Joyner-Pitts v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1993
• Docket Number: JOYNER-PITTS,No. 1789,1789
• Citation: 647 A.2d 116,101 Md.App. 429
• Parties: Jason Lamontv. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 429

101 Md.App. 429

647 A.2d 116

Jason Lamont JOYNER-PITTS v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 1789, Sept. Term, 1993.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 6, 1994.

Bradford C. Peabody, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Mary Inn Ince, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Alexander Williams, Jr., State's Atty. for Prince George's County of Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.

Submitted before WILNER, C.J., and GARRITY and HARRELL, JJ.

HARRELL, Judge.

Jason Lamont Joyner-Pitts was charged with the murder of his girlfriend's seventeen month old child, Shalinia. Following a third trial, appellant was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of second degree murder. He was sentenced by the court to twenty years imprisonment.

The first mistrial occurred as a result of an utterance by the prosecutor made in the course of the trial. The second trial took place in May 1993. Although appellant was being tried under a one count indictment charging first degree murder, the court instructed the jury that, under the single count, it could consider whether the State had proven that Joyner-Pitts was guilty of: (1) murder in the first degree; (2) murder in the second degree--specific intent; (3) murder in the second degree--depraved heart; or, (4) manslaughter as a The case went to the jury on 20 May 1993. Around the noon hour on 21 May, the jury sent the court a note stating "We have a 10-2 jury. What do we do and how?" When the jury foreperson was unable to respond to the court's question whether further deliberation would assist in movement one way or the other, the jury was excused for lunch so the judge could consider what to do next, after consultation with counsel. When court was reconvened after the luncheon recess, the judge sent the jury back to consider whether further deliberation would assist in movement to a unanimous verdict or whether the positions were irrevocably locked in.

                result of a grossly negligent act.  To aid the jury in its deliberations, the court apparently gave the jury a paper with these four variations of homicide listed. 1  The defense characterized the paper as a "special verdict sheet."   The court disagreed, characterizing it as "a scorecard I gave them to keep track of the four ways a person could be guilty under this [one count] indictment of this charge."
                

Thirty minutes passed before another note was sent out by the jury. It said "Further deliberations in our opinion will not result in a unanimous decision." The judge brought the jury back, gave them an Allen charge, and sent them back a few minutes before 2:00 p.m. to resume deliberations. A very short time later, the jury sent a third note indicating "After further deliberation[,] we are still at deadlock. Please advise."

Out of the jury's presence, counsel and the court discussed the situation. Defense counsel wanted the judge to bring the jury in and "take a verdict on any of the offenses set out in the special verdict sheet and declare a mistrial as to any offenses that they can't reach a verdict on." The judge refused to do that, explaining that he interpreted the jury's "10-2" vote as an indication that they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the single count indictment. Defense counsel argued it would be "absolutely unjust" to subject Joyner-Pitts to The jury was returned to the courtroom. After the foreperson advised the court that further deliberation would not be productive, defense counsel asked the judge to "inquire whether they've reached a verdict as to any of the offenses that were set out on the verdict sheet." Instead, the judge inquired of the jury whether they would be "able to give us a unanimous verdict as to this one count indictment?" After the foreperson responded in the negative, a mistrial was declared due to the jury deadlock.

jeopardy at yet another trial on any of the submitted versions of homicide if the jury unanimously could find him not guilty as to that version. The State, on the other hand, urged the court to make the jury continue to deliberate. The judge was unwilling to do that, observing that, in view of the jury's position, to do so would be coercive.

Prior to commencement of his third trial, appellant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court's refusal in the second trial to ask the jury if it could find appellant not guilty of either first or second degree murder violated his right not to be retried for first degree murder. In his motion, appellant asserted that there was a "substantial basis to believe that defendant may have been acquitted of first degree murder or first degree and second degree murder in this case." The relief sought in the motion was that the court "dismiss any charges against the defendant to which the jury has previously reached a verdict."

