minor children, Lauren and Colin. In 1997, Dube alleged that Jonielunas had sexually abused one or both of his children. Based, in part, on that allegation, Dube successfully requested that the Probate Court suspend Jonielunas's visitation rights and obtained an order, pursuant to M.G.L.C. 209A ("the 209A Order") preventing Jonielunas from visiting his children without court-approved supervision.¹

On May 14, 1998, Dube informed the Worcester police that she believed a violation of the 209A Order had occurred. The previous day, Jonielunas was alleged to have repeatedly driven by Lauren's school while Lauren was in the schoolyard. Officer James E. Grady ("Grady") of the Worcester police department responded to Dube's complaint. Grady examined the 209A Order and determined that, based on the language of the order, no violation had occurred on May 13th. Although the Defendant, Officer David DeCelles ("DeCelles") of the Worcester police Domestic Violence Unit determined that probable cause for an arrest existed as a result of that incident, Jonielunas was not arrested at that time.²

Later that same month, Jonielunas was again alleged to have inappropriately contacted his daughter, Lauren. His ex-wife claimed that, on the morning of May 27, 1998, Jonielunas drove by Lauren's school where he "gave her the middle finger and leered at her." Nancy Dube again reported the incident as a violation of the 209A Order. Later that day, the Defendant Worcester Police Officer Jennifer Humphrey ("Humphrey") was dispatched to Dube's home to investigate the reported violation. During her investigation, Humphrey observed that Lauren appeared distraught by the incident, and learned that Dube had just recently moved into her residence. Moreover, Dube thought that Jonielunas did not know her new address or of Lauren's new school.

Following her meeting with Dube and Lauren, Humphrey consulted with her sergeant, Frank Lahey, who instructed her to look at the 209A Order. He told her that if the order suggested probable cause for an arrest, Humphrey should have Jonielunas arrested by the police in Warren, where Jonielunas then resided. Based on the language of the 209A Order, Humphrey determined that Jonielunas was prohibited from being alone with his children and that a violation of the 209A Order had occurred. Humphrey apprised the Warren Police Department of her conclusion and directed the Warren police to arrest Jonielunas at his home that night, which they ultimately did.

Sometime after the Warren police received the request from Officer Humphrey, they offered the Worcester police an alibi for the alleged May 27th violation by Jonielunas. While in the Communications Department at the Worcester police station, Humphrey learned that the Warren police telephoned to inform the Worcester officers that Jonielunas could not have violated the 209A Order on the morning of May 27th because he was "with" the Warren police at that time. Several Warren police officers later elaborated that they saw Jonielunas at locations in Warren at 8:45 a.m. that day, approximately the same time as the second alleged violation of the 209A Order. The complaint pursuant to which Jonielunas was arrested was ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution and this lawsuit was filed.

After a four-day trial, a jury returned a verdict on December 12, 2003, in which it found that (1) neither Humphrey nor DeCelles violated Jonielunas's constitutional right to be free from arrest except based on probable cause, (2) Officer DeCelles was liable to Jonielunas under the state law claim of false imprisonment and (3) the City was liable to Jonielunas for a municipal violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The jury awarded Jonielunas damages in the amount of $5,000 against DeCelles for false imprisonment and $45,000 against the City for the § 1983 violation.

Now pending before this Court is the Defendants' Renewed (Post-Judgment) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Docket No. 109) and the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees (Docket No. 112).

II. Legal Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), a moving party may renew a request for judgment as a matter of law by "filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment[.]" In ruling on such a motion if a verdict was returned at trial, a court is faced with the following options: (1) to allow the judgment to stand, (2) to order a new trial or (3) to direct entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b).

As the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held, a district court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only when, after considering the evidence of record and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, "the record reveals no sufficient evidentiary basis for the verdict." Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir.2001); see also Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1987)(courts "must examine the evidence and the inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.").

Moreover, courts "take the facts as shown by the nonmovant's evidence and by at least such of movant's uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence as, under all the circumstances, the jury virtually must have believed." Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 200, quoting Karelitz v. Damson Oil Corp., 820 F.2d 529, 530 (1st Cir.1987).

Certain considerations are beyond the Court's purview. Specifically, "the [C]ourt may not weigh the evidence, undertake credibility determinations, or engage in differential factfinding." Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 75. Simply put,

the jury's verdict must stand unless the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, points unerringly to an opposite conclusion. Id.

Even if the standard for judgment notwithstanding the verdict has been met, this Court has discretion to order a new trial rather than grant judgment as a matter of law. The Court may do so "if it believes that the defect in the nonmoving party's proof might be remedied on a second trial[.]" 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2538, at 357 (2d ed.1994); see also Malley-Duff & Associates v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 145 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072, 105 S.Ct. 564, 83 L.Ed.2d 505 (1984)(finding inconsistent verdict, vacating jury award and ordering a new trial).

The standard for ordering a new trial is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a) by which it is determined that this Court

may set aside a jury's verdict and order a new trial only if the verdict is against the demonstrable weight of the credible evidence or results in a blatant miscarriage of justice. Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1994).

B. Analysis

The jury in the instant case returned a verdict in which it found that DeCelles had falsely imprisoned Jonielunas and that the City maintained a custom or policy that violated the right of Jonielunas to be free from arrest except based upon probable cause.

1) False Imprisonment Claim Against DeCelles

To sustain a claim for false imprisonment in Massachusetts, a plaintiff must demonstrate an intentional and unlawful confinement of a person, either directly or indirectly, of which the person confined is conscious or is harmed by such confinement. Noel v. Town of Plymouth, 895 F.Supp. 346, 354 (D.Mass.1995)(internal citations omitted). In Noel, the determination of whether a false imprisonment occurred hinged on whether a false arrest occurred. See id.

Under Massachusetts common law, in order for an arrest to be lawful, a police officer must have "reasonable grounds" for making the arrest. See Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 383 (1st Cir.1989); Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc., 359 Mass. 319, 323-26, 268 N.E.2d 860, 862-64 (1971). "The requirement of reasonable grounds has been held to be substantially overlapping with the constitutional requirement of probable cause." Santiago, 891 F.2d at 383, citing Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 205-06; Coblyn, 359 Mass. at 323-26, 268 N.E.2d at 862-64. Thus, a police officer may be liable for false imprisonment where, either directly or indirectly, he causes the false arrest of a putative tort claimant.

In the instant case, Officer DeCelles's involvement in the arrest of Jonielunas...