Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Willis

• Decision Date: 12 March 1980
• Docket Number: No. 2-1078A353,2-1078A353
• Citation: 401 N.E.2d 87
• Parties: JOSEPH E. SEAGRAM & SONS, INC., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Kathleen L. WILLIS, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 87

401 N.E.2d 87

JOSEPH E. SEAGRAM & SONS, INC., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Kathleen L. WILLIS, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 2-1078A353.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

March 12, 1980.

Edward K. Halaby, Kimpel, Halaby, Hyland & Weinkam, Cincinnati, Ohio, Edwin J. Bunny, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Howard S. Young, Young & Young, Indianapolis, for appellee.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

This is an appeal from an action brought before the Industrial Board of Indiana (Board) by claimant-appellee Kathleen Willis against defendant-appellant Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. (employer) to recover workmen's compensation benefits on account of the death of her husband, an employee of Seagram's. The Hearing Member found in favor of the claimant and the Board affirmed. The salient parts of the Board's award are as follows:

"Said Hearing Member having reviewed the file and being duly advised in the premises, now finds that on or about May 30, 1972, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant; that on said date, the plaintiff while working for the defendant and within the plaintiff's scope of duties, the plaintiff did fall, resulting in injuries to his head and face.

"It is further found that the defendant immediately received notice of said injuries and accident and provided plaintiff with medical and hospital services and sending him to Dearborn County Hospital Mount George Hospital and General Hospital and, further, in providing him with the care of Dr. Miller.

"It is further found that plaintiff continued to be treated by Dr. Miller, a duly qualified orthoped surgeon, who released plaintiff to return to light duty work on October 16, 1972; that plaintiff never returned to work but continued to endure severe headaches; that, pursuant to such pain, the plaintiff sought the services of a neurologist namely, Dr. Elam; that the plaintiff did not request, nor did the defendant know that plaintiff had sought Dr. Elam's services; that plaintiff saw Dr. Elam on two occasions, November 2, 1972 and December 12, 1972.

"It is further found that the physician, Dr. Miller, by his own admission, did not attend to nor was he qualified to attend to the headaches of the plaintiff; that Dr. Miller admits that a neurologist is best qualified to treat trauma induced headaches.

"It is further found that the plaintiff had good reason to seek medical care of his own choosing, in that he was still suffering from headaches caused by the accident and that the medical care tendered by defendant did not include treatment for his headaches.

"It is further found that the said Dr. Miller (sic) prescribed Valium and Librium for the decedent in order to reduce the pain of the headaches.

"It is further found that the decedent died on December 31, 1972, as a direct result of taking the above described prescriptions, along with ingesting alcohol, the combined effect of which led to drug poisoning causing death.

"It is further found that there were no proven burial expenses.

"It is further found that at the time of plaintiff's decedent's death, he left surviving him as his sole and only heir, his wife, who was residing with him and was wholly dependent upon him at the time of his said accidental injury and death.

"It is further found that defendant shall pay the medical expenses of Dr. Miller.

"It is further found that prior to the filing of said claim there was a good faith effort between the parties to adjust said claim, which effort resulted in a dispute between the parties.

"Said Hearing Member now finds for the plaintiff and against defendant on plaintiff's Form 10 application filed April 1(3), 1974."

The error assigned by the employer is that the award was contrary to law. This assignment of error presents for review both the sufficiency of the findings of fact utilized to sustain the award and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact. Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. v. Savage (1979), Ind.App., 390 N.E.2d 203. In its cross-appeal the claimant maintains the Board erred in overruling her motion to add interest on the award from the date of the decedent's death.