At the hearing on appellant's motion to dismiss conducted on 21 September 1993, the judge, after ruling that it was inadmissible hearsay for the foreperson of the jury in the second trial, called as appellant's witness, to answer defense counsel's questions about what happened in the prior jury deliberations, himself asked the witness what the result of the jury's deliberations had been on each of the varieties of homicide that had been submitted to it. The witness responded: (a) 12-0 not guilty as to first degree murder; (b) 12-0 not guilty as to second degree murder, specific intent; (c) 10 voting guilty as to second degree murder, depraved heart Appellant argued that the anomaly of Maryland law that permits under a single count indictment for first degree murder the consideration of lesser included varieties of homicide requires, in recognition of a defendant's constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, that a judge receive and accept partial verdicts on any of the included varieties of homicide, Maryland Rule 4-327(d) notwithstanding. Stated another way, for constitutional analysis, appellant contended that each of the homicide varieties included under the single count should be viewed as separately charged offenses.

                and, (d) 2 voting guilty of manslaughter.  [647 A.2d 118]  Quixotically, the trial judge restated his opinion that the foregoing testimony was inadmissible as hearsay, but because he wanted "to get to the nub" of appellant's contention, he admitted the testimony "for the purposes of this hearing."   The "nub," as the judge saw it, was whether the court was required to take partial verdicts
                

The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss. In explaining his ruling, he seemed at first to recant his earlier, somewhat ambiguous evidentiary ruling as to the admissibility of the jury foreperson's testimony. He stated "I don't believe the evidence is before the Court because as I ruled, the evidence before the Court was blatant hearsay evidence." He continued, however, saying:

But going beyond that I don't think it makes any difference because I do not believe the state of the law is at this moment that when you submit a one count indictment to the jury and the jury comes back and says we're ten to two that you have the--that the Judge then has the duty to say in what regard are you ten to two?

At some point between the court's denial of the motion to dismiss on 21 September and the commencement of the third trial the next morning, the State "dumped the first degree murder charge." This we are able to infer from a comment made by defense counsel early in the proceedings on 22 September. Thus, the third trial proceeded only on the

remaining varieties of homicide--second degree (specific intent), second degree murder (depraved heart), and manslaughter. The jury returned its verdicts of not guilty to second degree murder (specific intent) and guilty of second degree murder (depraved heart) on 28 September 1993. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

Appellant has posed three questions for our consideration:

I. Did the trial court err in denying the motion to dismiss the charge of second degree specific intent murder and in sending that count to the jury?

II. Did the trial court give an improper instruction on the meaning of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt"?

III. Did the trial court err in admitting Appellant's statement to the police?

Because of our affirmative reply to appellant's second question, we need not address his third question. We do deem it necessary, however, to reach his initial query in this opinion.

FACTS

On Friday, 14 August 1992, at about 3:00 a.m., appellant, who was seventeen years old at the time, arrived at the basement apartment of his seventeen year old girlfriend, Wilhandest Shannon, in Landover, Prince George's County. Ms. Shannon lived there with her two children, Shalinia, age 17 months, and Daniel, age 2 years.

Sunday evening, 16 August, Ms. Shannon and appellant had "an argument.... about Shalinia," and "about going to bed." Afterwards, appellant slept on the floor.

On Monday morning, 17 August, Ms. Shannon left for work, after leaving Shalinia with her landlady, Gloria Herrera, who lived upstairs in the same house. Appellant walked with Ms. Shannon to the bus stop at about 8:30 a.m. Ms. Shannon told appellant to "go home," explaining to him: "That we was having a problem and things weren't going to change."

According to the landlady, when appellant returned to the house that morning, he took Shalinia and went downstairs.

Later that afternoon, appellant came upstairs to tell the other occupants of the house to "call on the phone." Herrera followed appellant downstairs, where "he was breathing on her [Shalinia's] mouth and rubbing her chest."

The responding firefighters testified that appellant was attempting to perform CPR on the child and saying "don't die, don't die." Asked what happened, appellant told one firefighter that he was "trying to sleep" and he "told the baby to leave me alone,...