Jordan v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 October 1961
• Docket Number: No. 3864,3864
• Citation: 353 S.W.2d 256
• Parties: James J. JORDAN, Appellant, v. NEW AMSTERDAM CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 256

353 S.W.2d 256

James J. JORDAN, Appellant, v. NEW AMSTERDAM CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 3864.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Waco.

Oct. 5, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1962.

John H. Holloway, Houston, for appellant.

Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates & Jaworski, Jerry V. Walker, Houston, for appellee.

McDONALD, Chief Justice.

This is a compensation case. Parties will be referred to as in the Trial Court. Plaintiff alleged he fell on concrete and sustained injuries to back, legs, nerves, and body in general, and that such injuries resulted in total permanent disability. Trial was to a jury which, in answer to Special Issues found that plaintiff sustained injury on 12 September 1957 which produced total incapacity for 55 weeks (from 12 September 1957 to 1 October 1958), and partial incapacity for 75 additional weeks (from 1 October 1958 to 9 March 1960).

Plaintiff appeals on 9 points, the principal contentions of which are:

1) The finding that plaintiff's incapacity would terminate 75 weeks after 1 October 1958 is supported by no evidence, and/or insufficient evidence, and/or is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

2) The Trial Court erred in overruling Motion for New Trial based on jury misconduct.

3) The Trial Court erred in overruling Motion for New Trial based on prejudicial jury argument of defendant's counsel.

4) The Trial Court erred in permitting defendant to exhibit motion pictures of plaintiff's activities made without his knowledge.

5) The Trial Court erred in permitting defendant's witness, Dr. Price, to testify to the jury that plaintiff was 'medically' a man 65 years of age.

6) The Trial Court abused its discretion in denying a new trial on the ground of material 'newly discovered evidence' of additional surgery performed on plaintiff after the trial of the case but before Motion for New Trial was acted on.

We revert to plaintiff's 1st contention that the finding that plaintiff's incapacity would terminate 75 weeks after 1 October 1958 is supported by no evidence or insufficient evidence. Plaintiff fell on concrete while working at a filling station sustaining back and body injuries. His doctor, Dr. Knight, diagnosed a ruptured disc between the 4th and 5th lumber vertebrae. Plaintiff underwent surgery for a correction of this condition. Plaintiff and Dr. Knight testified in effect that plaintiff was totally and permanently incapacitated. Dr. Price, the defendant's doctor, testified in effect that plaintiff was not totally and permanently incapacitated; that he had some problems which he described as arthritic changes caused by 'wear and tear'; that there was nothing to indicate plaintiff could not do normal activities for a man of his age; and that in his opinion, plaintiff could do work in a filling station. At the time of trial, plaintiff was working as delivery man for a pharmacy. The jury awarded plaintiff 55 weeks of total incapacity, followed by 75 weeks of partial incapacity. We think that there is evidence to support the jury's finding, and that same is ample under the rule of In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660.

Plaintiff's 2nd contention complains of alleged jury misconduct. Plaintiff contends that while the jury was deliberating the case, several jurors related certain personal experiences with back injuries, and the duties which could be performed by one who had sustained a back injury. The record reflects that the jurors differed as to whether the alleged experiences in fact were related by various jurors. The Trial Court overruled Motion for New Trial, thereby impliedly finding that the alleged misconduct did not occur. We further conclude that the alleged misconduct, if it did occur, was not material and could not reasonably have resulted in any injury to plaintiff. In order to grant a new trial for jury misconduct: 1) such misconduct must be proved; 2) such must be material; 3) it must reasonably appear that probable injury resulted to the complaining party. Rule 327 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Crawford v. Detering Co., 150 Tex. 140, 237 S.W.2d 615; Baird's Bread Co. v. Hearn, 157 Tex. 159, 300 S.W.2d 646.

