Jordan v. Whitted (In re Re)
| Decision Date | 12 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 76168-4-I,76168-4-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re: LORI J. JORDAN, Respondent, v. STEPHEN EARL WHITTED, Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SPEARMAN, J. — Lori Jordan brought an action against Stephen Whitted to enforce six years of unpaid child support pursuant to Georgia decree. After ruling that Lori properly registered the Georgia decree in Washington, the trial court found Stephen in contempt. Stephen appeals both orders, making a variety of arguments related to the statute of limitations, standard of review at a revision hearing, due process, substantial compliance with the registration statute, and error in entering the contempt order. We conclude that none of Whitted's arguments have merit and affirm.
FACTS
Lori Jordan and Stephen Whitted1 divorced in 2007 in Georgia. Their divorce decree required that Stephen pay $1,735.93 in monthly child support as well as provide medical and dental insurance for the couple's three children. Lori was to transfer $55,000 to Stephen from her retirement account. Stephen never provided medical and dental insurance, and stopped paying child support in October 2010. Lori never transferred the retirement funds.
In the meantime, Lori and the children moved to Washington and Stephen moved to Maryland. In 2016, Lori filed an action in Washington to enforce and modify the child support provisions of the Georgia decree. She sought to hold Stephen in contempt for failure to pay child support. Lori registered the foreign Georgia decree in Washington pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), chapter 26.27 RCW.
Stephen appeared telephonically and pro se at a contempt hearing on August 22, 2016. There, the commissioner raised whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute because Lori had registered the foreign decree under the UCCJEA, rather than the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), chapter 26.21A RCW. The commissioner denied without prejudice Lori's contempt motion, finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter because she failed to substantially comply with UIFSA registration requirements.
Lori moved to revise the commissioner's order. The trial court determined that Lori substantially complied with UIFSA registration provisions and granted Lori's motion for revision. On Lori's motion for contempt, the court found Stephen in contempt for failure to pay child support and provide medical and dental insurance. The court declined to offset the $164,868.85 arrearage by Lori's unpaid retirement account obligations, finding that the retirement transfer was not properly before it. The court ordered Stephen into custody, allowing him to purge his contempt with payment of a $5,000 cash bail and $2,000 per month toward back support. The court also entered an order withholding $2,000 in wages each month. Stephen purged his contempt and appeals both the order of contempt and the order granting Lori's motion for revision.
DISCUSSION
Statute of Limitations
Stephen argues that the trial court erred in finding that the statute of limitations to enforce the Georgia child support order had not expired.
Whether a statute of limitations applies to preclude an action is a mixed question of law and fact. But where the material facts are undisputed, the appellate court's review is de novo. See Ellis v. Barto, 82 Wn. App. 454, 457, 918 P.2d 540 (1996). "In a proceeding for arrears under a registered support order, the statute of limitation of this state or of the issuing state or foreign country, whichever is longer, applies." RCW 26.21A.515(2). In Washington, child support orders are enforceable until ten years after the 18th birthday of the youngest child for whom support is ordered. RCW 4.16.020(3); RCW 4.56.210(2). InGeorgia, there is no limitation on claims for uncollected child support. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-60(d); Wynn v. Craven, 301 Ga. 30, 799 S.E.2d 172 (2017). The unlimited Georgia collections period applies because it is longer. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that its authority to enforce the decree was not time barred. There was no error.
Standard of Review on Revision
Stephen argues that the revision court improperly reviewed the commissioner's order de novo after he offered oral testimony to the commissioner.
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law that we review de novo. Thomson v. Doe, 189 Wn. App. 45, 51, 356 P.3d 727 (2015). "On revision, the superior court reviews both the commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo based upon the evidence and issues presented to the commissioner." State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106, 113, 86 P.3d 132 (2004) (citing In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 993, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999); State v. Wicker, 105 Wn. App. 428, 433, 20 P.3d 1007 (2001)). Contrary to Stephen's assertions, no oral testimony was taken at the commissioner's hearing. He appeared pro se and offered argument, but did not present oral testimony under oath. As a result, we do not reach Stephen's argument on the standard of review for testimony.
Stephen also argues that even if no oral testimony was taken, its absence was procedurally improper. But a hearing without testimony is not procedurally improper, as the commissioner and judge had the opportunity to considerevidence and testimony in the form of sworn declarations. See In re Marriage of James, 79 Wn. App. 436, 442, 903 P.2d 470 (1995). There was no error.
Failure to Plead UIFSA
Stephen argues that he was deprived of due process because Lori's pleadings did not notify him that she was proceeding under the UIFSA. He contends this also violated notice pleading requirements.
We review de novo whether an individual's due process rights were violated. Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491, 501, 387 P.3d 680 (2017). No person may be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. CONST. art. I, § 3; U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV. This constitutional guarantee requires notice and the opportunity to be heard and defend before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case. In re Marriage of Ebbighausen, 42 Wn. App. 99, 102, 708 P.2d 1220 (1985) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950)).
Stephen had substantial notice that Lori was proceeding with an action to hold him in contempt for failure to pay child support. Lori's declaration in support of her motion for a show cause hearing for contempt notes that she seeks contempt for "Failure to comply with the provision of the child support order. . . ." CP at 179. Stephen was aware of Lori's allegations against him at both the commissioner's hearing and the revision hearing, and responded to these allegations in memoranda of law.
Lori's failure to mention the UIFSA in her initial pleadings also did not deprive Stephen of due process. The UIFSA is a procedural statute under whichan out of state order is registered. Lori proceeded with a contempt, not UIFSA, cause of action. Additionally, Lori's error did not prejudice Stephen because the commissioner raised the UIFSA issue sua sponte on Stephen's behalf and ruled in his favor. Stephen then had an opportunity to respond to the issue at the revision hearing. Because Stephen cannot demonstrate that he lacked an opportunity to meaningfully defend against the action, his due process argument fails.
Stephen also argues that the failure to mention the UIFSA in the initial contempt pleadings violated CR 8 notice pleading rules. A complaint fails to meet notice pleading standards if it neglects to give the opposing party "fair notice." Pac. Nw. Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of Sequim, 158 Wn.2d 342, 352, 144 P.3d 276 (2006) (citing Dewey v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 95 Wn. App. 18, 26, 974 P.2d 847 (1999)). A complaint must at least identify the legal grounds upon which the plaintiff is seeking recovery. Molloy v. City of Bellevue, 71 Wn. App. 382, 385, 859 P.2d 613 (1993). Lori's contempt pleadings need not include notice of the registration statute because that is not the legal ground upon which she is seeking recovery.
Lori's failure to mention the UIFSA in her initial pleadings did not violate due process or notice pleading rules. There was no error.
Substantial Compliance with the UIFSA
Stephen argues that the revision court erred when it found that Lori substantially complied with UIFSA requirements.
Whether a party substantially complies with statutory registration requirements is a question of law that we review de novo. Schneider, 173 Wn.2d at 358.
The UIFSA was designed "to facilitate registration and enforcement of decrees in non-issuing states." Owen, 126 Wn. App. at 504. To register a foreign support order in Washington under the UIFSA, a litigant must file:
RCW 26.21A.505. Substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient. Owen, 126 Wn. App. at 495.
The record supports the revision court's finding that Lori substantially complied with the UIFSA requirements. Stephen asserts that there are a variety of deficiencies with Lori's...
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