Basically the employer's position is that the necessary causal connection between the decedent's industrial accident and his death was not established by claimant. It is urged that the decedent's death was not a natural consequence of his industrial accident insofar as intoxication was an independent intervening agency which broke the chain of causation. ¹

"It seems to be well settled that a subsequent incident or accident which results in a new, different or additional injury is compensable if it is of such nature and occurs under such circumstances that it can be considered as the proximate and natural result of the original injury. . . . Although not concerned with a second or subsequent accident this court said in United Paperboard Co. v. Lewis, 1917, 65 Ind.App. 356, 117 N.E. 276, 278: 'It is well settled that where the primary injury arises out of the employment, every consequence which flows from it likewise arises out of the employment.' The same principle is announced in Goshen Veneer Co. v. Cozzi, 1931, 93 Ind.App. 160, 176 N.E. 634, and cases cited. (Citations omitted)

"On the other hand the subsequent incident or accident may be such as to constitute an independent intervening agency which breaks the chain of causation between the two injuries and relieves the employer of responsibility for the latter. . . . And this is true even though the first injury may have contributed to the second accident to some extent. . . . As was said in Marshall v. City of Pittsburgh, supra, (119 Pa.Super. 189, 180 A. 733, 735): 'Cases may arise where the elements of time and space and intervening causes may be so involved that the second injury could not be said to be the proximate, natural, and probable result of the original accident, or the second accident may (be) so predominate that it overshadows the original cause.' Lack of ordinary care on the part of the claimant which proximately results in the second accident has been held to constitute an independent intervening agency which breaks the chain of causation between the two injuries and thus bars recovery for the second. . . . (Citations omitted)

"Whether the second accident, in the case before us, was the proximate and natural result of the original injury or whether it was the proximate result of the appellant's negligence and therefore should be regarded as an independent intervening cause, was a question of fact for the Industrial Board, to be decided in view of all the circumstances, and its findings in that regard must be sustained, even though the evidence is undisputed, if there is any legitimate theory applicable to the facts on which the award can be upheld. The appellant, knowing full well that his right knee was weak and unexpectedly gave way on occasions, causing him to fall, elected to carry a bundle of trash, which occupied both his hands, down a basement stairway. Whether this was the act of an ordinarily prudent and careful man under all the circumstances rested exclusively with the Industrial Board to determine. The board concluded that it was not and we cannot say, as a matter of law, that such conclusion is wrong.

"But even so the appellant contends that negligence on the part of the claimant is not a defense in workmen's compensation cases. That is true as far as the primary injury is concerned but the employer's liability for a second injury depends upon an unbroken chain of causation between it and such primary injury and the chain is broken when any independent agency, including the claimant's negligence, intervenes and becomes the proximate cause of the second accident."

Yarbrough v. Polar Ice & Fuel Co. (1948), 118 Ind.App. 321, at 324-326, 79 N.E.2d 422, at 423-424.

Thus, certain conduct on the part of the decedent such as negligence or intoxication may constitute an intervening cause of the subsequent injury thereby relieving the employer of liability. Where the injured rashly undertakes a line of action with knowledge of the risks involved in the activity in light of the condition stemming from the industrial injury, the causative chain from the industrial injury is broken as to the subsequent accident caused by such conduct. Beaty v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. (1978), 80 Cal.App.3d 397, 144 Cal.Rptr. 78; 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law (1978) § 13.12. However, a distinction must be drawn between such conduct and mere carelessness or errors of judgment which do not break the causative chain. Beaty v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd., supra; Swanson v. Williams & Co. (1951) 278 App.Div. 477, 106 N.Y.S.2d 61.

Both Yarbrough and Crosby v. Grandview Nursing Home (1972) Me., 290 A.2d 375, highlight this distinction between engaging in a course of conduct with knowledge of the attendant risks created by the industrial injury and mere carelessness. In Yarbrough the Board denied compensation benefits on the basis that the actions of the claimant in carrying trash down a flight of stairs knowing full well that his knee was weak and gave way unexpectedly was not the act of an ordinary and prudent man under the circumstances. On appeal the Board's award was affirmed.

In Crosby v. Grandview Nursing Home, supra, the claimant injured her foot in an industrial accident and was required to wear a cast. The employer accordingly compensated her for this mishap. Subsequently she began suffering acute foot strain. Her physician advised her to obtain some decent supportive shoes but did not furnish her with specific instructions regarding footwear. The...