Joshua v. State
Decision Date | 30 October 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 4D18-3724,4D18-3724 |
Citation | 284 So.3d 551 |
Parties | Robert JOSHUA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Kibbey | Wagner, and Jordan R. Wagner, Stuart, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Robert Joshua appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief, which was premised on claims of newly-discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the reasons that follow, we find no error in the trial court's summary denial and affirm.
The salient facts of this case are set forth in detail in our prior opinion affirming in part and reversing in part following Joshua's trial, conviction and sentence on the charges of trafficking in methamphetamine (crystal meth) and trafficking in methylenedioxymethamphetamine (ecstasy). See Joshua v. State , 205 So. 3d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).1 Nevertheless, we reproduce some of the background facts to place into proper context Joshua's postconviction claims and our analysis of those claims:
Id. at 852-53 (footnotes omitted).
Joshua was convicted of and sentenced for trafficking in crystal meth (Count I) and trafficking in ecstasy (Count II). On appeal, Joshua challenged both convictions on several grounds.
This court affirmed the conviction and sentence for trafficking in ecstasy—i.e., the drugs observed in plain view when police entered Joshua's home to execute the anticipatory search warrant which had been issued for the crystal meth delivered by FedEx.2 However, we reversed and remanded the conviction and sentence for trafficking in crystal meth. As to that charge, we found 1) Joshua's motion to compel the disclosure of the confidential informant's identity was legally sufficient; and 2) Joshua's accompanying affidavit satisfied the "initial burden of asserting a legally cognizable defense to the charge of trafficking in crystal meth, which he supported with sworn proof, and established that the confidential informant may be a material witness to his defense, such that the trial court was required to conduct an in camera hearing of the confidential informant and thereafter apply Roviaro [v. United States , 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) ] and its Florida progeny to determine whether disclosure is appropriate under the circumstances presented." Id. at 858. As we noted: "Joshua's defense to Count I [trafficking in crystal meth] was that he was set up, that he did not know drugs were being delivered to him, and that he had no intent to receive or keep the drugs." Id. at 858.
And although the trial court did conduct an in camera hearing on Joshua's motion to compel disclosure of the confidential informant, the hearing was not properly conducted, requiring us to reverse the conviction for trafficking in crystal meth and remand with instructions for the trial court to conduct a proper in camera hearing on the motion. Id. at 859.
In other words, we determined that the trial court's failure to conduct a proper in camera hearing required reversal of the conviction and sentence for Count I only (crystal meth) because of Joshua's asserted defense as to that count. Had the State, following our remand, resumed its prosecution of Joshua on the crystal meth count, the trial court would have been required to conduct a proper in camera hearing, including taking testimony of the confidential informant and determining...
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