United Paperboard Co. v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 11 October 1917
• Docket Number: No. 9865.,9865.
• Citation: 117 N.E. 276,65 Ind.App. 356
• Parties: UNITED PAPERBOARD CO. v. LEWIS.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

65 Ind.App. 356

117 N.E. 276

UNITED PAPERBOARD CO.

v.LEWIS.

No. 9865.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

Oct. 11, 1917.

Appeal from State Industrial Board.

Amberson Lewis filed a claim against the United Paperboard Company before the Industrial Board under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915. From an award in favor of the former, the latter appeals. Affirmed.John B. Coughlin, of Indianapolis, for appellant. Switzer & Bent, of Wabash, for appellee.

BATMAN, J.

Appellee filed his claim against appellant, before the Industrial Board of Indiana, under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, alleging that on the 7th day of August, 1916, he received personal injuries by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by appellant in the city of Wabash, Ind. On a hearing before the full Industrial Board, an award was adjudged in favor of appellee, from which appellant prosecutes this appeal.

Appellant, under its assignment of errors, urges that the award of the Industrial Board is contrary to law and not sustained by sufficient evidence.

The evidence tends to establish the following facts: Appellee is married, and has two minor children. On the 7th day of August, 1916, he was in the employ of appellant as “cellar boy.” His duties were to keep the place clean. He was in good health when he went to work on the morning of said day. There were about two big wagonloads of steaming pulp in the basement room where he was required to work on said day, which had run out of a broken iron pipe through which it was conducted onto the cement floor of such room. Appellee's foreman directed him to remove said pulp by flushing it out into the sewer with water. To do this he was required to use a hose, through which hot water from the exhaust of the engine was forced. He was compelled to hold the hose in his hands in directing the flow of hot water against the pulp. It became so hot that he had to wrap it with a cloth in order to hold it. He began this work about 8 o'clock in the morning, and finished it in about 3 1/2 hours. During such time he was compelled to stand in said heated pulp, inhale the steam, and smell the odor which it gave off. By reason of the heat of said pulp and water his working place became extremely hot. He perspired profusely, and his clothes thereby became thoroughly wet. The sweat from his body ran down into his rubber boots, until they were very wet on the inside, and his feet became extremely hot from such pulp and water. When he had completed this work he went home to get his dinner. On his way home he began to chill, and continued to chill for several days. On reaching home he changed his clothes. He felt stiff the next day. Soon afterwards acute nephritis manifested itself, which confined him to his bed for about eight weeks and from the effects of which he has not fully recovered. His affliction resulted from the conditions described, and has caused disability for work.

[1] The Workmen's Compensation Act of this state makes provision for the payment of compensation for personal injury or death by accident to an employé, arising out of and in the course of his employment. Appellant first contends that the evidence shows that the disability of which appellee complains is the result of a disease, and not of an accident within the meaning of such act. Repeated efforts have been made to define an “accident” as used in similar acts in various jurisdictions, but the definitions are not uniform. One frequently approved defines an accident to be “an unlooked for mishap, an untoward event which is not expected or designed.” The courts have also differed as to whether a disease following an employment, should be considered an injury by accident within the meaning of such acts. In the various decisions on this subject it is generally recognized that diseases are of two classes: First, the so-called industrial or occupational diseases, which are the natural and reasonably to be expected results of a workman following a certain occupation for a considerable period of time; second, diseases which are the result of some unusual condition of the employment. The first class is illustrated by lead poisoning and the second by pneumonia following an enforced exposure. As a rule such industrial or occupational diseases are not considered as injuries by accident and in the absence of special statutory provision compensation is not allowed therefor. On the other hand it is generally accepted that a disease, which is not the ordinary result of an employé's work, reasonably to be anticipated as a result of pursuing the same, but contracted as a direct result of unusual circumstances connected therewith, is to be considered an injury by accident, and comes within the provisions of acts providing for compensation for personal injury so caused. Adams v. Acme, etc., Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485, L. R. A. 1916A, 283, and note on page 290, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 689; Glasgow Coal Co. v. Welsh, Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1916E, 161; Bradbury on Workmen's Compensation, pp. 349, 350, 363, 371; Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, vol. 1, § 97; Corpus Juris Treatise on Workmen's Compensation Acts (1917) pp. 64-67; Hurle's Case, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N. E. 336, L. R. A. 1916A, 279, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 919;Larke v. John Hancock, etc., Co., 90 Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320, L. R. A. 1916E, 584;McPhee's Case, 222 Mass. 1, 109 N. E. 633;Bayne v. Riverside, etc., 181 Mich. 378, 148 N. W. 412;Rist v. Larkin & Sangster (Sup.) 156 N. Y. Supp. 875; Sheeran v. F. & J. Clayton & Co., 3 B. W. C. C. 583; Kelly v. Auchenlea Coal Co., 4 B. W. C. C. 417; Alloa Coal Co. v. Drylie, 6 B. W. C. C. 398; Brown v. John Watson, 7 B. W. C. C. 259; Barbeart v. Chugg, 8 B. W. C. C. 37.

In the instant case it is clearly apparent that appellee contracted the disease which caused the disability for which he seeks compensation, as the direct result of an unusual circumstance connected with his employment. His duties required him to keep the basement room clean, but this did not ordinarily require him to flush hot steaming pulp into the sewer with hot water from the exhaust of the engine. It is evident that this was only required when the iron pipe through which such pulp was conducted broke and allowed it to escape to the floor. Hence the Industrial Board may have very properly found that the breaking of the pipe created an unusual condition under which appellee was required to work at the time in question, resulting in enforced exposure. In such event, any disease, of which such exposure is shown to have been the cause, may properly be said, under the rule stated, to constitute a personal injury by accident, and to come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state.

[2] Appellant further contends that, even if the court should find that appellee is suffering from a personal injury by accident, still he would not be entitled to an award of compensation therefor, as the evidence fails to show that such injury arose both out of and in the course of his employment. The statute makes these two features essential to such an award, and this contention calls for our consideration.

[3] It may be well to observe that the courts are practically unanimous in holding that the words “by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment,” as used in Workmen's Compensation Acts, should be given a broad and liberal construction in order that the humane purpose of their enactment may be realized. Holland-St. Louis Sugar Co. v. Shraluka, 116 N. E. 330, and the authorities there cited. Their meaning, when so used, has been frequently considered in various jurisdictions having such acts, and it is generally accepted that an injury is received in the course of the employment when it comes while the workman is performing the duty for which he is employed, and that it arises out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon a consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work was required to be performed and the resulting injury. In re Annie McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697, L....