Jucker v. Jucker

• Decision Date: 19 July 1983
• Citation: 461 A.2d 1384,190 Conn. 674
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Edith JUCKER v. Ueli JUCKER.

Page 1384

461 A.2d 1384

190 Conn. 674

Edith JUCKER v. Ueli JUCKER.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 2, 1983.

Decided July 19, 1983.

James A. Plessinger, Glastonbury, for appellant (plaintiff).

Christopher F. Droney, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were Hubert J. Santos and A. Susan Peck, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY, GRILLO and COVELLO, JJ.

COVELLO, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from the denial of the plaintiff's motion to open a judgment of dissolution in full or in part on the grounds of fraud. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not presented clear proof of the fraud and further that she had failed to use due diligence to discover and expose the alleged deception at the original trial. We find that there is an adequate factual basis for the conclusions reached by the court, that its conclusions of law were legally correct and we therefore find no error.

On January 28, 1977, the parties' twelve year marriage was dissolved. At the time of the decree, the court approved the parties' agreement concerning custody, alimony, support and the division of their property.

The court awarded custody of their three children to the plaintiff, ordered $100 per week alimony, $30 per week support for each child, ordered the defendant to maintain medical insurance for the children, together with his assumption of any unreimbursed medical and dental expenses, directed the transfer of a family automobile to the plaintiff and ordered the conveyance of the family home to the plaintiff. In consideration of this latter transfer, the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant $10,000 on November 18, 1985, or sooner in the event of her death, remarriage or sale of the house. Finally, the court ordered the defendant to maintain life insurance for the benefit of the children until they reached age eighteen.

On November 25, 1980, the plaintiff moved to open the judgment in full or in part. The motion alleged the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with his answers to a motion for disclosure and production dated June 25, 1976, and in his sworn financial statement filed with the court and dated January 27, 1977. ¹ On November 24, 1980, the court conducted a full hearing on this motion.

The gravamen of the plaintiff's claim was that the defendant failed to disclose (1) the existence of a Swiss savings account; (2) the fact that he had a personal accountant; (3) his ownership of a 50 percent interest in the stock of Jucker and Peace, Inc., a closely held corporation; (4) a 60 percent vested interest in a pension and profit sharing plan provided by that corporation; (5) his actual income for 1976; (6) his ownership of business real property in East Windsor; (7) the rental income derived from that property; and (8) the fact that he was self-employed.

"With ... judicial supervision, private settlement of the financial affairs of estranged marital partners is a goal that courts should support." (Citations omitted.) Baker v. Baker, 187 Conn. 315, 322, 445 A.2d 912 (1982). " 'Under our statutes, a court has an affirmative obligation, in divorce proceedings, to determine whether a settlement agreement is "fair and equitable under all the circumstances." General Statutes § 46b-66. [To this end] [t]he presiding judge has the obligation to conduct a searching inquiry to make sure that the settlement agreement is substantively fair and has been knowingly negotiated. Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 183-84, 413 A.2d 819, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S.Ct. 20, 62 L.Ed.2d 14 (1979).' " Baker v. Baker, supra, 321-22, 445 A.2d 912.

Pivotal to the validity of such an inquiry is the absolute accuracy of the financial information furnished by the parties to one another and to the court. "A court is entitled to rely upon the truth and accuracy of sworn statements required by § of the Practice Book, and a misrepresentation of assets and income is a serious and intolerable dereliction on the part of the affiant which goes to the very heart of the judicial proceeding." Casanova v. Casanova, 166 Conn. 304, 305, 348 A.2d 668 (1974). It follows, therefore, that a judgment rendered by the court with consent of the parties may be subsequently opened if it is shown that the stipulated settlement was obtained by fraud or intentional material misrepresentation. Cf. Kenworthy v. Kenworthy, 180 Conn. 129, 131, 429 A.2d 837 (1980); Sparaco v. Tenney, 175 Conn. 436, 437-38, 399 A.2d 1261 (1978).

Although the law will intervene to insure that substantial justice is done where fraud has been perpetrated, the frequency and extent of this intervention must be tempered by a sometimes conflicting adjudicative proposition that mandates the ultimate conclusion of all legal controversy. Thus, the setting aside of a judgment on the basis of fraud "will only be granted if the [movant] is not barred by any of the following restrictions: (1) There must have been no laches or unreasonable delay by the injured party after the fraud was discovered. (2) There must have been diligence ... in trying to discover and expose the fraud. (3) There must be clear proof of the perjury or fraud. (4) There must be a substantial likelihood that the result of the new trial will be different. James, Civil Procedure (1965) § 11.7, pp. 540-42; [note,] 36 Ill.L.Rev. 894, 896-97 (1942)." Varley v. Varley, 180 Conn. 1, 4, 428 A.2d 317 (1980).

Having heard the parties and reviewed the...