Jordan v. State

• Decision Date: 12 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. A97A1978,A97A1978
• Citation: 230 Ga.App. 560,497 S.E.2d 48
• Parties: , 98 FCDR 874 JORDAN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 48

497 S.E.2d 48

230 Ga.App. 560, 98 FCDR 874

JORDAN v. The STATE.

No. A97A1978.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 12, 1998.

James D. Michael, Decatur, for appellant.

J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Sheila A. Conners, Robert M. Coker, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

BLACKBURN, Judge.

Daniel Jordan appeals his conviction of two counts of child molestation, contending that the trial court gave an overly broad jury instruction on the permissible uses of similar transaction evidence. He argues that the instruction was overbroad because it allowed such evidence to be considered for purposes not articulated by the State or the court during the admissibility hearing required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3(B) and Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).

The charges in the present case arose out of an incident in which Jordan masturbated in his car in front of a group of young girls on their way to school. ¹ At trial, the State sought to introduce evidence regarding a prior conviction for public indecency involving similar conduct. At the USCR 31.3(B) admissibility hearing, the State said it was offering the evidence to show the defendant's bent of mind, course of conduct, and lustful disposition. After concluding that the prior incident was nearly identical to the present charges, the court found that the evidence was admissible to show the defendant's lustful disposition, bent of mind, course of conduct, and method of operation.

When the evidence was introduced at trial, the court gave a limiting instruction, stating that the evidence was admitted for purposes of showing defendant's identity and state of mind. Jordan raised no objection to this instruction, although identity had not been mentioned at the USCR 31.3(B) hearing.

At the close of the case, the court charged the jury that the similar transaction evidence could be considered "for the limited purpose of showing, if it does, the identity of the perpetrator, the state of mind of the perpetrator, the knowledge or intent of the perpetrator, or the lustful disposition of the perpetrator." The court further charged that "you are strictly limited in your consideration of this evidence as to the identity, state of mind, lustful disposition, or course of conduct." Jordan's attorney did not raise any objections to the charge, but stated that he reserved objections until the motion for new trial or appeal. Jordan now contends that this charge was overbroad because it informed the jury that it could consider similar transaction evidence for purposes not articulated by the State or the court at the USCR 31.3(B) hearing. ² In particular, the charge included identity, intent, and knowledge as permissible purposes, although these were not articulated by the State or the court at the admissibility hearing.

Jordan's argument fails. "The essential purpose of conducting the Williams analysis [at the USCR 31.3(B) hearing] is to ensure that there exists a legitimate, probative purpose in introducing an independent criminal act and that there exists sufficient similarity to make the probativeness outweigh any prejudice as a consequence to injecting character into the case." McTaggart v. State, 225 Ga.App. 359, 364(2), 483 S.E.2d 898 (1997). Where the purposes set forth in the court's charge are legitimate, the fact that they vary somewhat from the purposes mentioned in the USCR 31.3(B) hearing does not necessarily render the charge erroneous. See McClain v. State, 220 Ga.App. 474, 477(5), 469 S.E.2d 756 (1996) ("Although there was a difference between the State's stated purpose and the court's instruction, each of the purposes espoused by both the State and the court were permissible"). See also McTaggart, supra ("when Williams has been complied with in a USCR 31.3(B) hearing, the trial court has made a determination of admissibility, and a limiting instruction specifies the legitimate purpose or purposes for which the jury may consider the prior similar crime, under such circumstances there is no error in a broader jury charge which encompasses multi-purposes"); Gardner v. State, 263 Ga. 197, 198(3), 429 S.E.2d 657 (1993) (State's failure to articulate purpose for which evidence offered is harmless where trial court subsequently instructs jury on legitimate purposes, indicating that court has made Williams determination that evidence is offered for legitimate purpose).

In this case, each of the additional purposes articulated by the trial court in its jury charge was a permissible purpose relevant to an issue in the case. The prior transaction was extremely similar to the charges in this case, occurring in the same neighborhood and involving children on the way to school. Identity was clearly an issue in this case, as it was contested by Jordan and as some of the alleged victims were unable to positively identify him as the perpetrator. One of the...