Joyner v. Priest

• Citation: 117 S.W.2d 9,173 Tenn. 320
• Parties: JOYNER, Sheriff, et al. v. PRIEST, Comptroller, et al.
• Decision Date: 27 May 1938
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

117 S.W.2d 9

173 Tenn. 320

JOYNER, Sheriff, et al. v. PRIEST, Comptroller, et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 27, 1938

Appeal from Chancery Court, Davidson County; R. B. C. Howell Chancellor.

Bill by Guy Joyner, Sheriff, and others, against Marshall Priest Comptroller, and others, for declaratory judgment to test the constitutionality of the act creating the State Crime Commission. The chancellor found that the complainants were not entitled to a declaratory judgment but declared the act unconstitutional, and both parties appeal.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

COOK Justice.

The bill was filed by Guy Joyner, Sheriff, W. T. McLane, District Attorney, and Thomas Welford, foreman of the grand jury public officials of Shelby County, W. Percy McDonald, a State official, Clarence Bowe, W. W. Fisher, E. A. Powell and Sam House, citizens and taxpayers of Shelby County. The object of the bill was to test the constitutionality of Chapter 13, Third Public Acts Extra Session of 1937, which created a Crime Commission; and if the Act is found valid the complainants ask for a judgment declaratory of their rights, duties and obligations under it.

It was charged that the Act violates provisions of both the State and Federal Constitutions and is void. The defendants demurred to the bill because (1) it presents no ground for a declaratory decree, and (2) the bill discloses no constitutional defect that would justify a decree declaring it void.

The chancellor found that the complainants were not entitled to a declaratory judgment but declared the Act unconstitutional. Both parties appealed. The complainants insist that the chancellor should have ruled, if the Act was constitutional, that the bill presents a case for a declaratory decree and that this court should reverse his ruling because (1) Guy Joyner, as sheriff, has a direct interest in knowing how far and to what extent he can be directed to serve process issued by the Commission or receive into his custody as jailer persons committed by the Commission for contempt; (2) W. T. McLane is directly interested in knowing the extent to which he must cooperate with the Commission, and whether he shall turn over his books and records and whether he can proceed to indict persons under arrest or prosecute persons under indictment contrary to immunities given or pardons granted by the Commission; (3) Thomas Welford, foreman of the grand jury, asserts that he has a special interest in knowing the extent to which he must refrain from indictment of persons who have been granted immunity by the Commission and to what extent he must reveal the secrets of the grand jury by orders of the Commission, and (4) other complainants insist that they have special rights in a decree declaratory as to whether they must obey the processes and orders of the Commission.

There is no merit in complainants' assignments of error to the action of the chancellor in holding that their bill presents no case for a declaratory decree. Elaboration is not necessary. It is sufficient to say, from the foregoing synopsis, substantially copied from complainants' brief, that no rights are involved upon which a declaratory decree could be made under their bill. The decree of the chancellor sustaining the second ground of demurrer and holding that the bill presents no case for a declaratory decree is affirmed.

For reasons stated in the opinion filed in the cause of Walter Rushing et al. v. Tennessee Crime Commission et al., 173 Tenn. 308, 117 S.W.2d 4, the action of the chancellor in sustaining the first ground of the demurrer and holding the act unconstitutional is reversed. As said in the opinion of Rushing v. Crime Commission, supra, the Act provides for a committee of inquiry, called the Tennessee Crime Commission, and confers upon the Commission authority to investigate, assemble facts, and make findings for a report to the Legislature as the basis for corrective legislation designed to protect the public against the consequences of crime, arising from whatever cause, and to provide means through which the duties imposed upon the Commission may be accomplished.

In addition to the ten or more constitutional infirmities alleged and relied on in the case of Rushing v. Crime Commission, supra, the complainants insist that the...