Judson School v. Wick
| Decision Date | 15 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 10548--PR,10548--PR |
| Citation | 494 P.2d 698,108 Ariz. 176 |
| Parties | JUDSON SCHOOL, an Arizona corporation, Petitioner, v. David WICK, Real Party in Interest, and The Honorable Roger Strand, Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court, Respondents. John HOLMAN et al., Petitioners, v. David WICK, Real Party in Interest, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Moeller, Hover, Jensen & Henry, by James Moeller, Phoenix, for petitioner Judson School.
John S. Schaper, Phoenix, for petitioners John Holman, Mattie Conway, Margaret Ward, Constance B. Ashley and Henry C. Wick III.
Lewis & Roca, by John P. Frank, and David L. Cocanower, Phoenix, for respondent David Wick.
This matter arose as a Petition for Special Action in the Court of Appeals to prohibit the Superior Court of Maricopa County and the Honorable Roger Strand, Judge thereof, from permitting the aggregation of claims as a class action in a certain pending lawsuit. The Court of Appeals refused to accept jurisdiction and we accepted review, considering that, aside from other aspects of the case, one important jurisdictional issue should be resolved. Petitioner's prayer for relief is denied.
The single issue involved is whether the Superior Court may hear and determine a class action suit where the individual claims of the members of the class are each less than the $200.00 minimum jurisdiction of that court. Respondents contend that the individual claims may be aggregated so that the amount in controversy is the total of the claims of the entire class. Petitioner argues that the opposite view has been adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969), in construing Federal Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and that Arizona adopted the federal rule by an amendment to its Rule 23, 16 A.R.S., effective October 31, 1966, and, therefore, we should follow that case. The difficulty with petitioner's position is that Snyder is not applicable to the jurisdiction of state courts irrespective of how admirably it may fit the federal scheme of things. To prevent the federal district courts from being overburdened with cases, Congress decided that they should not hear cases based on diversity of citizenship, unless each claim involved as a minimum $10,000.00. Snyder points out that the Supreme Court of the United States does not have the power to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to include cases excluded by act of Congress.
In Snyder, the Court also indicated that when Congress increased the jurisdictional minimum of the district courts, it must have been aware of previous court holdings that claims could not be aggregated. The Court stated:
'Suits involving issues of state law and brought on the basis of diversity of citizenship can often be most appropriately tried in state courts.'
It is this statement which differentiates the federal rule from the case at bar.
Were we to hold that claims of less than $200.00 cannot be aggregated in Arizona, there would be no forum where class actions potentially involving millions of dollars and hundreds, possibly thousands of parties could find effective relief. A justice of the peace court clearly is not equipped to handle the serious legal questions frequently posed by a suit on a small claim which should be determinative of the rights of many and it becomes either impossible or it is improvident for one litigant alone to absorb the enormous expense of prosecuting his claim or defending his position.
This problem is not one unique to Arizona and it has been thoroughly examined into by commentaries in the area. See, for example: Class Actions by Professor Charles Alan Wright, 47 Federal Rules Decisions 169, 182, et seq., and Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of Jurisdictional Amount, by George A. Bangs, 10 Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review, 601--614.
We find it unnecessary now to examine other reasons advanced in this case against aggregation of separate claims of members of a class and dismiss without prejudice to the question whether the action in the Superior Court is otherwise appropriate for a class action.
Petitioner's prayer for relief is denied.
The rule announced by the majority permitting aggregation of claims under Rule 23 to reach the jurisdictional amount of a Superior...
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