Joseph J., In re, 81-549-A
| Decision Date | 23 August 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-549-A,81-549-A |
| Citation | 465 A.2d 150 |
| Parties | In re JOSEPH J. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Joseph's foster parents brought this action in the Family Court seeking injunctive relief. They sought to prevent the Department of Children and Their Families (DCF) from reuniting Joseph with his natural mother until there could be a hearing on their petition for adoption. The Family Court determined that the foster parents lacked standing and denied them relief. We affirm.
Joseph was born on November 1, 1978. At the time, his mother was addicted to drugs. She allegedly suffered from an overdose the day before his birth. Joseph showed signs of the effects of drug abuse by his mother when he was born. As a result, the predecessor agency of DCF petitioned the Family Court to commit Joseph to its care and custody. On November 27, 1978, the agency placed Joseph in the foster home, where he remained until August of 1981. In June of 1981, DCF recommended that Joseph and his natural mother be reunited. The agency's recommendation was based upon the mother's progress in her drug-treatment program and her success in finding employment. Pursuant to the reunification plan with DCF, she had saved money to be used in obtaining independent living arrangements and demonstrated good parenting skills with Joseph.
Apparently, upon learning of the reunification plan, the foster parents filed a petition for adoption. They also sought to enjoin DCF from reuniting Joseph and his mother pending hearing on their adoption petition. The Family Court denied injunctive relief and ordered that the plan for reunification be effectuated at the end of August 1981. The record does not indicate whether or not a hearing has ever been held on the adoption petition. On appeal, the foster parents claim that the Family Court justice abused his discretion by denying them injunctive relief pending a hearing on their adoption petition.
This case reaches us in a peculiar procedural posture. Ordinarily, the interlocutory nature of the action below, without more, would prevent us from considering this appeal. We do, however, grant review when the case falls within previously enunciated exceptions to this rule, such as the legislatively created exception that allows a party to appeal the granting of injunctive relief. See G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 14-1-52, P.L.1981, ch. 329 § 1 and G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-24-7. Another exception, judicial in origin, permits a review of a decree which, although in a strict sense interlocutory, has such an element of finality that we will act before the case has finally terminated in order to prevent possible injurious consequences. Redfern v. Church of the Mediator, 101 R.I. 182, 185, 221 A.2d 453, 455 (1966). Review in the latter situation, however, is by way of discretionary writ of certiorari. See Mutual Clerks' Guild of Rhode Island v. Pari Mutual Employees Union of Building Service International Union, 84 R.I. 258, 123 A.2d 255 (1956).
Neither party provides us with any assistance in addressing the precise issue before us. Because the Family Court denied the requested relief, the case clearly does not fall within the exception created in §§ 14-1-52 and 9-24-7. Also, because the foster parents filed an appeal, they should not be allowed to proceed under the judicially created exception. The action of the court below, however, does have an element of finality because the denial of the temporary relief permitted the reunification to progress unimpeded and foreclosed the foster parents' hopes for adoption. We shall therefore depart from our usual procedure and consider the appeal as a petition for certiorari in order to address the merits of the case.
The purpose of a restraining order or preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a hearing on the merits of a case. Before granting such temporary relief, the court must make a finding not only that the status quo must be preserved to prevent irreparable injury but also that petitioner has a reasonable probability of success on the merits. See Town of West Greenwich v. Stepping Stone Enterprises, Ltd., R.I., 416 A.2d 659 (1979); Gilbane Building Co. v. Cianci, 117 R.I. 317, 366 A.2d 154 (1976). Our consideration is limited to a determination of whether or not the trial justice abused his discretion. Griggs and Browne Co., Inc. v. Healy, R.I., 453 A.2d 761, 762 (1982).
Foster parents provide temporary care for a child in a foster home when the child's own family cannot adequately provide the child with social, emotional, and physical care. See G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 42-72-2(2)(b), as enacted by P.L.1979, ch. 248, § 1. Ideally, the foster family, for a period of time, provides the child with the care and protection of a family environment while DCF helps the natural parents make the necessary changes and adjustments that will permit the child to be returned to them. See § 42-72-2. Foster parents are licensed by the state and are required to keep accurate records of the children for whom they care. General Laws...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Seibert v. Clark
...claim was based on case law that has since been overturned, the decision was correct, nevertheless, and will be affirmed. In re Joseph J., 465 A.2d 150, 152 (R.I.1983); Souza v. O'Hara, 121 R.I. 88, 90, 395 A.2d 1060, 1061 (1978); Bric's Market, Inc. v. State, 105 R.I. 572, 577, 253 A.2d 59......
-
Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC
...in order to seek appellate review of a decision which is not final ( i.e., an interlocutory decision). See, e.g., In re Joseph J., 465 A.2d 150, 151 (R.I.1983). The plaintiff in the instant case did not petition this Court for a writ of certiorari, but rather filed a direct appeal from the ......
-
State v. Ellis
...We sustain the motion justice's ruling even though we do so on grounds different from those upon which he relied. See In re Joseph J., 465 A.2d 150 (R.I.1983), and cases cited Carolyn Skinner's Grand Jury Testimony The defendant argues that his motion to dismiss the indictment should have b......
-
Leone v. Town of New Shoreham, 86-274-A
...that a showing of substantial likelihood of success is necessary before a preliminary injunction may issue. See also In re Joseph J., 465 A.2d 150, 152 (R.I.1983). Similarly R.I. Turnpike & Bridge Authority v. Cohen, 433 A.2d 179, 182 (R.I.1981), holds that irreparable harm is a necessary ...