The record fails to reflect that the offending statements actually occurred, or that any juror was influenced by same, if they did occur. The burden to show probable prejudice has not been met. See also Rule 434 T.R.C.P. Plaintiff's 3rd contention is that defendant's counsel made improper argument to the jury. The record reflects that plaintiff went to a Dr. Seducia and to a Dr. DeYoung. These doctors were not called to testify by plaintiff. Defendant's counsel argued substantially to the jury: 'Where is Dr. Seducia and Dr. DeYoung'; 'I think that we can assume that if Dr. Seducia and Dr. DeYoung thought plaintiff had anything wrong with him, they would be here to tell you about it.' Plaintiff objected to the foregoing argument as prejudicial and inflammatory. The Trial Court overruled such objection.

Before a judgment is reversed because of the argument of counsel, two things must appear: 1) the argument is improper, 2) it must be such as to satisfy the reviewing court that it was reasonably calculated to and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case. 'Probably' means, 'having more evidence for than against; supported by evidence which inclines the mind to believe, but leases some room for doubt; likely.' Aultman v. Dallas Ry. & Term. Co., 152 Tex. 509, 260 S.W.2d 596, 600; Rainey v. McMillian, Tex.Civ.App., 271 S.W.2d 103, W/E Dis'd; Lantex Const. Co. v. Lejsal, Tex.Civ.App., 315 S.W.2d 177, W/E Ref. n. r. e.; Lumbermen's Lloyds v. Loper, 153 Tex. 404, 269 S.W.2d 367; Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. A. v. Carrell, Tex.Civ.App., 318 S.W.2d 744, W/E Ref., n. r. e.; Langford v. Pearson, Tex.Civ.App., 334 S.W.2d 473, W/E Ref. n. r. e.; Rules 434 and 503 T.R.C.P. Applying the foregoing rules to the argument of counsel, as well as to the record as a whole, we conclude that the argument, if improper, was harmless, and that the jury would have in all probability entered the same verdict that was rendered, whatever the argument of counsel

Plaintiff's 4th contention is that the Trial Court erred in permitting the defendant to exhibit to the jury motion pictures of plaintiff's activities, made without plaintiff's knowledge.

Defendant's witness who displayed and took the pictures, testified that he had seen both the pictures and the transactions which they portrayed and that the pictures accurately and correctly reflected what he had seen. The pictures merely showed plaintiff going about his duties delivering parcels for the pharmacy for which he worked, and which he himself testified about. The evidence was admissible. Further, the Trial Judge has considerable discretion in admitting or excluding photographic evidence. City of Ft. Worth v. Barlow, Tex.Civ.App., 313 S.W.2d 906. The trial Judge in the instant case did not abuse his discretion.

Plaintiff's 5th contention complains of the witness Dr. Price testifying that in his opinion plaintiff was 'medically' a man 65 years of age. Plaintiff's true age was 50. Dr. Price testified that his disabilities were due to 'wear and tear'. He amplified this by stating that the plaintiff's physical condition or age 'medically', was some 10 or 15 years older than his actual age. The record is clear that this testimony did not mislead the jury as to plaintiff's actual age, and that all concerned understood that Dr. Price was merely testifying as to plaintiff's physical condition. Such is admissible. Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Cost, 132 Tex. 299, 123 S.W.2d 332.

Plaintiff's 6th contention is that plaintiff should have a new trial because of 'material newly discovered evidence.'

The instant case was tried during the week of 15 October 1959. Judgment was not actually entered in the case until 25 July 1960. On 22 August 1960, plaintiff filed Amended Motion for New Trial setting up, among other things, that subsequent to the trial, plaintiff was first examined by Dr. Brelsford, who found evidence indicating a need for surgery; that on 16 August 1960 a myelogram confirmed a complete block of the spinal canal at the level of the L-4 lumbar disc interspace; that Doctors Brelsford and Robertson, on 18 August 1960, operated on his disc in a 'second back operation'. Plaintiff contends that the 75 weeks' partial incapacity terminated on 9 March, 1960, and that the second back operation and the necessity therefor conclusively established that his 'temporary incapacity'...