JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Timmons
Decision Date | 23 June 2021 |
Docket Number | 2021-UP-231,Appellate 2018-000355 |
Parties | JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, Respondent, v. Fritz A. Timmons, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted May 1, 2021
Appeal From Chesterfield County William O. Spencer, Jr., Special Referee
Fritz A. Timmons, of Hartsville, pro se.
Benjamin Rush Smith, III and Nicholas Andrew Charles, both of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia, for Respondent.
Fritz A. Timmons appeals the special referee's order granting summary judgment to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) in its foreclosure and claim and delivery actions against Timmons involving a mobile home and real property (the Property) in Chesterfield County. On appeal, Timmons argues (1) Chase had "dirty hands" and lacked standing; (2) Chase did not have a cause of action for foreclosure; (3) the special referee lacked jurisdiction because Timmons did not consent to the special referee hearing the case and the special referee conspired with Chase and the clerk of court; (4) Timmons preserved issues for review because of perjury and fraud upon the court; (5) Michael P. Leddy, the attorney in fact for a prior holder of the note (the Note) and assignee of the mortgage (the Mortgage), did not have authority to assign the Note; (6) all parts of the special referee's orders were perjury and fraud upon the court, and this court must justify each and every finding; (7) the Mortgage was void when there was no recourse and remedy; (8) Timmons was entitled to several remedies based on criminal actions of Chase, the clerk of court, and the special referee; and (9) Chase was unjustly enriched by the annexation of Timmons's mobile home. We affirm.[1]
1. As to issue three, whether the special referee did not have jurisdiction because Timmons did not consent to the case being referred to the special referee, we hold the special referee had jurisdiction because Rule 53(b), SCRCP, provides the clerk of court may refer foreclosure and related causes of action to a special referee without consent of the parties. See Rule 53(b), SCRCP . Moreover, once the case was referred without limitation to the special referee, the special referee had the power to act with the power and authority of a circuit court judge. See Rule 53(c), SCRCP ("Once referred, the master or special referee shall exercise all power and authority which a circuit judge sitting without a jury would have in a similar matter."). In support of his position that his consent was required, Timmons cites to sections 14-17-250 and 14-11-60 of the South Carolina Code (2017); however, these code sections do not apply. See § 14-17-250 ("The clerk of any county in which the office of master does not exist may, by consent of parties, sign orders of reference in vacation and may also, upon proper proceedings filed, grant orders for the partition of real or personal estate and for the admeasurement of dower in cases where the right of partition or dower is not contested or the same has been ascertained by a decree of the court."); § 14-11-60 ().[2] Because this case was properly before the special referee, we need not analyze the specific relief Timmons requests in issue eight.
2. As to issue one, whether Chase did not have standing and had unclean hands, we hold Chase had standing to bring this case because Chase held the Note and was assigned the Mortgage. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Draper, 405 S.C. 214, 219 746 S.E.2d 478, 480 (Ct. App. 2013) ; id. ; id. at 220, 746 S.E.2d at 481 ; id. ; S.C. Code Ann. § 36-3-205(b) (2003) ("When indorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed."); Ballou v. Young, 42 S.C. 170, 176, 20 S.E. 84, 85 (1894) ("The transfer of a note carries with it a mortgage given to secure payment of such note.").[3]
3. As to issue two, whether Chase had no cause of action for foreclosure, we find Timmons abandoned this argument because he only cited the standard of review without identifying what was wrong with the complaint. See Ellie, Inc. v. Miccichi, 358 S.C. 78, 99, 594 S.E.2d 485, 496 (Ct. App. 2004) ().
4. As to issues four, five, and seven, we find they are unpreserved. See S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301-02, 641 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007) ( ; S.C. Const. art. V, § 9 (); State v. Phillips, 416 S.C. 184, 194, 785 S.E.2d 448, 453 (2016) (); Cowburn v. Leventis, 366 S.C. 20, 41, 619 S.E.2d 437, 449 (Ct. App. 2005) ().
5. As to issue six, whether the special referee's orders were perjury and fraud upon the court, we need not address these arguments. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) ( ). Timmons's arguments surrounding his belief that the special referee's orders were perjury and fraud upon the court were based on the belief that the special referee did not have jurisdiction and the action was not properly before the special referee. As stated above, we hold the causes of action were properly referred to the special referee.
6. As to Timmons's issue nine, concerning unjust enrichment and the Fourth Amendment, Timmons did not file an answer challenging that the Mortgage only applied to the Property. Thus, he admitted Chase's allegation asserted in its complaint that the Mortgage covered the mobile home too. See Rule 7(a), SCRCP (); Rule 12(a), SCRCP ("A defendant shall serve his answer . . . ."); Rule 8(d), SCRCP (). Moreover, we find Timmons abandoned his argument about the Fourth Amendment because he failed to explain in his brief how the Fourth Amendment applied and did not cite to any authority for that specific proposition. See Broom v. Jennifer J., 403 S.C. 96 115, 742 S.E.2d 382, 391 (2013) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial