Josephson v. Planning Bd. of City of Stamford

• Decision Date: 31 March 1964
• Citation: 151 Conn. 489,199 A.2d 690,10 A.L.R.3d 687
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 10 A.L.R.3d 687 Abraham JOSEPHSON et al. v. PLANNING BOARD OF the CITY OF STAMFORD et al. Arthur SMITH et al. v. ZONING BOARD OF the CITY OF STAMFORD et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 690

199 A.2d 690

151 Conn. 489, 10 A.L.R.3d 687

Abraham JOSEPHSON et al. v. PLANNING BOARD OF the CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

Arthur SMITH et al. v. ZONING BOARD OF the CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 31, 1964.

E. Gaynor Brennan, Stamford, with whom were E. Gaynor Brennan, Jr., Stamford, and, on the brief, P. Benedict Fraser, Stamford, for appellants-appellees (plaintiffs in each case).

Morgan P. Ames, Stamford, with whom, on the brief, were Walter B. Lockwood and Raymond T. Benedict, Stamford, for appellee-appellant (defendant The Stamford Hall Co. in cach case).

Theodore Godlin, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Sidney C. Kweskin, Corp. Counsel, for appellee (named defendant in each case).

Before KING, C. J., MURPHY, ALCORN and COMLEY, JJ. and HOUSE, Acting justice.

HOUSE, Acting Justice.

The defendant The Stamford Hall Company applied to the defendant planning board in June, 1961, for an amendment to the master plan of Stamford to change the designation of fifteen acres of unimproved land owned by the company from 'Residential, Multi-family, Low Density' to 'Commercial, Neighborhood or Local Business.' After a public hearing, the planning board made the requested amendment, subject, however, to stipulations which are of questionable validity when incorporated in such a master plan. The terms of the stipulations were taken from an agreement between The Stamford Hall Company and the Associated Dry Goods Corporation, which had contracted to buy the land of the former company if certain conditions were fulfilled. Subsequent to the action of the planning board, the defendant zoning board, on the application of The Stamford Hall Company, approved a change in the zonal classification of the fifteen acres from C-N, a neighborhood business district, and R-7 1/2, a one-family residence district, to C-L, a limited business district. Appeals were taken to the Court of Common Pleas from the action of the planning board in the Josephson case and from the action of the zoning board in the Smith case. The decisions of both these bodies were upheld, and the plaintiffs have appealed to this court. The Stamford Hall Company has filed a cross appeal in both cases on the issue whether the plaintiffs were aggrieved persons.

The Stamford municipal charter provides that the zoning map cannot be amended 'to permit a use in any area which is contrary to the general land use established for such area by the master plan.' Stamford Charter § 552; 26 Spec.Laws 1234. Consequently, the legality of the zoning change rests on the legality of the amendment to the master plan, and hence the view we take on the action of the planning board disposes of the appeal from the zoning board.

The cross appeal of The Stamford Hall Company cannot be sustained. To be an aggrieved person one must establish a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of a decision as distinguished from a general interest such as is the concern of all members of the community. General Statutes § 8-28; Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 662, 145 A.2d 832; Langbein v. Planning Board, 145 Conn. 674, 676, 146 A.2d 412. Whether a party falls within this definition is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. Luery v. Zoning Board, 150 Conn. 136, 140, 187 A.2d 247; Fox v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 146 Conn. 665, 667, 154 A.2d 520. The trial court concluded that some of the plaintiffs were aggrieved. This finding has not been successfully attacked. Thus, there are proper parties in the appeals from the decisions of the planning board and the zoning board.

In the Josephson case an assignment of error, on which the plaintiffs particularly rely, is directed to the conclusion of the court that John Denham, a member of the planning board, had no such personal or financial interest in the subject matter of the application presented to the planning board as would disqualify him from sitting on the matter.

Section 8-21 of the General Statutes entitled '[d]isqualification of members in matters before planning or zoning boards' provides, in part, as follows: 'No member of any planning commission shall participate in the hearing or decision of the commission of which he is a member upon any matter in which he is directly or indirectly interested in a personal or financial sense.' A similar provision provides for the disqualification of members of zoning authorities. § 8-11. These statutory provisions were enacted by the General Assembly in 1951 following the decision of this court in Low v. Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774, which clearly enumerated the criteria governing disqualification of members of zoning bodies. Sup.1951, §§ 161b, 168b; Cum.Sup.1955, §§ 382d, 392d. Since that decision, this court has had repeated occasion to reaffirm the principle that public policy requires that members of such public boards cannot be permitted to place themselves in a position in which personal interest may conflict with public duty. See Mills v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 493, 134 A.2d 250; Senior v. Zoning Commission, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415; Lage v. Zoning Board...