Jordan v. Shands, Record No. 971316.

• Decision Date: 17 April 1998
• Docket Number: Record No. 971316.
• Citation: 500 S.E.2d 215,255 Va. 492
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Gwendolyn L. JORDAN v. Samuel SHANDS, et al.

500 S.E.2d 215

255 Va. 492

Gwendolyn L. JORDAN v. Samuel SHANDS, et al.

Record No. 971316.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

April 17, 1998.

Martha L. Bond (James T. Edmunds; McEachin & Gee, on briefs), Richmond, for appellant.

William Joe Hoppe, Richmond, for appellees Jerry Oliver and Cecil Richardson.

Robert B. Delano, Jr. (Henry C. Spalding, III; Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, on brief), Richmond, for appellees Samuel Shands and C.V. Townsend.

Present: All the Justices.

HASSELL, Justice.

I.

Gwendolyn L. Jordan filed her amended motion for judgment against Samuel Shands, Jerry Oliver, D.L. Wright, Cecil Richardson, C.V. Townsend, John Doe, and Mary Doe. The plaintiff alleged the following facts.

On June 21, 1995, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident in Richmond. Wright, a City of Richmond police officer, investigated the accident. The plaintiff sustained injuries during the accident, and she was transported by an ambulance to a hospital.

After the plaintiff arrived at the hospital, a nurse informed a physician, in the plaintiff's presence, that the plaintiff "was wanted and would be picked up by the Richmond Police Department." Subsequently, Richardson, a police officer employed by the City of Richmond, arrived at the hospital and arrested the plaintiff "on information about an outstanding capias" issued by the Dinwiddie County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. The plaintiff asked Richardson why the capias had been issued, and he responded that "he wasn't sure." The plaintiff informed Richardson that "he was making a mistake." The plaintiff was escorted from the hospital and taken to a police station in a "paddy wagon." Subsequently, she was transported to the Richmond City Jail.

When Richardson attempted to place the plaintiff in the custody of the jail, the jail personnel refused to accept custody because Richardson did not have a warrant. "Richardson produced a paper described as a `hit' and the jail personnel contacted the Dinwiddie Sheriff's office and asked that [it submit a facsimile of] the warrant to [the Richmond City Jail]."

When the Richmond police received the warrant, it contained "information from Jordan's driver's license inserted in a warrant issued for Gwendolyn M. Jordan, [and identified her address as] 231-B S. Jefferson Street, Petersburg, Virginia 23803." The plaintiff's address is Route 1, Box 128-C, Blackstone, Virginia 23824. According to the plaintiff's allegations, a "simple examination of her driver's license should have alerted Richardson to the fact that he had arrested the wrong person...." The plaintiff was "searched, fingerprinted and her personal belongings were taken." After being detained for about four hours, the plaintiff was finally released in the custody of her aunt.

Upon her release from jail, the plaintiff was told to report to the Dinwiddie County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on July 11, 1995. She later received a letter commanding her appearance on that date. When she appeared in the Dinwiddie County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the plaintiff was informed that Gwendolyn M. Jordan did not have a social security number and that the Richmond police personnel had placed the plaintiff's social security number on the warrant. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court judge apologized to the plaintiff and dismissed the charges against her.

The plaintiff filed her motion for judgment on June 27, 1996. She alleged, among other things, that Townsend placed the incorrect information on the warrant issued for her arrest and that he was acting within the course and scope of his employment with Shands, Sheriff of Dinwiddie County. She also alleged that Wright and Richardson were acting within the course and scope of their employment with Jerry Oliver, Chief of the Richmond Police.

The plaintiff further alleged that Richardson falsely imprisoned her "without any sufficient legal excuse" and that he made defamatory statements about her. She alleged that Townsend intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her by entering her personal and confidential data on a warrant that he knew, or should have known, was intended for another person. She alleged that Wright intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her by transferring her personal and confidential data from her driver's license to Townsend, when Wright knew or should have known that the plaintiff was not Gwendolyn M. Jordan and that this information would be affixed to a warrant that would be the basis of a false arrest and imprisonment.

The defendants filed responsive pleadings, including special pleas of the statute of limitations and demurrers. The defendants asserted in their special pleas that the plaintiff's causes of action for false imprisonment and defamation were barred by Code § 8.01-248 which, at the time the plaintiff's cause of action accrued, contained a one-year statute of limitations.¹ The defendants also filed a demurrer asserting, among other things, that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

The trial court considered memoranda and argument of counsel and entered an order dismissing plaintiff's alleged causes of action for false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation because those claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-248. The court also stated in its judgment order that even though the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against Chief Oliver or Sheriff Shands, the court would not rule on this issue since its rulings on the statute of limitations were dispositive of this proceeding.

The plaintiff appeals the judgment, and Chief Oliver and Richardson assign cross-error to the trial court's failure to sustain their demurrers. The plaintiff does not, however, assign error to the trial court's judgment dismissing John Doe and Mary Doe.

II.

A.

Code § 8.01-243(A) states in relevant part:

"Unless otherwise provided in this section or by other statute, every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery ... shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues."

Code § 8.01-248, in effect when the plaintiff's cause of action arose, stated: "[e]very personal action, for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within one year after the right to bring such action has accrued."

Plaintiff argues that her cause of action for false imprisonment which is asserted against Richardson is an action for personal injuries and, thus, this claim is governed by the two-year statute of limitations. Richardson asserts that the plaintiff's claim is a "personal action" for which no limitation was prescribed and, thus, is governed by the one-year statute of limitations.

We agree with the plaintiff. We have defined false imprisonment as "the direct restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another without adequate legal justification." W.T. Grant Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 921, 141 S.E. 860, 865 (1928). We have also observed that "[f]alse imprisonment is a wrong akin to the wrongs of assault and battery, and consists in imposing by force or threats an unlawful restraint upon a man's freedom of locomotion." Id. (quoting Gillingham v. Ohio River Ry. Co., 35 W.Va. 588, 14 S.E. 243, 245 (1891)).

We are of opinion that the deprivation of an individual's freedom by physical restraint or the threat of such restraint is a tort committed against an individual's body because that individual's body is actually confined to an area and deprived of physical liberty. Accordingly, we hold that an action for false imprisonment is an action for personal injuries and, thus, subject to the two-year statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-243(A).

B.

Plaintiff concedes that her cause of action alleging defamation is governed by a one-year limitation period, but argues that the period did not commence to run on June...