Jordan v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 07 December 1951 |
| Citation | 237 P.2d 1005,108 Cal.App.2d 91 |
| Parties | JORDAN et al. v. REYNOLDS et al. Civ. 7988. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Preston & Falk, Ukiah, for appellants.
Spurr & Brunner, by John Lawrence, Ukiah, for respondents.
This is the second appeal in a controversy concerning a sawmill located in Mendocino County. In the first appeal, 97 Cal.App.2d 194, 217 P.2d 66, this court reversed a judgment in favor of defendants, the action being for damages for eviction from the sawmill and for conversion of logs, and remanded the cause for further proceedings. We upheld the finding of the trial court that the agreement between the parties was one for the conditional sale of the sawmill by respondent Reynolds to appellants, but we held that the findings as a whole were inconclusive on the question of whether Reynolds was entitled to repossess the sawmill.
Upon the cause being remanded the parties stipulated that the matter could be resubmitted to the trial court upon the evidence theretofore taken. No additional evidence was offered by either party. The trial court again rendered judgment for defendants upon findings that the parties entered into certain agreements, see Jordan v. Reynolds, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d at page 196, 217 P.2d 66, under which it was agreed that appellants could remove the sawmill from the land where it stood any time after payment to Reynolds of $5,000; that appellants agreed to treat the sawmill as personal property, and that said agreements constituted a conditional sale of said personal property; that appellants agreed to pay Reynolds at the rate of $1.50 per thousand board feet of lumber cut by the mill in a period not to exceed five years; that appellants agreed to commence operating the mill and to operate it continuously in a workmanlike manner at its full rate of productivity except when prevented by bad weather, and if so prevented by bad weather for a period of thirty days to make a minimum payment of $25 per month during such period of idleness; that the following obligations of appellants were conditions precedent to respondents' obligation to permit them to occupy the said premises; that time was of the essence of the said contract; that appellants entered into possession of the mill in October, 1944, and thereafter operated it for approximately three weeks; that after December, 1944, the mill was not operated by plaintiffs or for their account in a continuous, profitable or workmanlike manner, and was idle for substantially the entire period between December, 1944, and September, 1945; that on September 2, 1945, Reynolds served notice on appellants that their rights in the sawmill would terminate in thirty days; that on October 25, Reynolds peaceably took possession of the sawmill, it previously having been abandoned by appellants, and thereafter sold it for $4,000; that appellants' activities in connection with the operation of the sawmill were not substantial compliance with the contract, and appellants were in substantial, unexcused and wilful breach thereof; that from the date of said contract appellants have paid Reynolds only $312.23, and tendered an additional $175, which tender was refused by Reynolds; that appellants have never tendered adequate compensation for their breaches of the contract or offered to perform; that respondents fully performed all their duties and obligations under the contract; that the $7,000 expended by plaintiffs in making changes in the sawmill were detrimental thereto and the market value of the sawmill was reduced by reason of said changes; that appellants suffered no loss by reason of Reynolds' repossession of the mill; that 256,685 feet of logs owned by appellants, and situated on the sawmill premises were abandoned by them, and were not converted by respondents, and that at the time of the alleged conversion were deteriorated in quality, unmarketable, and...
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