Jordan v. Dep't of Corrs.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:22-cv-701 (CSH) |
| Decision Date | 13 March 2023 |
| Parties | VICTOR LAMOND JORDAN, SR., Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; ROLLIN COOK, COMMISSIONER; ANGEL QUIROS, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER; GIULIANA MUDANO, WARDEN; ROGER BOWLES, WARDEN; SOLOMON BAYMON, DEPUTY WARDEN; GREGORIO ROBLES, UNIT MANAGER; DARREN CHEVALIER, UNIT MANAGER; BLACKSTOCK, CAPTAIN; JACKSON, CAPTAIN; BETANCES, LIEUTENANT; LEONE, OFFICER; FRAYNE, DR.; SCOTT MUELLER, DR.; DAVID MAIGA, DIRECTOR OF POPULATION MANAGEMENT; JOHN DOE 1, LIEUTENANT; JOHN DOE 2, OFFICER; JOHN DOE 3, OFFICER; JOHN DOE 4, OFFICER; JOHN DOE 5, OFFICER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER RE: SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
In this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pro se plaintiff, Victor Lamond Jordan, Sr., alleges unconstitutional conditions of his confinement at Northern Correctional Institution, where he was previously housed.[1] Most recently, he filed a Second Amended Complaint in response to an order [Doc. 13] by Judge Covello who presided over the case until the end of September 2022. In that “Ruling and Order,” Judge Covello dismissed the Complaint for “failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,” but granted leave to amend “within thirty days from the date of [the] order.” Doc. 13, at 27-28.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff now sues the Department of Correction, and nineteen individual defendants, including: former Commissioner Rollin Cook; Deputy Commissioner Angel Quiros;[2]Giuliana Mudano, Warden of Northern (May to September 2019); Roger Bowles, Warden of Northern (October 2019); Solomon Baymon, Deputy Warden of Northern (May 2019); David Maiga, Director of Population Management; Gregorio Robles, Unit Manager of 1 West Unit at Northern; Captain Jackson, Administrative Captain of Intelligence and Investigations at Northern; Darren Chevalier, Unit Manager of 1 West Unit, Restrictive Housing at Northern (October 21, 2019); Captain Blackstock, Unit Manager of 1 West Unit, Restrictive Housing at Northern (July 22, 2020); Dr. Scott Mueller; Dr. Frayne, Mental Health Supervisor (2019); Lieutenant Betances; Correctional Officer Leone; Lieutenant John Doe 1, Correctional Officer on third shift (May 31, 2019); John Does 2 and 3, Correctional Officers on third shift (May 31, 2019); and John Does 4 and 5, Correctional Officers on first shift (June 3, 2019). Doc. 14, at ¶¶ 114-36. Defendants Cook, Mueller, Frayne, and John Does 2-5 are sued in their individual capacities for damages - compensatory, punitive, and nominal. Id. ¶¶ 118, 128-29, 133-36. All other individual defendants are sued in both their individual and official capacities for damages and injunctive and/or declaratory relief.[3]Id. ¶¶ 119-27, 130-32.
In a separate Ruling [Doc. 24], familiarity with which is assumed, the Court granted Plaintiff conditional leave to file the Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 14], which is the subject of this Ruling.[4] With respect to his particular claims in the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges violation of his Eighth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). In his discussion of the parties, as described above, Plaintiff states that he seeks damages and injunctive relief, but includes no “prayer for relief” to specify either the amounts or forms of relief he seeks to recover.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a prisoner's civil complaint seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee and dismiss any portion that “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the Complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This plausibility standard is not a “probability requirement” but imposes a standard higher than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir. 2000). However, the Court is “not bound to accept conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” Faber, 648 F.3d at 104 (quoting Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008)). Moreover, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Consequently, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Ultimately, “determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense.” Id. at 663-64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Dismissal of the complaint is only appropriate if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 597 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). “This rule applies with particular force where the plaintiff alleges civil rights violations or where the complaint is submitted pro se.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998).
With respect to pro se litigants, it is well-established that “[p]ro se submissions are reviewed with special solicitude, and ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 706 Fed.Appx. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) () (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
This liberal approach, however, does not exempt pro se litigants from the minimum pleading requirements described above: a pro se complaint still must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Mancuso v. Hynes, 379 Fed.Appx. 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Therefore, even in a pro se case, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may not “invent factual allegations” that the plaintiff has not pled. Id.
The facts recounted herein are alleged in the Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 14]. For purposes of this review, these facts are accepted as true and all inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Faber, 648 F.3d at 104; Cruz, 202 F.3d at 596.
This action concerns Plaintiff's solitary confinement in Administrative Segregation at Northern Correctional Institution (“Northern”) in 2019 and 2020. Plaintiff was transferred to Northern in 2019, following an incident at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution (“MacDougall”) on May 30, 2019, when Plaintiff refused to leave his cell. That incident is the subject of another lawsuit pending in this District, Jordan v. Gifford, No. 3:19-cv-1628 (CSH). The day after the MacDougall incident, Plaintiff was transferred to Northern.
Upon his arrival at Northern, Lieutenant Doe and two Officers Doe escorted Plaintiff to the medical unit. Doc. 14 (“Second Amended Complaint”), ¶¶ 25-26. A nurse checked him but did not treat his visible injuries, namely a “gash” on his right wrist caused by officers applying pressure to his handcuffs at MacDougall. Id. ¶ 26. Lieutenant Doe told Plaintiff that he would not receive treatment because he had assaulted correctional officers. Id. The nurse dismissed the gash as “nothing” and instructed Plaintiff to “stop complaining.” Id. Plaintiff was allowed “to cleanse and attempt to decontaminate himself” in a medical cell but he did not receive hygiene items to clean the chemical agent that had been sprayed on him in the MacDougall incident. Id. He alleges he suffered “psychological torment” and “physical pain” from the remnants of chemical spray. Id. ¶ 27. According to Plaintiff, whenever he perspired, the chemical would reactivate. Id. ¶ 31. Seeking relief from his suffering, he allegedly informed Dr. Mueller and Nurse Kelham that the chemical agent was “in his beard and hair on his genitals,” but “neither one did anything to help” him. Id.
On May 31, 2019, Plaintiff saw Dr. Mueller to discuss his mental health issues. Id. ¶ 28. However, rather than providing Plaintiff with the relief he sought, Mueller allegedly interrogated Plaintiff in a manner to get him to say things favorable to the...
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