Joseph O., Matter of

• Citation: 245 A.D.2d 856,666 N.Y.S.2d 322
• Parties: , 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 11,094 In the Matter of JOSEPH "O". 1 Surya B. Toraty, as Clinical Director of Binghamton Psychiatric Center, Appellant; Mental Hygiene Legal Services, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 18 December 1997
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

Page 322

666 N.Y.S.2d 322

245 A.D.2d 856, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 11,094

In the Matter of JOSEPH "O". ¹

Surya B. Toraty, as Clinical Director of Binghamton

Psychiatric Center, Appellant;

Mental Hygiene Legal Services, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Dec. 18, 1997.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General (Gina M. Ciccone, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

Sheila E. Shea, Mental Hygiene Legal Services, Albany, for respondent.

Before CARDONA, P.J., and CREW, WHITE, YESAWICH and CARPINELLO, JJ.

CARDONA, Presiding Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Monserrate, J.), entered March 3, 1997 in Broome County, which denied petitioner's application pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 33 for authorization to administer antipsychotic medication to Joseph "O".

Petitioner is the Clinical Director of the Binghamton Psychiatric Center (hereinafter the Center) where Joseph "O" (hereinafter the patient) is currently being treated. This appeal involves the propriety of Supreme Court's denial of petitioner's application for an order permitting the Center to administer antipsychotic medication to the patient against his will. Following a hearing, Supreme Court denied the application finding that petitioner failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the patient lacked the capacity to make his own decisions concerning psychiatric treatment.

The test for determining whether the State may exercise its parens patriae power to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill patient is set forth in Rivers v. Katz (67 N.Y.2d 485, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E.2d 337). The State must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the patient lacks "the capacity to make a reasoned decision with respect to proposed treatment" (id., at 497, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E.2d 337). If that showing is made, then "the court must determine whether the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest" (id., at 497, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E.2d 337). As to the first inquiry, we have noted that "[w]hether or not [a] * * * mentally ill patient has the capacity to make a reasonable decision with respect to a particular treatment is clearly a question of fact for a hearing court" (Matter of Eleanor R. v. South Oaks Hosp., 123 A.D.2d 460, 506 N.Y.S.2d 763, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 602, 512 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 504 N.E.2d 395). Significantly, the findings of the trial court are entitled to due deference (see, Matter of McConnell, 147 A.D.2d 881, 882, 538 N.Y.S.2d 101, appeal dismissed, lv. denied 74 N.Y.2d 759, 545 N.Y.S.2d 99, 543 N.E.2d 742).

In the instant case, the patient is a 56-year-old male with a 30-year history of paranoid schizophrenia. Prior to 1994, he functioned quite well and had been taking the drug Stelazine for over 20 years. At the request of the patient's brother in Oregon, the patient's regular psychiatrist, Florante Tinio, changed his medication in 1994 to the drug Risperdal. Shortly after this change, the patient refused to take any medication resulting in a deterioration of his mental condition and ensuing admission to the Center. While at the Center, the patient has consistently refused further medication and the physicians have therefore devised a treatment plan which they wish to implement over the patient's objection.

At the hearing, the Center's psychiatrist, Nicholas Exarchou, testified that although the patient is oriented to time and date, he is psychotic and unable to focus on any particular subject. Exarchou related an incident in which the patient trespassed in a church rectory where he engaged in profane and threatening behavior. He further...