Jordan v. Vieira

• Decision Date: 20 April 2016
• Docket Number: H042257
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CAROL JORDAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANUEL A. VIEIRA, Defendant and Appellant.

CAROL JORDAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANUEL A. VIEIRA, Defendant and Appellant.

H042257

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

April 20, 2016

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV180954)

This appeal concerns a preliminary injunction that prohibits defendant and appellant Manuel Vieira (Defendant) from asserting a legal cause of action to have plaintiff and respondent Carol Jordan's (Plaintiff) mobilehome declared a nuisance under the Mobilehome Residency Law (MRL). The injunction also prohibits Defendant from interfering with the sale and occupancy of the mobilehome, which is located at Cabrillo Mobile Homes Estates (the Park) in the City of Capitola. The trial court issued the preliminary injunction after Plaintiff sought to enjoin any action by Defendant that would interfere with (1) her contractual rights in the purchase of the mobilehome and (2) her right to keep and occupy the mobilehome in the Park.

Defendant argues the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it enjoined his right to assert a legal cause of action under the MRL. He also argues the preliminary injunction is mandatory in nature because it alters the status quo between the parties, and that review of a mandatory injunction requires closer scrutiny. He urges this court to find the trial court abused its discretion when weighing the balance of harms to find in Plaintiff's favor.

Plaintiff agrees with Defendant that the assertion of a legal cause of action under the MRL may not be enjoined by a preliminary injunction. But Plaintiff otherwise argues the injunction is proper to maintain the status quo between the parties to prevent interference with her right to possession of the mobilehome in the Park until her claims are adjudicated at trial.

We agree that a preliminary injunction may not enjoin the assertion of a legal cause of action under the MRL. Accordingly, we will strike the language ", including the assertion of rights to have the manufactured home located at Space 29 of the Cabrillo Mobile Home Estates, 930 Rosedale Avenue, Capitola, California, declared a nuisance under California Civil Code § 798.87(b)," from the injunction.¹ With this modification, we find the injunction is prohibitory in nature, not mandatory, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the balance of harms between the parties. We will affirm the trial court's order granting the preliminary injunction as we have modified it.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PLAINTIFF'S PURCHASE OF A MOBILEHOME IN DEFENDANT'S PARK

Defendant is the owner of the Park. Plaintiff arranged to purchase a mobilehome located in the Park from nonparties Janine Turnage and Rowland Yorba (Sellers), along with an assignment of Sellers' 12-year lease.² Sellers submitted a resident's notice oftermination of tenancy. The notice stated Sellers' intent to sell the mobilehome to Plaintiff with the mobilehome to remain in the Park (hereafter, a "sale in place"). The form notice acknowledged that for a sale in place, Park management could require the right of prior approval of the proposed purchaser, and the sale or transfer agreement had to include a copy of a fully executed lease agreement. The notice further stated that the purchaser "shall not have any rights of tenancy" if the purchaser fails to execute a lease agreement.

In response to Sellers' notice of termination of tenancy and the application for tenancy by Plaintiff—which application is not in the record—Defendant's office manager sent a letter to Plaintiff dated October 29, 2014, approving Plaintiff's application for tenancy in the assigned space in the Park but advising "there are items that need to be completed, prior to the approval of the sale of the mobilehome." The office manager attached a letter from Defendant to Sellers, dated October 26, 2014, specifying sixteen repairs or improvements that "must be completed prior to the approval of the sale of your home." Sometime after approving Plaintiff's tenancy application, Defendant learned Plaintiff did not intend to live in the mobilehome. Instead, she intended to provide it as a home for a relative with physical disabilities.

Plaintiff alleges she asked the office manager whether title to the mobilehome could be transferred, and was advised by her that it could be transferred. Plaintiff then paid Sellers and, on November 6, 2014, obtained record title and registration to the mobilehome. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff began the repairs and improvements listed in the October 26 letter.

Defendant observed construction taking place at the mobilehome, and on November 12, 2014, Defendant's counsel sent Sellers a cease and desist letter. The letter noted the "unpermitted and unapproved ongoing construction" at the mobilehome anddemanded Sellers cease all construction and obtain required permits and approvals before starting construction or making modifications to the mobilehome. Defendant subsequently learned that Plaintiff had obtained record title to the mobilehome.

Defendant's counsel served a second cease and desist letter on November 14, 2014, designated as a seven-day notice pursuant to Civil Code section 798.56, which authorizes termination of a tenancy in a mobilehome park on specified grounds. The November 14 notice demanded that Sellers transfer title back into their name, obtain permits and authorization for construction, and complete all repairs and improvements listed in the October 26 letter. It gave Sellers seven days to remedy the violations or face termination of their tenancy. The letter also warned of potential liability for legal fees and indicated that pursuant to Civil Code section 798.87, subdivision (b), the "substantial violation of a Park rule shall be deemed a public nuisance."

Plaintiff contends that Defendant's counsel also contacted her and informed her that only Sellers could obtain permits and carry out repairs, that title needed to revert back to Sellers, and that Plaintiff had "no standing" with the Park. With the assistance of counsel, Plaintiff responded that she would assist Sellers in all aspects of compliance and would execute any documents necessary for her tenancy, including assumption of the balance of the twelve-year lease. She continued making repairs to the mobilehome. She later obtained a permit from the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) for work relating to the deck.

Defendant served another seven-day cease and desist notice on November 22, 2014, which restated the warnings and demands of the earlier notices and listed an additional violation for painting. Citing noncompliance with the prior notices, on December 19, 2014, Defendant served Sellers with a 60-day notice of termination of tenancy pursuant to section 798.56, subdivision (d). The termination notice required Sellers to vacate the Park premises within 60 days and to remove or sell the mobilehome.

Plaintiff eventually had the deck of the mobilehome inspected by HCD. HCD issued a permit noting its approval of the deck. The permit is dated January 14, 2015.

B. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff filed suit on January 27, 2015, before expiration of the 60-day notice period, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, and damages for interference with contract. By verified complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following facts. In September 2014, she contracted to purchase the mobilehome and lease assignment from Sellers, received conditional acceptance of her tenancy from the Park and verbal confirmation that title could be transferred, and based on that information, paid Sellers, obtained title, and tried to comply with the repairs and improvements specified by Defendant in a letter dated October 26, 2014. Defendant, however, imposed additional conditions beyond those of the October 26 letter and demanded payment of his legal fees. As of January 14, 2015, Plaintiff and Sellers had HCD inspect the deck and had notified Defendant that all required items listed in the October letter were complete. Defendant, however, disputed that the mobilehome was in compliance with all regulations set forth in Title 25 of the California Code of Regulations (Title 25), accused Sellers of delay, and argued that his attorney's fees had not been paid.

Plaintiff sought: (1) injunctive relief to prevent Defendant from continuing to add conditions precedent to completion of the mobilehome sale, and from taking steps to have the mobilehome deemed a nuisance under section 798.87; (2) declaratory relief that Plaintiff met all conditions in the October 26 letter, complied with Park rules, and was entitled to acceptance as a resident of the Park, legal owner of the mobilehome, and the responsible tenant of the leasehold through 2023; and (3) damages for interfering with and delaying completion of Plaintiff's contract with Sellers for sale of the mobilehome.

Plaintiff immediately obtained a temporary restraining order and order to show cause regarding the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff based her requested relief on Code of Civil Procedure section 526, subdivision (a)(3), which authorizes acourt to enjoin an act "during litigation, that a party . . . threatens, or is about to do, . . . in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual."

Defendant opposed the request. He argued that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate interference with a contractual right, since the Park never approved the sale or title transfer of the mobilehome, and that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate harm...