Judah v. State, 93-2954
| Decision Date | 09 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-2954,93-2954 |
| Citation | 654 So.2d 994 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1149 Danny Eldred JUDAH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Donald S. Modesitt, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Thomas Crapps, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
Danny Judah (Appellant) appeals from a judgment and sentence entered after the jury found him guilty of possession of over 20 grams of cannabis and carrying a concealed firearm. Appellant claims reversible error in the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress (Issue II) and his motion for judgment of acquittal (Issue III). From our review of the proceedings below, we conclude that the points raised in Issues II & III are without merit and warrant no further discussion. Sec. 901.151, Fla.Stat. ("stop and frisk" law); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Daniels v. State, 543 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (); Sec. 790.001(2), Fla.Stat. (defining "concealed firearm"); Ensor v. State, 403 So.2d 349, 353-54 (Fla.1981) (). In Issue I, Appellant challenges the decision of the trial court sua sponte to excuse without a full inquiry several members of the venire who knew Appellant, but to retain on the jury panel those individuals who knew the state's key witnesses. From our review of the voir dire proceedings, as set forth in pertinent part, infra, we conclude that the judicial error alleged in Issue I was not preserved for appeal. Turner v. State, 645 So.2d 444, 446 (Fla.1994); Maxwell v. State, 443 So.2d 967, 970 (Fla.1983) (). Accordingly, we affirm judgment and sentence.
However, we feel compelled to set forth and comment on the unorthodox and inconsistent methods used by the trial court in conducting the jury selection process. The marijuana and the firearm had been discovered in Appellant's truck by officers of the Monticello Police Department in Jefferson County. With the venire assembled, the trial judge explained the process of voir dire:
[C]ounsel for the prosecution and counsel for the defendant, will be asking you questions touching on your qualifications to serve as jurors in this particular case. This part of the case is what's known as the voir dire examination, which is for the purpose of determining whether your decision in this case would in any way be influenced by opinions which you now hold or by some personal experience or special knowledge which you may have concerning the subject matter to be tried. The object is to obtain six persons who will impartially try the issues of this case upon the evidence presented in this courtroom, without being influenced by any other factors. Please understand that this questioning is not for the purpose of prying into your private affairs but it is only for the purpose of obtaining an impartial jury.
The charges in the information were read, and the venire was asked whether anyone knew anything about Appellant's case through rumor, personal knowledge, the media, or discussions with others. The first disputed exchange involved prospective juror Houston:
Without an objection to the excusal, the trial court called for another venire member to fill Mr. Houston's spot. Moments later, the trial court recognized another prospective juror who had raised his hand:
Again, no objection to the dismissal was made.
Venireman Mr. Braswell indicated some knowledge of the case and, upon questioning by the trial court, stated that he had simply read about Appellant's case in the newspaper. Asked whether this knowledge would interfere with his ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror, Mr. Braswell indicated "No." He affirmatively expressed his belief that, if selected as a juror, he could base his verdict solely on the evidence heard in the courtroom. Without further immediate inquiry of Mr. Braswell, the trial court resumed questioning of others in the venire:
Ms. Johnson was excused, without objection from counsel.
The trial court returned to Mr. Braswell and asked how he knew Appellant.
Mr. Braswell nodded affirmatively.
THE COURT: All right. I'll ask that you step down, then, Mr. Braswell. Thank you for being here.
As another member of the venire (Mr. Scurry) was called, defense counsel asked to approach the bench. Although the bench discussion was not transcribed into the record, subsequent discussions in the record demonstrate unmistakably that defense counsel (Mr. Modesitt) objected at the bench and that the trial judge indicated that counsel would have occasion later to elaborate on his point. When that opportunity was given, defense counsel set forth his reason:
MR. MODESITT: During the selection of the jury, the Court inquired of certain jurors, ... probably four men, as to whether or not they knew the defendant, that the men indicated they did or that they had employed him or worked with him on various relationships at one time. And the Court automatically excluded those people for cause, and excused those jurors. I objected to that.
After the bench discussion, the trial court inquired of the next venireman:
Defense counsel did not object to Mr. Scurry's excusal, although in subsequent comments counsel characterized the removal of Scurry as "questionable." The six jurors were selected and were duly sworn without an objection from defense counsel. Denmark v. State, 656 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ().
The purpose of preserving alleged error in the lower tribunal is to afford the judge an opportunity to consider the matter in question. Thomas v. State, 599 So.2d 158, 159-61 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. den., 604 So.2d 488 (Fla.1992). Four prospective jurors had been excused by the trial court before defense counsel questioned this procedure. Having carefully considered the sequence and timing of the events that led to the excusal of the succession of venire members who knew Appellant, we conclude that the issue of the sua sponte removal of Houston, Roe, Johnson, and Braswell was not preserved for appeal. Peterka v. State, 640 So.2d 59, 65-66 (Fla.1994) (); Cannady v. State, 620 So.2d 165, 168-69 (Fla.1993) ().
We are struck by the distinctly different manner in which the trial court conducted the voir dire concerning members of the venire who indicated familiarity with the state's witnesses. The trial court asked the prosecutor and defense counsel to supply the names of individuals who might testify. The state announced that Monticello police officers Mosley, Blackmon, Murphy, and Bullock were potential witnesses. The trial court inquired as to whether anyone in the venire knew any of the state's witnesses.
A prospective juror, Ms. Abbie Hall, stated that she knew Mosley and Bullock, was a close friend of Mosely, and had worked with Bullock when he was a little boy. The court inquired further:
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Leveritt v. State
...to provide the court an opportunity to correct any error. See Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1978); Judah v. State, 654 So.2d 994, 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In the instant case, however, because the statutory presumption was valid at the time of the trial, the presumption instructi......
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People v. Evans, 96CA1602.
...against such excusals when there is a question as to whether the juror is in fact unqualified to serve on the jury. See Judah v. State, 654 So.2d 994 (Fla.App.1995); People v. Beasley, 251 Ill.App.3d 872, 190 Ill.Dec. 919, 622 N.E.2d 1236 (1993); Alvarado v. State, 822 S.W.2d 236 Here, the ......