Joseph v. SCI-Rockview Superintendent Mark Garman
| Decision Date | 31 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 18-2202 |
| Parties | CARRINGTON K. JOSEPH, Petitioner, v. SCI-ROCKVIEW SUPERINTENDENT MARK GARMAN, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
On May 24, 2018, Carrington Joseph filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF 1.) Over the next two months, Joseph filed several amendments to his petition. (ECF 5, 8, 10, 12.) Respondents answered the petition, (ECF 25), and Magistrate Judge Hart issued a Report and Recommendation recommending the petition's denial. (ECF 30.) Joseph objected to the R&R.[1] (ECF 38.) After thoroughly reviewing the record, Judge Hart's R&R and Joseph's objections the Court overrules the objections and adopts the R&R.
The relevant facts and procedural history are set forth in Judge Hart's R&R and need not be repeated here other than that Joseph was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole for the gruesome stabbing death of his wife. Joseph's petition asserts nine claims for relief: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a first-degree murder conviction; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to prevent him from waiving his right to a jury trial; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move for a competency hearing; (4) prosecutorial misconduct for failing to disclose that a Commonwealth witness had a prior arrest and conviction; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue an imperfect self-defense charge; (6) ineffective assistance of counsel for instructing him not to testify; (7) prosecutorial misconduct for withholding evidence that the murder weapon contained the victim's fingerprints; (8) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to dismiss under Pennsylvania's Speedy Trial Act; and (9) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to recuse the trial judge and ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel for failing to raise the issue. (ECF 1, 5, 8, 10, 12.)
Judge Hart considered Joseph's claims and recommended that the Court deny his petition in full. The Court reviews de novo the portions of the R&R to which Joseph objects, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011), and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 limits federal courts' power to grant writs of habeas corpus. Under the Act, a federal court may not grant a writ “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings [unless the state court's decision] was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Berghuis v Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380 (2010). A state court ruling is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the court applies a rule that contradicts Supreme Court precedent or if the court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision but arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406-07 (2000). A state court ruling “is considered an ‘unreasonable application' if the state court unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the particular facts, unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context, or unreasonably refuses to extend the principle to a new context where it should apply.” McMullen v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2009).
Before a federal court can grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must exhaust the remedies available in state court. Lambert v. United States, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must “fairly present” his claims to the state court; if he does not, the claims become procedurally defaulted and he may not raise them in federal court. Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 725 (3d Cir. 2005).
A petitioner may be exempt from the exhaustion requirement under three circumstances: (1) he demonstrates cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law; (2) he demonstrates that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice; or (3) he invokes the narrow Martinez exception. Id. at 750; Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). To establish cause, the petitioner must “show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.” Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 193 (3d Cir. 2000). To show prejudice, the petitioner must prove “not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Id.
The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception “will apply only in extraordinary cases, i.e., where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. Asserting actual innocence requires the petitioner to “show it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence presented in his habeas petition.” Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2004).
Finally, under the Martinez exception, ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are not procedurally defaulted if: (1) the default was caused by ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, (2) that occurred in the first collateral proceeding in which the claim could be heard, and (3) the underlying claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness has some merit, analogous to the substantiality requirement for a certificate of appealability. Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2014).
Joseph argues he is entitled to habeas relief because the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree murder. (Habeas Petition 3, ECF 1.) When analyzing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a habeas case, “the critical inquiry . . . does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Instead, the Court must review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Judge Hart concluded that, “upon review of the evidence as presented by the prosecution in this case, there is no doubt that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” (R&R 11, ECF 30.) Joseph objects, contending “[t]he evidence presented by the Commonwealth cannot rationally support an inference that Petitioner had the specific intent to kill.” (Objs. to R&R 3, ECF 38.) He believes the evidence shows that he “did not intend to kill the decedent but protect himself from [her].” (Id.)
The Commonwealth presented more than enough evidence for a rational trier of fact to convict Joseph of first-degree murder.
A person is guilty of first-degree murder where the Commonwealth proves that a human being was unlawfully killed the person accused is responsible for the killing; and the accused acted with specific intent to kill. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d); Commonwealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 2005). An intentional killing is a killing by means of poison, or by laying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). The Commonwealth may establish that a defendant intentionally killed another “solely by circumstantial evidence, and the fact finder may infer that the defendant intended to kill a victim based on the defendant's use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's body.” May, 887 A.2d at 753.
Commonwealth v. Housman, 226 A.3d 1249, 1271 (Pa. 2020). Evidence at trial showed Joseph stabbed the victim more than 80 times, mostly in the back, head, neck and torso. (Cmwlth. Appx. Vol. II 20-21, ECF 25-2.)[2] In doing so, he broke several knives and repeatedly returned to the kitchen to retrieve additional knives so he could continue his attack. See (Cmwlth. Appx. Vol. I 93, 95-96, 100, ECF 25-1). When the victim managed to momentarily escape, Joseph followed her outside the house, threatened to stab her sister who tried to help her, pulled the victim's hair and stabbed her in the neck, then dragged her back inside the house. (Cmwlth. Appx. Vol. I 73-74, 86-89); see also (id. at 62). When police questioned him, Joseph calmly recounted his brutal attack. (Cmwlth. Appx. Vol. II 17); see also (Cmwlth. Appx. Vol. I 62). This evidence supports the first-degree murder conviction and, more specifically, the trial court's finding that Joseph had the specific intent to kill the victim. If Joseph meant only to defend himself-as he argues in his pro se objections-he could have stopped his brutal attack and escaped at various times. He chose not to. Since a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Joseph was guilty, the state court's determination that the evidence was sufficient to support Joseph's conviction was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Jackson.
Next Joseph asserts several ineffective assistant of counsel claims. ...
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