Judge v. United States

• Decision Date: 11 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–2896 (JEI).
• Citation: 119 F.Supp.3d 270
• Parties: Ahmed JUDGE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

119 F.Supp.3d 270

Ahmed JUDGE, Petitioner,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 13–2896 (JEI).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed Aug. 11, 2015.

Ahmed Judge, Terre Haute, IN, pro se.

Diana V. Carrig, Howard Joshua Wiener, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Camden, NJ, for Respondent.

IRENAS, Senior District Judge:

Presently before the Court is the amended motion of Ahmed Judge ("Petitioner") to vacate, set aside, or correct his April 2009 conviction, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 8). Petitioner filed his initial motion to vacate on or about May 6, 2013. (ECF No. 1). On May 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion to amend his motion to add several new claims. (ECF No. 6). This Court issued a Miller notice on May 30, 2013. (ECF No. 7). Petitioner thereafter filed his amended motion on August 29, 2013. (ECF No. 8). Respondent, United States of America ("Respondent" or "the Government"), thereafter filed a Response on July 31, 2014. (ECF No. 15, 18), to which Petitioner replied on or about January 30, 2015. (ECF No. 23, 25). Also before the Court is Petitioner's motion to file his reply brief nunc pro tunc and to exceed the page limit in that brief. (ECF No. 24). As this Court has considered Petitioner's reply brief in reaching its decision, and Respondents have not opposed the motion to file nunc pro tunc, this Court grants Petitioner's motion to file his reply nunc pro tunc and to exceed the page limit for such a reply. For the following reasons, however, the Court will deny Petitioner's § 2255 motion and deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court of Appeals, in its opinion in United States v. Judge, 447 Fed.Appx. 409 (2011), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2376, 182 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2012), provided the following summary of the relevant background facts underlying Petitioner's conviction:

Raymond Morales, who served as one of the government's key cooperating witnesses in this case, was the leader of a large-scale drug-trafficking organization based in Camden, New Jersey. Between 1993 and 2004, Morales's organization sold hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and cocaine base. Morales distributed both through "drug sets," areas known for drug sales he operated in Camden, and through sub-organizations headed by individuals with whom Morales was friendly. One such sub-organization was led by Jevon Lewis. During the early 1990s through 1995, and from early 2001 through September 2002, Lewis bought cocaine in bulk from Morales. Lewis sold at his own "drug sets" in Camden, including one at 8th and Central Streets. Ahmed judge worked for Lewis for a period of time in 2001 and 2002, functioning primarily as an armed body-man or "enforcer" at Lewis's sets. Mack Jones headed a second subgroup that sourced from Morales.... Troy Clark ran a third group that sourced through Morales, the "MOB Boys."

On September 8, 2001, an individual was shot and killed at Morales's drug set at Atlantic and Norris Streets. Morales believed violence at his markets was bad for business, and wanted to retaliate. Morales mistakenly believed the perpetrator was Kenneth Fussell, and offered Jevon Lewis $10,000 to have Fussell killed. Lewis accepted and contracted with [Petitioner] and Jamar Bacon to carry out the murder. At 11:30 p.m. on October 4, 2001, [Petitioner] and Bacon shot and killed Fussell on the front steps of Fussell's apartment in Camden.

Camden police officer Sergeant Strang was two blocks away from the shooting when it occurred and went to the scene immediately. An eyewitness told Strang he saw, from his second story bathroom, an African–American male wearing a sweatshirt and a baseball cap flee to a nearby field. Strang searched the field and within minutes, found [Petitioner] hiding behind hay bales, squatting on a sweatshirt and a baseball cap. Strang asked [Petitioner] to show his hands and when [Petitioner] did not respond, Strang directed another officer to handcuff him. [Petitioner] told Strang he had been shot. When Strang asked by whom, [Petitioner] did not respond. Strang asked if the clothes [Petitioner] was sitting upon belonged to him, and [Petitioner] answered affirmatively.

Hours later, at approximately 4:00 a.m. on October 5th, [Petitioner] was given Miranda warnings at the Camden police station, which he waived, and was questioned by Officer Kellejan. [Petitioner] made exculpatory statements. ¹ On November 3, 2001, [Petitioner] was arrested for the Fussell murder and brought to the Camden police station. He was again issued Miranda warnings, which he waived, and was again questioned by Officer Kellejan. [Petitioner] reaffirmed his statements from his session ... on October 5th.

A grand jury returned a four-count indictment against [Petitioner], Jevon Lewis, and Mack Jones. Count one charged defendants with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy) and § 841(b)(1)(A) (drug trafficking);² Count Two charged [Petitioner] and Lewis with murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise or a drug-trafficking conspiracy, under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) ; Count three charged [Petitioner] and Lewis with murder in the course of a firearms offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and Count Four charged [Petitioner] with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). After a two-month trial, the jury found the defendants guilty on all counts.

Judge, 447 Fed.Appx. at 411–12.

This Court thereafter sentenced Petitioner to concurrent life sentences on counts one and two, a one hundred and twenty month sentence on count four to run concurrent with counts one and two, and a consecutive one hundred and twenty month sentence on count three. (Document 2 attached to ECF No. 15). Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed on October 11, 2011.

Judge, 447 Fed.Appx. at 409. Petitioner thereafter filed the instant § 2255 motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A prisoner in federal custody may file a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging the validity of his or her sentence. Section 2255 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255. Unless the moving party claims a jurisdictional defect or a constitutional violation, to be entitled to relief the moving party must show that an error of law or fact constitutes "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." United States v. Horsley, 599 F.2d 1265, 1268 (3d Cir.1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962) ), cert. denied 444 U.S. 865, 100 S.Ct. 135, 62 L.Ed.2d 88 (1979) ; see also Morelli v. United States, 285 F.Supp.2d 454, 458–59 (D.N.J.2003).

B. Analysis

1. An evidentiary hearing is not required

Under § 2255, a motion to vacate requires an evidentiary hearing "unless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) ; United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir.2005) ; United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 41–42 (3d Cir.1992). Where the record, supplemented by the trial judge's personal knowledge, conclusively negates the factual predicates asserted by the petitioner or indicate that petitioner is not entitled to relief as a matter of law, no hearing is required. Government of Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1075 (3d Cir.1985) ; see also United States v. Tuyen Quang Pham, 587 Fed.Appx. 6, 8 (3d Cir.2014) ; Booth, 432 F.3d at 546 (evidentiary hearing is necessary only where the petitioner's claims are not conclusively resolved by the record). For the reasons set out below, Petitioner's claims are without merit, and therefore the record establishes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. As such, no evidentiary hearing is required on Petitioner's § 2255 motion.

2. Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims

In his motion, Petitioner raises numerous arguments in support of his claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Claims of ineffective assistance are governed by the two-prong test set forth in the Supreme Court's opinion in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To make out such a claim under Strickland, a petitioner must first show that "counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; see also United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 299 (3d Cir.2007). To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner must also show that counsel's allegedly deficient performance prejudiced his defense such that the petitioner was "deprive[d] of a fair trial ... whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 299.

In evaluating whether counsel was deficient, the "proper standard for attorney performance is that of ‘reasonably effective assistance.’ " Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 102 (3d Cir.2005). A petitioner asserting ineffective assistance must therefore show that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" under the circumstances. Id. The reasonableness of counsel's representation must be determined based on the...