Journigan v. Duffy

• Decision Date: 08 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. 75-1404,75-1404
• Citation: 552 F.2d 283
• Parties: James Julian JOURNIGAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John F. DUFFY, Sheriff, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 283

552 F.2d 283

James Julian JOURNIGAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John F. DUFFY, Sheriff, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 75-1404.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

March 8, 1977.

Richard S. Henderson, San Diego, Cal., for petitioner-appellant.

Henry R. Mann, Deputy Dist. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

Before CHOY and WALLACE, Circuit Judges, and RICHEY, ^* District Judge.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Journigan petitioned the district court for habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the statute which was the basis of his state court conviction. The district judge did not reach the merits, holding that Journigan's guilty plea in the state court precluded federal habeas corpus relief. We reverse and remand for consideration of the merits of the petition.

I. Background

A criminal complaint was filed against Journigan, charging violations of five different sections of the California Business and Professions Code. He pleaded not guilty and sought habeas corpus or other extraordinary relief in the state courts on the grounds that the statutes did not apply to him and, alternatively, that they were unconstitutional. His petition for extraordinary relief was denied and, pursuant to a plea bargain, Journigan pleaded guilty to one count. The remaining counts were dismissed.

Subsequently, Journigan unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. He then filed a petition for federal habeas corpus in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the district judge ruled on this petition, Journigan attempted to take a direct appeal from his conviction pursuant to California Penal Code § 1237.5. ¹ A prerequisite to such an appeal subsequent to a guilty plea is the securing of a certificate of probable cause from the California Superior Court. Upon denial of the certificate, Journigan unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal to compel its issuance. The California Supreme Court refused a petition for a rehearing on the denial of the writ of mandate.

In the federal district court, the judge ruled that Journigan's guilty plea in the state court precluded his habeas corpus petition pursuant to Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), and Mann v. Smith, 488 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932, 94 S.Ct. 1445, 39 L.Ed.2d 490 (1974). ² On appeal from that ruling Journigan asserts that under Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Tollett, it was improper not to consider the merits of his petition for habeas corpus relief.

II. Limitations upon Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners

The Supreme Court has established that deliberate bypass of state remedies may act as a bar to federal habeas. In addition, the Court has held that certain constitutional claims may no longer be raised subsequent to a counseled guilty plea. To resolve the questions raised in this case properly, we must analyze the Supreme Court cases determining the scope of these two limitations.

A. Deliberate By-Pass

In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), the Supreme Court held that federal courts have power under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to grant federal habeas corpus relief to a petitioner in state custody despite the petitioner's failure to have pursued a state remedy not available to him at the time of the application for habeas. 372 U.S. at 398-99, 83 S.Ct. 822. However, the Court also held that the federal courts may "deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies." Id. at 438, 83 S.Ct. at 849.

The Court also provided standards for determining whether the petitioner had in fact deliberately by-passed the state courts.

The classic definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461) "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" furnishes the controlling standard. If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits though of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other means, of the facts bearing upon the applicant's default.

Id. at 439, 83 S.Ct. at 849.

Thus, a voluntary guilty plea may constitute a deliberate by-pass of orderly state procedures. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 289, 95 S.Ct. 886, 43 L.Ed.2d 196 (1975); ³ McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 768-69, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). The guilty plea prevents the state trial court from reaching the constitutional questions and, in most states, prevents the defendant from raising those questions on appeal. In most states, therefore, by pleading guilty with an understanding of these consequences, the defendant deliberately refuses to place his federal claims before the state courts in the first instance.

This case, however, presents an unusual fact pattern. Subsequent to his guilty plea, Journigan did not take a direct appeal but he was permitted to raise his federal constitutional claim in a state habeas corpus proceeding. ⁴ Accordingly, the narrow issue first before us is whether a knowing and counseled guilty plea not followed by a direct appeal constitutes a deliberate by-pass of orderly state procedures, even though the state provided and the petitioner used state habeas corpus proceedings to challenge his conviction.

Under our federal system, procedures for the administration of the state courts are established by the states themselves. If the state establishes alternate avenues by which a claim may be raised, we should not require more exacting compliance with state procedures than the state itself demands. Thus, where a state permits a defendant to raise constitutional issues in state habeas corpus proceedings subsequent to a guilty plea, we will not foreclose federal habeas because the defendant does not raise his constitutional claims on direct appeal. As the Court stated in Fay, the federal court may "deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies." 372 U.S. at 438, 83 S.Ct. at 849 (emphasis added). Here, however, Journigan did not forfeit his state court remedies by pleading guilty. He could still raise his claim in state habeas corpus proceedings. Thus, under these circumstances, the plea did not constitute a deliberate by-pass. See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 n. 3, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); United States ex rel. Ross v. Fike, 534 F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 1976); Partida v. Castaneda, 524 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1975); Hale v. Henderson, 485 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930, 94 S.Ct. 1442, 39 L.Ed.2d 489 (1974); Miller v. Carter, 434 F.2d 824, 825 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972, 91 S.Ct. 1658, 29 L.Ed.2d 137 (1971); Anders v. Turner, 379 F.2d 46, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1967).

This result is consistent with the reasoning underlying the deliberate by-pass doctrine. The doctrine was born from comity a recognition that in our federalism, appropriate recognition must be paid to state jurisdictions. Thus, the federal district judge in his discretion may "accord controlling effect to a state's insistence upon compliance with reasonable procedural rules which promote legitimate state interests." Anders v. Turner, supra, 379 F.2d at 50. It follows that if the state treated the voluntary guilty plea as a final resolution of the criminal proceeding, thereby vindicating its interest in finality, see Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 441 (1963), the federal court could impose a forfeiture of federal habeas insofar as the petitioner's claim could have been raised at trial. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, supra, 420 U.S. at 289, 95 S.Ct. 886. However, comity provides no justification for imposing a forfeiture when the state itself does not treat the guilty plea as a final resolution of the proceedings. ⁵

B. Claim Subsequent to Guilty Plea

In the Brady trilogy, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970), the Court established another bar to federal habeas subsequent to a guilty plea. In these cases, the Court held that a guilty plea, voluntarily and intelligently given upon the advice of competent counsel, barred a later collateral attack relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the plea. This principle was reaffirmed in Tollett v. Henderson, supra, 411 U.S. at 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602. ⁶

While there is language in the trilogy suggesting that the reason for the rule was waiver of rights, see, e. g., Brady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, or deliberate by-pass, see, e. g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 768-69, 90 S.Ct. 1441, the Court later emphasized that neither waiver nor by-pass was the main theme. Rather, it was that a guilty plea establishes as a substantive matter the factual guilt of the defendant. ⁷ Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975); see Tollett v. Henderson, supra, 411 U.S. at 266, 93 S.Ct. 1602; see also ...