Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hosp.
| Citation | 984 S.W.2d 593 |
| Parties | Martha P. JORDAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Mary Sue Douglas, Deceased, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. BAPTIST THREE RIVERS HOSPITAL, Mark W. Anderson, M.D., Noel Dominguez, M.D., and Patrick J. Murphy, M.D., Defendants/Appellees. |
| Decision Date | 25 January 1999 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
David Randolph Smith, Robert Blake Menzel, Nashville, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Gayle Malone, Jr., Kathryn J. Ladd, Kara E. Shea Nashville, for Defendant/Appellee, Baptist Three Rivers Hospital.
Dan L. Nolan, Suzanne M. Pearson, Clarksville, for Defendant/Appellee, Mark W. Anderson, M.D.
Thomas F. Rainey, Jackson, for Defendant/Appellee, Noel Dominguez, M.D.
Robert E. Hoen, John R. Callcott, Nashville, for Defendant/Appellee, Patrick J. Murphy, M.D.
H. Naill Falls, Jr., James B. Johnson, Nashville, for Amicus Curiae, Steffone McClendon.
John A. Day, Donald Capparella, Nashville Steven W. Terry, Morristown, for Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association.
We granted this appeal to determine whether spousal and parental consortium losses should be permissible in wrongful death actions. Tennessee law previously permitted the anomalous result of allowing spousal consortium losses in personal injury cases but not in cases of wrongful death. Upon review of the modern trend of authority and careful scrutiny of our statutory scheme, we hold that loss of consortium claims should not be limited to personal injury suits. We hold that the pecuniary value of a deceased's life includes the element of damages commonly referred to as loss of consortium.
This cause of action arises out of the death of Mary Sue Douglas ("decedent"). The plaintiff, Martha P. Jordan, is a surviving child of the decedent and the administratrix of the decedent's estate. The plaintiff, on behalf of the decedent's estate, filed a medical malpractice action against the defendants, Baptist Three Rivers Hospital, Mark W. Anderson, M.D., Noel Dominguez, M.D., and Patrick Murphy, M.D. The plaintiff has alleged that the defendants' negligence caused the decedent's death.
The plaintiff's complaint sought damages for loss of consortium and for the decedent's loss of enjoyment of life or hedonic damages. The defendants filed a motion to strike and a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting that Tennessee law does not permit recovery for loss of parental consortium and for hedonic damages.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike and granted the plaintiff permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff's application for appellate review was untimely. Nevertheless, the appellate court "reviewed the plaintiff's application and the responses of the defendants and [found] that this [was] not an appropriate case for an interlocutory appeal." The plaintiff's application for an interlocutory appeal was denied. We granted appeal 1 to determine whether claims for loss of spousal and parental consortium in wrongful death cases are viable in Tennessee under Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-113. 2 We express no opinion as to whether the loss of parental consortium may be recovered in personal injury actions in which the parent or parents survive. That issue will be addressed in an appropriate case.
A wrongful death cause of action did not exist at common law. See Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Denying a Common-Law Recovery for Wrongful Death, 61 A.L.R.3d 906 (1975). Pursuant to the common law, actions for personal injuries that resulted in death terminated at the victim's death because "in a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984) ("Prosser "). "The [legal] result was that it was cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him, and that the most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of the victim ... without a remedy." Id. This rule of non-liability for wrongful death was previously the prevailing view in both England and in the United States. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co. v. Lilly, 90 Tenn. 563, 18 S.W. 243, 244 (Tenn 1891); Hall v. Nashville & C.R. Co., 1 Shan. 141 (Tenn.1859).
In 1846, the British Parliament enacted a wrongful death statute designed to abrogate the common law rule's harsh effect of denying recovery for personal injuries resulting in death. The English statute was referred to as "Lord Campbell's Act" and created a cause of action for designated survivors that accrued upon the tort victim's death. See Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 Stan. L.Rev. 1043, 1051 (1965); Prosser, § 127, at 945.
