Juan G. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cnty.
| Decision Date | 15 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. B241316.,B241316. |
| Citation | 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 816,209 Cal.App.4th 1480 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | JUAN G., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent. The People, Real Party in Interest. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
See 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Parent and Child, § 835 et seq.
Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender of Los Angeles County, Albert J. Menaster, Robert Krauss and Michael A. Theberge, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles, Roberta Schwartz and Shirley S.N. Sun, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.
Sixteen-year-old Juan G. was named in two wardship petitions filed in juvenile court alleging he had committed attempted murder and violated a criminal street gang injunction. After the People filed a criminal complaint directly in superior court charging Juan with murder in an unrelated incident, the pending juvenile court petitions were transferred to adult criminal court without a fitness hearing. The juvenile court reasoned the district attorney's discretionary direct filing of the murder complaint constituted a finding of unfitness within the meaning of the governing transfer statute, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.01, subdivision (a)(3)(A),1 and no formal fitness hearing or additional finding of Juan's unfitness was required to transfer the pending wardship petitions.
We agree with Juan a judicial finding of unfitness following a hearing was required before the wardship petitions could be transferred to adult court. The juvenile court's contrary conclusion failed to consider the express language of section 606, which, in the circumstances presented here, prohibits a criminal prosecution based on the facts underlying a wardship petition absent a finding of unfitness by the juvenile court. In addition, the court's broad construction of the language in the transfer statute ignored the incremental development of the relevant juvenile law and violated fundamental principles of statutory interpretation disfavoring the implied repeal of existing law. Accordingly, we grant Juan's petition for a writ of mandate and direct respondent Los Angeles Superior Court to vacate its order deeming him unfit for juvenile court treatment and thereafter to conduct a formal fitness hearing pursuant to section 707.
On January 13, 2012 the People filed a wardship petition under section 602 alleging Juan had committed the crime of attempted murder (Pen.Code, §§ 187, 664) on January 8, 2012 and further alleging Juan had personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim and the crime had been committed to benefit a criminal street gang. The petition specifically alleged Juan was 16 years old at the time of the alleged offense. Contemporaneously with their filing of the section 602 petition, the People also filed and served a motion for a determination Juan was not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law. (§ 707, subds.(b), (c).)
On February 14, 2012 the People filed a second section 602 petition alleging Juan had violated a criminal street gang injunction, a misdemeanor. (Pen.Code, § 166, subd. (a)(10).) Both matters were continued to February 28, 2012 for the setting of a fitness hearing.
Also on February 14, 2012 the People filed a criminal complaint ( People v. Gutierrez–Hernandez and [G.] (Superior Court, Los Angeles County, No. BA393911)), alleging on October 26, 2011 Juan and a confederate had committed the crime of murder (Pen.Code, § 187) with special allegations Juan had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or death (Pen.Code, § 12022.53, subds.(b), (c), (d)) and the crime had been committed to benefit a criminal street gang.
At a hearing to schedule the fitness hearing on February 28, 2012, Commissioner Robert J. Totten, sitting as a juvenile court referee, noted the murder complaint naming Juan as a defendant had been directly filed in criminal court and explained his view of the governing law: “[W]hen there has been a direct filing, that is a determination by the Legislature that the minor is unfit and, therefore, pursuant to [section] 707.01 this case should go up to the adult court.” The court then invited argument from counsel. The deputy public defender representing Juan argued transfer of the pending petition to criminal court required a judicial finding of unfitness; the discretionary direct filing of the criminal complaint did not carry with it an implied finding of unfitness within the meaning of section 707.01, the transfer statute. The deputy district attorney agreed with defense counsel's argument:
Following argument the court expanded on its reasoning, observing that section 707.01 refers to a finding of unfitness “pursuant to section 707” as a prerequisite to transfer of a pending wardship petition and the authorization for discretionary direct filing in the criminal court is set forth in section 707, subdivision (d): “[I]t doesn't exclude (d)(1), it just says 707.” The court also commented it would make no sense to have a minor subject to adult consequences in one case as the result of a direct filing yet continue in juvenile court on another case. Finally, the court expressed the pragmatic assessment that, even if an evidentiary hearing were held, evaluation of the criteria for determining fitness would undoubtedly result in a finding of unfitness in light of the pending criminal charge that “is so heinous that the Legislature determines ... you have discretion to file as an adult.”
The court then ruled “that the minor is, therefore, unfit for juvenile court and that this case is ordered to be filed in the adult court.” The minute order reflects the matter was referred to the District Attorney for prosecution in criminal court and the juvenile petition dismissed, with dismissal stayed pending the filing of an adult complaint. The court thereafter stayed its orders pending a rehearing before a superior court judge. Juan timely filed a petition for rehearing, which was summarily denied.
After the stay was lifted, the People filed an amended criminal complaint in the pending felony case (No. BA393911), alleging the October 26, 2011 murder as count 1, the January 8, 2012 attempted murder as count 2 and the December 15, 2011 violation of the criminal street gang injunction as count 3. The two pending section 602 petitions were then dismissed. Juan was arraigned on the amended complaint on May 1, 2012.
On May 21, 2012 Juan petitioned this court for a writ of mandate to compel the juvenile court to vacate its orders deeming him unfit for juvenile court treatment and thereafter to conduct a formal fitness hearing pursuant to section 707. At our request the People filed an informal response to the petition. Although they had previously supported Juan's position and urged the juvenile court to conduct a fitness hearing, in their opposition to the writ petition the People argued Juan was properly found unfit without a hearing based on the discretionary direct filing of a case against him in criminal court.2
On June 21, 2012 we issued an order to show cause why the relief requested in the petition should not be granted. On July 9, 2012 the People filed their return and answer to the petition, and on July 30, 2012 Juan filed his reply.
The juvenile court generally exercises delinquency jurisdiction over a minor who has violated the law while under the age of 18. (See §§ 602, 603.) In a variety of circumstances, however, minors who are alleged to have committed certain enumerated offenses at age 14 or older may, and in some instances must, now be prosecuted as adults in a criminal court.
Historically, a child could be tried in criminal court only after a judicial determination, before jeopardy attached, that he or she was unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law. Since 1975 the procedural requirements for fitness hearings have been established by section 707. (See § 707, subds. (a), (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.766(a).)
Under current law, if the minor is 16 years old or older and is alleged to have committed an offense other than one of the serious felonies listed in section 707, subdivision (b),3 the prosecutor may request a fitness hearing; the prosecutor has the burden of proof of unfitness. ( § 707, subd. (a)(1).) The court must order an investigation and report by the probation department on the behavior patterns and social history of the minor ( ibid.) and base its evaluation whether the minor is amenable to the care, treatment and training programs available through the facilities of the juvenile court by considering the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor, whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, the minor's previous history of delinquency, the success of prior rehabilitation efforts and the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the pending petition. ( § 707, subd. (a)(1)(A)-(E).)
If the child is alleged to have committed an offense listed in section 707, subdivision (b), and is 14 years old or older, a fitness hearing may be requested; in these circumstances there is a presumption of unfitness. (§ 707, subd. (c).) To rebut that presumption, the minor must persuade the court he or she is amenable to treatment under the juvenile court law based upon an evaluation of the same five criteria as used to determine fitness under section 707, subdivision (a)(1). Similarly, if the child is 16 years old or...
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Juan G. v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty., B241316.
...209 Cal.App.4th 1480147 Cal.Rptr.3d 816JUAN G., Petitioner,v.The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent.The People, Real Party in Interest.No. B241316.Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.Oct. 15, 2012.Review Denied Jan. 16, See 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (......