Joseph B., In re
| Decision Date | 14 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | S.F. 24600 |
| Citation | 34 Cal.3d 952,671 P.2d 852,196 Cal.Rptr. 348 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 671 P.2d 852 In re JOSEPH B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH B., Defendant and Appellant. |
Carol E. Hawes, Anderson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Dennis Fischer, Santa Monica, for defendant and appellant.
George Deukmejian and John K. Van de Kamp, Attys. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Eddie T. Keller and Janice Rogers Brown, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Must a minor who admits a juvenile court petition secure a certificate of probable cause (Pen.Code, § 1237.5) to obtain appellate review of any errors committed before or in the process?
In a petition filed in the Alameda County Juvenile Court on August 20, 1980, appellant was charged with a violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 871 1 for failing to attend school. On September 3, 1980, four Vehicle Code violations were added, as well as one count of unlawfully resisting or obstructing an officer in the discharge of his duties (Pen.Code, § 148).
Shortly thereafter, appellant admitted two of the allegations and the others were dismissed. On September 19, 1980, he was released to his parents' custody and the case was transferred for disposition to San Joaquin County, where his parents reside. Neither the minor nor his parents appeared at a subsequently scheduled hearing in the case, and a bench warrant issued.
Thereafter, appellant was arrested on new charges, and another petition was filed in the San Joaquin Juvenile Court on December 4, 1980. Appellant was charged with public intoxication (Pen.Code, § 647, subd. (f)), driving on the wrong side of the road (Veh.Code, § 21650), driving without a license (Veh.Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), and robbery (Pen.Code, § 211). At a jurisdictional hearing on December 29, 1980, appellant admitted the public intoxication and license violations, and all the other counts were dismissed. At the dispositional hearing conducted on January 12, 1981, the court removed appellant from the custody of his parents. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
On appeal, several contentions are raised, including alleged errors which occurred before or in the process of admitting the allegations of the petitions. This court must decide whether appellant must secure a certificate of probable cause before he may obtain appellate review of these contentions.
Penal Code section 1237.5 provides that "[n]o appeal shall be taken by defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a revocation of probation following an admission of violation, except where: [p] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement ... showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings; and [p] (b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the county clerk."
By its terms, Penal Code section 1237.5 does not apply to minors. The statute refers to defendants who stand convicted upon a guilty or nolo contendere plea. Further, minors charged with violations of the Juvenile Court Law are not "defendants." They do not "plead guilty," but admit the allegations of a petition. Moreover, "adjudications of juvenile wrongdoing are not 'criminal convictions.' " (Leroy T. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 434, 439, 115 Cal.Rptr. 761, 525 P.2d 665.) As section 203 states, "[a]n order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding." 2
Moreover, the Legislature's intent is clear and unambiguous. Section 800, which governs juvenile appeals, provides in part: (Emphasis added.)
As is evident from the language of section 800, the Legislature did not distinguish between juvenile appeals involving contested adjudications and those in which a minor admits the allegations of a petition. To perfect an appeal under that statute, only a notice of appeal need be filed. Furthermore, section 800 refers to Penal Code section 1240.1, which speaks of trial counsel's duty to aid appellants in noncapital criminal, juvenile court, or civil commitment cases by filing a notice of appeal. 3 There is no mention in that statute of a corresponding duty to file a certificate of probable cause. While it is clear from this court's decisions that such a duty exists when a certificate is otherwise required, 4 it is equally clear that Penal Code section 1240.1 does not itself impose such a requirement.
Furthermore, in 1978, when the italicized language quoted above was added to section 800 (Stats.1978, ch. 1385, § 3, p. 4591), Penal Code section 1237.5 was in effect. Therefore, it can be assumed that if the Legislature desired to require a certificate of probable cause for juvenile appeals, it would not have added language calling merely for the filing of a notice of appeal in the only statute which applies to juvenile appeals. (Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837-839, 122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874.) The Legislature's failure to mention a certificate of probable cause requirement in section 800 evidences an intent that a notice of appeal is sufficient to initiate appellate review of any error arising during juvenile court proceedings.
The Attorney General suggests that a 1980 amendment to section 800 indicates a contrary intent. That amendment added language which provides that "[a] ruling on a motion to suppress [evidence] shall be reviewed on appeal even if the judgment is predicated upon an admission of the allegations of the petition ...." (Stats.1980, ch. 1095, § 4, p. 3512.)
Invoking the maxim of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), the Attorney General argues that the Legislature's provision for a right to appeal from an order following a suppression motion where the minor has admitted the allegations of a juvenile court petition necessarily excludes any other right to appeal in similar circumstances.
Even assuming the maxim were applicable here, the phrase has (Estate of Banerjee (1978) 21 Cal.3d 527, 539, 147 Cal.Rptr. 157, 580 P.2d 657, fn. omitted.) Moreover, the maxim has no application "where no manifest reason exists why other persons or things than those enumerated should not be included and thus exclusion would result in injustice." (Id., at p. 539, fn. 10, 147 Cal.Rptr. 157, 580 P.2d 657.)
The Legislature's intent is clear: a notice of appeal is sufficient to perfect appellate review of alleged errors arising before or in the process of a minor's admission of allegations in a juvenile court petition. Had the Legislature intended minors to be bound by the certificate of probable cause requirement, it would have said so in section 800. "Hence, there is no occasion to resort to the foregoing, or any other, Latin maxim in arriving at our decision." (Estate of Banerjee, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 540, 147 Cal.Rptr. 157, 580 P.2d 657.)
Further, the maxim is of questionable applicability here. The intent of the 1980 amendment appears to have been to conform appellate review of juvenile suppression hearings to the adult procedure set forth in Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m). 5 Contrary to the Attorney General's suggestion, the amendment did not create a new right of appeal in juvenile cases. Rather, it cleared up confusion as to whether Penal Code section 1538.5, with its attendant guarantee of an appeal following a guilty plea, applies to juvenile proceedings.
Prior to 1980, at least two Courts of Appeal assumed the propriety of applying Penal Code section 1538.5 to juvenile court cases. (In re Richard C. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 477, 152 Cal.Rptr. 787; In re Donald L. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 770, 146 Cal.Rptr. 720.) On the other hand, the Court of Appeal in In re David G. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 247, 155 Cal.Rptr. 500, held that statute inapplicable to such cases. It concluded that equal protection was not violated by prohibiting appellate review of an unsuccessful suppression motion where a minor had admitted the allegations of a juvenile court petition. The David G. court was careful to avoid the suggestion "that the minor should not be given this right," but stated that "[t]his is a matter for legislative determination." (Id., at p. 254, fn. 3, 155 Cal.Rptr. 500.) The court also noted that the absence of such a procedure "may well have been an oversight and, if so, it should be corrected promptly by the Legislature." (Ibid.) The Legislature "corrected" the "oversight" in the 1980 amendment. Thus, there is no merit to the Attorney General's argument that the 1980 amendment by implication limited a minor's right to appeal in uncontested matters to rulings on suppression motions.
In spite of the fact that section 800 does not require a certificate of probable cause to perfect a juvenile appeal, confusion over whether the certificate requirement should apply arises from the language of rule 39(a), California Rules of Court. 6 That rule provides in part: "The rules governing appeals from the...
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