Rivera v. Dep't of Justice
| Decision Date | 28 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12-0168 (RLW) |
| Parties | GUILLERMO RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM OPINION
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTERS
This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.
In the Northern District of Illinois, Guillermo Rivera ("plaintiff") "pleaded guilty to four counts of bank robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and was sentenced to a total of 104 months' imprisonment." United States v. Rivera, 338 F. App'x. 532, 533 (7th Cir. 2009).2 He is serving his sentence in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). See Civil Complaint("Compl.") at 2 ().3 He brings this action against the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the BOP alleging that he has been "the victim of many civil rights violations while in custody, at the hands of a rogue Warden, who is permitted to operate outside of the law," with respect to prisoners at the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana ("USP Terre Haute").4 Id.
Plaintiff allegedly was "blackballed and denied employment in every department of the prison," id. at 5, and was denied "freedom of religious expression" when staff "confiscated [his] crucifix[,] . . . Bible and other religious study guides." Id. His civil rights allegedly were further violated when staff confiscated legal materials and denied him access to the law library while plaintiff was involved in legal proceedings in an Indiana state court and a post-conviction challenge to his sentences then pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.5 Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff also alleges that he was the victim of racism, in that prisoners at USP Terre Haute are assigned cells based on race such that "Whites must be housed with Whites . . . Blacks must be housed with Blacks . . . Hispanics with Hispanics etc." Id. at 6. While being escorted from a local hospital back to prison in July 2011, he was allowed to fall, "causing injury to his back, neck, and shoulder," that he "[h]as been made to wear the same Dirty Clothing[] for weeks at a time" and that he "has gone without clean linens for a month or longer." Id. at 7. Healso "has been kept in special housing as punishment for filing grievances," and the BOP "has had his grievances stalled over and over again, in an effort to discourage or confuse" him. Id. at 8. For these alleged harms, "[p]laintiff seeks damages in the amount of[] $15,000,000.00 (Fifteen Million Dollars) for mental and emotional duress, suffering and pain, for negligence and discrimination, inflicted upon his pe[r]son, while in the custody of the [DOJ] and the [BOP]." 6 Id. at 9. He also "demands an immediate release from custody." Id.
The Court construes the complaint as one bringing constitutional tort claims against the United States demanding monetary damages for violations of the United States Constitution by BOP officials or employees. See Scurlock v. Lappin, 870 F. Supp. 2d 116, 119 (D.D.C. 2012) ().7 Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue, and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See generally Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ( ) at 5-15.8
Subject matter jurisdiction is a requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution and by federal statute. See Wilson v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2011). It is the plaintiff's burden to establish that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations of the complaint as true, and it "may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction." Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff identifies two defendants to this action -- the DOJ and the BOP -- and he relies solely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis for this Court's jurisdiction.9 See Compl. (preprinted form) at 1. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that sovereign immunitybars plaintiff's civil rights claims under § 1983 for monetary damages against these federal entities. See Defs.' Mem. at 5, 11-12.
"It is elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . , and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (). "To sustain a claim that the Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims." Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citation omitted).
In his opposition, plaintiff barely mentions sovereign immunity, and instead argues that qualified immunity should not bar his claims. See Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 10-11. He contends that court review of "conduct by prison officials under specific constitutional provisions such as the Eighth Amendment . . . or general principles stemming from the Due Process Clause" is available under § 1983. Id. at 10. A government official or employee sued in his individual capacity "may, depending on his position, be able to assert personal immunity defenses," Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), such as qualified immunity, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). When that official or employee is sued in his official capacity, or, as in this case, if a government entity is the defendant, a qualified immunity defense is unavailable. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 167.
Plaintiff identifies no provision by which the United States has waived its immunity with respect to constitutional tort claims. Section 1983 does not apply to federal actors, Settles v. U.S.Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and "[d]efendants argue correctly that the United States has not consented to be sued for monetary damages based on a constitutional violation or, in other words, for a "'Bivens-type cause of action directly against a federal agency.'" Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486). Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims for money damages against the DOJ and the BOP. These claims therefore must be dismissed. See, e.g., Jordan v. Quander, 882 F. Supp. 2d 88, 97 (D.D.C. 2012); Bourdon v. Mabus, 813 F. Supp. 2d 200, 209 (D.D.C. 2011).
Plaintiff alleges that staff at USP Terre Haute confiscated his crucifix, Bible, and religious study guides. Compl. at 5. Insofar as plaintiff demands monetary compensation from the United States for these actions, he must proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), which waives the federal government's sovereign immunity, see United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 158 (1963) (), and renders "[t]he United States . . . liable . . . relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a privateindividual under like circumstances . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. There are limitations under and exceptions to the FTCA, however, which militate dismissal of plaintiff's claim.
First, there is an exhaustion requirement:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). "The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies," and plaintiff's apparent "fail[ure] to heed that clear statutory command" warrants dismissal of this claim. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); see Henderson v. Ratner, No. 10-5035, 2010 WL 2574175, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2010) (per curiam) (); Hammond v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 740 F. Supp. 2d 105, 111 (D.D.C. 2010) ().
Excluded from the FTCA is "[a]ny claim arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). "Section 2680(c) forecloses lawsuits against the United States for the unlawful detention of property by 'any,' not just 'some," law...
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