Joyner v. State
Decision Date | 29 November 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 1173,Sept. Term, 2011.,1173 |
Citation | 56 A.3d 787,208 Md.App. 500 |
Parties | Carlton Everette JOYNER v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Michael R. Braudes (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Robert Taylor, Jr. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: KEHOE, BERGER and LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
A jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County convicted Carlton Everette Joyner, appellant, of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The trial court sentenced appellant on July 15, 2011, imposing concurrent sentences of four and five years respectively.
Appellant filed a timely appeal and presents the following questions:
1. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress his statement to police?
[208 Md.App. 503]2. Did the trial court fail to properly exercise discretion, or in the alternative abuse its discretion, in refusing to permit a defense witness to testify?
3. Did the trial court err in permitting Nicole Edwards to testify as an expert when the State failed to disclose her as such in discovery?
4. Did the trial court err in permitting the State to play an audiotape of alleged telephone calls from prison by Appellant in the absence of proper authentication?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgments of conviction.
Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress pursuant to Md. Rule 4–252. A hearing on this motion was conducted, at which Detective Kevin McConnell of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department testified.2 Detective McConnell testified that on November 4, 2010, members of a drug enforcement task force executed a search warrant at 825 Marcy Avenue in Oxon Hill, and recovered crack cocaine, marijuana and associated paraphernalia.3
Appellant gave a statement while in police custody, and the appellant moved to suppress his statement. At the hearing on the pre-trial motion to suppress, Detective McConnell's testimony provided the context in which the statement was given:
And while we were doing the arrest paperwork at the computer terminal, after we set down at the terminal, we had no more contact with Mr. Joyner. He was off being processed.
On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Detective McConnell explained how appellant was advised:
Just verbally. I stated to him basically stating the obvious, that he's in handcuffs, being transported, he's under arrest. He's not free to go, and that he had a right to remain silent. Anything he said could be used against him in court. He has a right to an attorney. If he wants to talk to us now and answer questions, he can do so. He can stop answering at any time. Just, you know, just verbally. Also, that if he started answering questions and got to a question that he didn't want to answer, we would just move on. Or we might not have any questions for him at all and he can just tell me what happened today and what brought him here.
Detective McConnell testified that appellant had no questions about his rights, and that he had never asked to speak with an attorney. Appellant responded affirmatively when the Detective McConnell asked whether he understood everything. The detective also raised the possibility of cooperation:
When I had finished up at approximately 8:50 hours, I told him at some later point in time, if he wanted to get with his attorney and do some work for us, his attorney will get with the State's Attorney and maybe we could work something out.
On re-direct examination by defense counsel, Detective McConnell emphasized that his recitation of the Miranda4 rights “covered all the major points.” He was certain of this because he's
After the detective's testimony, defense counsel maintained that the appellant's statements to the detectives should be suppressed. Defense counsel argued that:
Regarding the statements of Mr. Joyner, Mr. Joyner was not asked to—was not asked at any point in time for any kind of written waiver, although that is the normal course definitely for the authorities in this area, in Prince George's County. And anybody who would be acting on their behalf, which I'm taking this task force to be acting in their behalf. And that's the standard that tells us that somebody has intelligently waived their rights.
Secondly, the fact is even Detective McConnell admits—I hope I got that right—admits that the statements themselves were not delivered in a classic form that had been approved by authorities but, instead, were given more or less in a more informal manner, perhaps sounding somewhat piecemeal and without any real assurance that they were all given or that Mr. Joyner would have known what exactly he was doing, nor that he would have received a warning that would have made him realize that the things he was saying were being recorded.
And I think the fact is the testimony did indicate at some point he talked about contact with President Obama, which indicated the lack of seriousness with which he was holding the conversation.
For that reason, I submit that Mr. Joyner did not have an intelligent waiver of his rights, and we ask the Court to suppress the statements he made that the state now wish to use against him.
Following argument from the prosecutor, defense counsel added:
Your Honor, just that I think the procedural safeguard is really what we're arguing herein that what Prince George's County has found to be a proper procedural safeguard was not followed in this case. And basically what we're saying is that we have to take the word of a person and that proper procedures which would assure us that the protections were provided have not been followed in both cases. Both in the deliverance of any possible Miranda-style warning[.]
The motions court denied appellant's motions to suppress. The court explained its ruling as follows:
As for the statements made in the back of the police car, while not exactly a blurt, in fact not a blurt, it may have started out that way. Eventually, the advisement to the defendant who apparently was not the first time he heard those words, certainly not on TV, understood clearly what he was saying. And when the police detective began writing it down, he got a little apprehensive and stopped. Outside of that, I see no legal reason whatsoever to grant the motion to suppress at this point.
Shawn Arthur testified as an agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“BATF”). He was on duty on November 4, 2010 at about 6:00 a.m., participating in the execution of a search warrant at 825 Marcy Avenue, ApartmentT–3, in Oxon Hill. Agent Arthur recounted that, upon entering the apartment he encountered appellant and “took [him] into custody.” The agent then searched the hallway closet and the kitchen area, and recovered $600 in United States currency from the pocket of an Eddie Bauer winter coat. He also located a digital scale on the top right shelf of a kitchen cabinet.
James Harris testified as an Agent with the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. Agent Harris also participated in the execution of the search warrant at the apartment where the appellant was arrested. Appellant was the only adult male in the apartment when Agent Harris entered, although there was a woman and children present. He located “multiple empty Ziploc bags” and discovered an additional...
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