Joyner v. Holland

• Decision Date: 02 August 1965
• Docket Number: No. 3717.,3717.
• Citation: 212 A.2d 541
• Parties: James R. JOYNER, Appellant, v. John Henry HOLLAND and Spartan Insurance Company, a corporation, Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

212 A.2d 541

James R. JOYNER, Appellant, v. John Henry HOLLAND and Spartan Insurance Company, a corporation, Appellees.

No. 3717.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 14, 1965.

Decided August 2, 1965.

James R. Treese, Washington, D. C., with whom Thomas S. Jackson, Robert M. Gray, and John L, Laskey, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.

Lyon L. Tyler, Ir. Washington, D. L., for appellees,

Before QUINN and MYERS, Associate Judges, and CAYTON (Chief Judge, Retired).

CAYTON, Judge:

Here for review is a decision of the trial court holding the owner of an automobile liable for the negligent operation thereof by his co-owner.

Following are the essential facts presented below. Appellant loyner and a mall named Foreman were owners of an automobile, Foreman was operating the automobile, Joyner not being with him at the time, and was involved in a collision with Holland, Rolland and his Insurer sued the two owners, Joyner and Foreman. Foreman defaulted and judgment was entered against him, Joyner presented no evidence by way of defense but moved for judgment on the ground that there had been no proof of agency as between the two defendants. This contention was rejected by the trial court and judgment was entered against. Joyner.

On this appeal the only question is whether plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case. Code 1961, 40-424 provides:

"Whenever any motor vehicle, after the passage of this chapter, shall be operated upon the public highways of the District of Columbia by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed to be the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle, and the proof of the owership of said motor vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that such person operated said motor vehicle with the consent of the owner." (Emphasis supplied.)

It has long been understood and accepted that the effect of this statute is to make proof of ownership prima facie evidence of consent and to place on the owner the burden of proving that his vehicle was not operated with his express or implied consent at the time of collision. See, e.g., Hiscox v. Jackson, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 127 F.2d 160; Lancaster v. Canuel, D.C. App., 193 A.2d 555; Conrad v. Porter, D.C. Mun.App., 79 A.2d 777; also various cases therein cited. Such indeed had been the general law in this jurisdiction long before the statute was enacted. Almost forty years ago it was held that "proof that the automobile was owned by the defendant at the time of the accident establishes a prima facie case for the plaintiff." Curry v. Stevenson, 58 App.D.C. 162, 163, 26 F.2d 534, 535.

The owner in this case presented no proof whatever. Instead, he relied on his status as "co-owner" as exempting him from liability. Such claim cannot be sustained. We cannot approve the reasoning by which co-owners would have a lesser responsibility than a single owner. There is no doubt that if a third party had been operating the automobile both owners would be presumptively liable under the statute. The fact that one of the owners was the driver does not entitle the other owner to say that he was automatically relieved of liability. If he relied on some special circumstances to establish immunity, it would have been a simple matter to present proof thereof; and such was his statutory obligation. But as we have seen, he elected to present no evidence.

The statute which governs here has a broad social purpose and is to be construed realistically. It would be highly unrealistic to construe it flatly as meaning that "a person other than the owner" does not include one of two co-owners, and that a plaintiff would have to prove affirmatively that one co-owner had the consent of the other to operate the vehicle. Such a construction would do violence to the letter and spirit of the statute. It is much more accurate to say that in a co-ownership of an automobile there is an implied mutual consent to the use and operation thereof by either owner.

On the basis of the record before us it must be held that the statute applied to both owners. See Krum v. Malloy, 22 Cal. 2d 132, 137 P.2d 18; Moore v. Noorthoek, 280 Mich. 431, 273 N.W. 758; Kangas v. Winquist, 207 Minn. 315, 291 N.W. 292. We agree with counsel for appellees that there is no valid basis in law or logic "to divide `the owner' into personal segments though one personal segment of `the owner' also be the operator."

Affirmed.

MYERS, Associate Judge (dissenting):

I must disagree with my associates' decision upholding imposition of liability by the trial court upon appellant under the Automobile Financial Responsibility Act (40 D.C.Code, 1961 § 424).

The majority opinion recites the common law rule that "proof that the automobile was owned by the defendant at the time of the accident establishes a prima facie case for the plaintiff." This rule was laid down in Curry v. Stevenson, 58 App.D.C. 162, 163, 26 F.2d 534, 535 (1928), a case decided before the statute in question was enacted and involving singular ownership of the vehicle involved. While the rule is applicable in a situation where only one owner of the vehicle is involved, it does not apply where two or more persons jointly hold title thereto. According to the rule in general acceptance, the fact that one is a co-owner of an automobile does not render him liable for damage caused by its negligent operation by another co-owner in using the vehicle for his own purposes unaccompanied by the co-owner. To hold the absent co-owner liable there must be evidence of agency or proof of joint enterprise. Rushing v. Polk, 258 N.C. 256, 128 S.E.2d 675 (1962); Nantz v. Nantz, 354 S.W.2d 283 (Ky.1962); Bolton v. Schimming, 226 Or. 330, 360 P.2d 540 (1961); Doleman v. Burandt, 160 Neb. 745, 71 N.W.2d 521 (1955); Hamilton v. Vioue, 90 Wash. 618. 156 P. 853, L.R.A.1916E, 1300 (1916); Towers v. Errington, 78 Misc.Rep. 297, 138 N.Y.S. 119 (1912); Annot., 109 A.L.R. 124; 8 Am.Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 562; 5A Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice § 3158. Since there was no evidence of principal and agent, joint enterprise, or some community of interest in the case before us, appellant's liability cannot be justified on the basis of common law principles.

My associates assert, however, that proof of agency was supplied here by 40 D.C. Code, 1961 § 424 and rely on that Code section to affirm the judgment below. Section 424 provides in pertinent part as follows:

"Whenever any motor vehicle * * shall be operated upon the public highways of the District of Columbia by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed to be the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle, and the proof of the ownership of said motor vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that such person operated said motor vehicle with the consent of the owner." [Emphasis supplied.]

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit passed upon the purpose of this statute in Mason v. Automobile Finance Co., 73 App.D.C. 284, 287, 121 F.2d 32, 35 (1941):

"[T]he purpose of the statute was to place the liability upon the person in a position immediately to allow or prevent the use of the vehicle and to do so by giving a lawful and effective consent or prohibition to its operation by others. The object was to control the giving of consent to irresponsible drivers by the one having that power rather than to impose liability upon one having a naked legal title with no immediate right of control."¹ [Emphasis supplied.]

The statute makes the owner's consent, express or implied, to the operation of his automobile by another in the District of Columbia the equivalent of agency. The effect of this provision is to shift the burden of proof and to impose on defendant owner the affirmative duty of proving that...