Jurisdictions in the United States were quick to follow England's lead. Id. In 1847, New York became the first American jurisdiction to enact a wrongful death statute. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death and Injury, § 1:9 (3d ed.1992). Presently, every jurisdiction in the United States has a wrongful death statute. Id.; see also Prosser, § 127, at 945. These statutes, including that of Tennessee, embody the substantive provisions of Lord Campbell's Act and permit designated beneficiaries to recover losses sustained as a result of the tort victim's death. Dixie Ohio Exp. Co. v. Butler, 179 Tenn. 358, 166 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tenn.1942); East Tennessee, 18 S.W. at 244.
Tennessee was one of the earliest states to abrogate judicially "[t]he artificial rule of the common law that every right of action for personal injury died with the person injured." East Tennessee, 18 S.W. at 244. As early as 1836, the Tennessee legislature enacted a statute providing for the survival of all civil actions for which suit had been commenced prior to the victim's death. 3 In 1850, our legislature made its initial attempt to permit recovery in wrongful death cases. The legislation permitted a recovery for wrongful death by enacting legislation that permitted a personal representative to bring an action on behalf of a widow or next of kin for the wrongful death of the victim regardless of whether suit had been commenced prior to the death. 4 This statute underwent revisions in 1851 5 and 1877 6 which moved the law closer to its present form. Thus, prior to 1850, Tennessee adhered to the common law rule that, upon the death of the victim, no cause of action for damages could be brought by the estate of the deceased for the benefit of third parties, such as family members, who sustained losses as a result of the death. See Daniel v. East Tenn. Coal Co., 105 Tenn. 470, 58 S.W. 859, 860 (Tenn.1900); Chambers v. Porter, 45 Tenn. 273, 276 (1868).
After more than a century of piecemeal revision by the legislature and interpretation by the courts, Tennessee's modern wrongful death law has taken shape. See generally, T.A. Smedley, Wrongful Death Actions in Tennessee, 27 Tenn. L.Rev. 447 (1960). Our present wrongful death statutes are substantially similar to the early codifications abandoning the rule of non-liability for wrongful death.
Specifically, Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-102, the direct descendent of the 1836 statute, provides that
[n]o civil action commenced, whether founded on wrongs or contracts, except actions for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff, shall abate by the death of either party ...; nor shall any right of action arising hereafter based on the wrongful act or omission of another, except actions for wrongs affecting the character, be abated by the death of the party wronged; but the right of action shall pass in like manner as [described in Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-106].
Moreover, Tenn Code Ann. § 20-5-106, the modern version of the 1877 statute, provides in part:
The right of action which a person, who dies from injuries received from another, or whose death is caused by the wrongful act, omission, or killing by another, would have had against the wrongdoer, in case death had not been ensued, shall not abate or be extinguished by the person's death but shall pass to the person's surviving spouse and, in case there is no surviving spouse, to the person's children or next of kin; or to the person's personal representative, for the benefit of the person's surviving spouse or next of kin.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a). Thus, an examination of the development of Tennessee's wrongful death law, from its inception to the present, establishes that the right of recovery in a wrongful death case is strictly a creation of statute. See Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221, 222-23 (Tenn.1958); Jamison v. Memphis Transit Management Co., 381 F.2d 670, 673 (6th Cir.1967).
Because a cause of action for wrongful death is a creation of statute, recoverable damages must be determined by reference to the particular statute involved. Although all states have abolished the rule of non-liability when personal injury results in death, the statutory methods of doing so fall into two distinct categories--wrongful death statutes and survival statutes. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 575 n. 2, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974).
The majority of states have enacted "survival statutes." These statutes permit the victim's cause of action to survive the death, so that the victim, through the victim's estate, recovers damages that would have been recovered by the victim had the victim survived. Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 575 n. 2, 94 S.Ct. 806; Recovery for Wrongful Death at § 1:15; Prosser, § 126, at 942-43. Survival statutes do not create a new cause of action; rather, the cause of action vested in the victim at the time of death is transferred to the person designated in the statutory scheme to pursue it, and the action is enlarged to include damages for the death itself. Prosser, § 126, at 942-43. "[T]he recovery is the same one the decedent would have been entitled to at death, and thus included such items as wages lost after injury and...
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