JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Seema

• Decision Date: 28 February 2019
• Docket Number: Index 381702/08,8561N
• Citation: 169 A.D.3d 622,92 N.Y.S.3d 888 (Mem)
• Parties: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Maharaj SEEMA, Defendant–Appellant, NYC Environmental Controls Board, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

169 A.D.3d 622

92 N.Y.S.3d 888 (Mem)

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Maharaj SEEMA, Defendant–Appellant,NYC Environmental Controls Board, et al., Defendants.

8561N

Index 381702/08

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Decided on February 28, 2019

The Rosenfeld Law Office, Lawrence (Avi Rosenfeld of counsel), for appellant.

Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLC, Rochester (Alex Cameron of counsel), for respondent.

Friedman, J.P., Kapnick, Webber, Oing, Singh, JJ.

Appeal from order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered on or about June 28, 2017, which denied defendant Maharaj's motion to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale and to dismiss the complaint, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as taken by a nonaggrieved party.

Only an "aggrieved" party, meaning one who has a "direct interest in the controversy which is affected by the result," may appeal from a judgment or order ( State of New York v. Philip Morris Inc., 61 A.D.3d 575, 578, 877 N.Y.S.2d 291 [1st Dept. 2009], appeal dismissed 15 N.Y.3d 898, 912 N.Y.S.2d 568, 938 N.E.2d 1002 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; CPLR 5511 ). Here, defendant Maharaj lacks a direct interest in the controversy because, before she moved to vacate the judgment of foreclosure, she had conveyed her interest in the subject property to a third party (see NYCTL 1996–1 Trust v. King, 304 A.D.2d 629, 630–631, 758 N.Y.S.2d 374 [2d Dept. 2003], lv dismissed 100 N.Y.2d 614, 767 N.Y.S.2d 396, 799 N.E.2d 619 [2003] ). Although Maharaj contends that she continues to have a potential interest in the foreclosure proceeding as a debtor on the underlying mortgage, it is undisputed that the foreclosure sale took place and the Referee delivered the deed in February of 2018, while the appeal was pending. Since more than 90 days have passed since the foreclosure sale and delivery of the deed, plaintiff is now precluded from pursuing a deficiency judgment against Maharaj ( RPAPL 1371[2],[3] ). Accordingly, the order appealed from does not impact any existing right of Maharaj (see 270 N. Broadway Tenants Corp. v. Round Oaks Props., LLC, 116 A.D.3d 1035, 1037, 985 N.Y.S.2d 123 [2d Dept. 2014] ).