Joughin v. Parks

• Decision Date: 17 March 1933
• Citation: 147 So. 273,107 Fla. 833
• Parties: JOUGHIN, Sheriff v. PARKS, Circuit Judge, et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

147 So. 273

107 Fla. 833

JOUGHIN, Sheriff v. PARKS, Circuit Judge, et al.

Florida Supreme Court

March 17, 1933

En Banc.

Original application by R. T. Joughin, as sheriff of Hillsborough county, and individually, for writ of prohibition to be directed to L. L. Parks, as judge of the circuit court of Hillsborough county, and others. Rule nisi in prohibition was issued (143 So. 145), and the rule was continued (143 So 306).

Rule for prohibition made absolute.

COUNSEL Charles F. Blake, Frank T. Phillips, Mabry Reaves & White, and R. J. Duff, all of Tampa, for petitioner.

John W Cone, William C. Pierce, Ray C. Brown, and C. L. Sparkman all of Tampa, for respondents.

OPINION

TERRELL, Justice.

June 24, 1932, J. W. Scally and other complainants filed their bill in the circuit court of Hillsborough county seeking to restrain R. T. Joughin, as sheriff, his deputies, and the inspectors of the various election precincts from violating any law regulating the holding of the second, or run-off primary election to be held in said county June 28, 1932. Before any action was taken by the chancellor on the application of complainants for a restraining order, petition was filed in this court by R. T. Joughin for writ of prohibition against L. L. Parks, as judge of the circuit court of Hillsborough county and the complainants in the injunction suit seeking to prohibit them from proceeding further to litigate said suit. A rule nisi was issued and the cause now comes on for determination of the question of whether or not a writ of prohibition absolute should be entered. See Joughin v. Parks (Fla.) 143 So. 145 and Joughin v. Parks (Fla.) 143 So. 306, for previous considerations of this case.

In Joughin v. Parks, 143 So. 306, supra, we purposely held the cause on the docket to determine 'what, if any, jurisdiction, courts of equity have in this state over the administration of primary election laws.' Petitioner states the question involved as follows: Is a primary election a political right over which courts of equity as administered in this state have any jurisdiction? No other question is presented.

A political right has reference to those rights exercised by the citizen in the formation, administration, or conduct of the government. In this sphere, political rights take a wide range, whether procured through constitutional, statutory, or use methods. The right to vote or otherwise participate in an election, to be a member of a political party, to be a candidate for and hold office, petition, to execute governmental duties, and to encourage political theories that make for the betterment of the citizen, are among some of the most common political rights. Political rights are distinguished from civil rights on the ground that the latter are those common to every citizen or inhabitant not connected with the organization, administration, or conduct of the government. The right to contract, to own and protect property, to trial by jury, to enter into the marital relation, and other rights that may be redressed in a civil action are enumerated as civil rights.

In jurisdictions recognizing distinct courts of law and equity like Florida, the rule is well settled that equity is without authority to determine questions involving rights that are purely political, nor will they undertake the protections of such rights by the writ of injunction. Joughin v. Parks (Fla.) 143 So. 145; State ex rel. Landis v. Tedder (Fla.) 143 So. 148; Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N.E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220; People ex rel. Attorney General v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 86 P. 224, 229, 231, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 822, 117 Am. St. Rep. 198; Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237; 14 R. C. L. 374; 21 Corpus Juris 156; 5 Pomeroy's Equity (4th Ed.) par. 1746; Bishpain Equity (10th Ed.) 64; High on Injunctions (4th Ed.) par. 20B, 1312; Keer Injunctions (5th Ed.) 10; Shoemaker v. City of Des Moines, 129 Iowa, 244, 105 N.W. 520, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 382.

This rule recognizes degrees in political rights and applies only where rights purely political are involved. One's right may not be purely political when it has coalesced with a civil or personal right, or has been clothed by the Constitution or statute with a quality superior and beyond the mere exercise of a political or party function. In such cases the question of whether or not a political right has been or is about to be exercised in compliance with law is a judicial question for determination by the courts.

The right to vote, for example, is not inherent. It is secured by law. So long as the security extends only to the naked right to vote it is purely political, but when the law takes it over and throws around it safeguards in the interest of the voter and requires it to be exercised under rules and regulations to safeguard the ballot and the body politic it becomes more than a naked political right and will be protected in like manner as a civil right. A court of equity will in other words not attempt to supervise or control the management of a political party or a political function, but when the law prescribes rules and regulations for the party to conduct an election any interested elector may invoke the aid of a court of appropriate equitable remedies to enforce such rules and regulations.

Generally the jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by statute or the Constitution, is limited to the protection of the rights of property or civil rights. In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 S.Ct. 482, 31 L.Ed. 402. To assume jurisdiction to control the exercise of political powers, or to protect purely political rights of the individual, would be an invasion of the function of the common law or the domain of the other departments of government; but we do not consider the exception to this rule here prescribed as such an invasion. Green v. Mills, 69 F. 852, 16 C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Id., 159 U.S. 651, 16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293.

Prohibition under our Constitution is an extraordinary remedy, and will not be enforced if the party seeking it has an adequate remedy in a court of law. The remedy at law to defeat this extraordinary writ must, however, be adequate to afford the relief the case demands, otherwise it is not sufficient. State ex rel. McCaffery v. Aloe, 152 Mo. 466, 54 S.W. 494, 47 L. R. A. 393; Arnold v. Henry, 155 Mo. 48, 55 S.W. 1089, 78 Am. St. Rep. 556. The writ of prohibition will not be invoked for slight reasons, but only in emergency cases to forestall an impending, present injury. State ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court for Spokane County, 40 Wash. 555, 82 P. 877, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 395, 111 Am. St. Rep. 925.

The bill of complaint referred to in the forepart of this opinion was brought by J. W. Scally and other complainants as citizens and electors of Hillsborough county against R. T. Joughin, as sheriff, and all his deputies, including the inspectors of each election precinct in said county; there being seventy-three in all. The bill charges a multitude of irregularities and violations of the election laws by the sheriff and his deputies, including the inspectors, in the conduct of the first primary election of June 7, 1932, and alleges that they have all reason to believe that such irregularities and illegalities will be continued in the second primary election of June 28, 1932. It also contended that the bill in effect charges a conspiracy on the part of the sheriff and his deputies and some of the inspectors to violate the election laws, and to thwart the voice of the people in the conduct of said election. It prays for a restraining order against the sheriff and his deputies as follows:

'1. From violating any of the election laws at the second or run-off primary election to be held in said Hillsborough County, Florida, on the 28th day of June, 1932, and directing and commanding them, and each of them, to strictly obey and enforce each and every

...