Judson v. American Ry. Express Co.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1922
• Citation: Judson v. American Ry. Express Co., 242 Mass. 269, 136 N.E. 103 (Mass. 1922)
• Parties: JUDSON v. AMERICAN RY. EXPRESS CO.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

242 Mass. 269

136 N.E. 103

JUDSON

v.AMERICAN RY. EXPRESS CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

June 30, 1922.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Essex County; Louis S. Cox, Judge.

Action by Mary Jane Judson against the American Railway Express Company for personal injuries caused by slipping on the floor of defendant's express office. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

Defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that on all the evidence plaintiff was not entitled to recover, that there was no evidence that defendant was negligent, and that on plaintiff's own evidence she was not in the exercise of due care, and excepted to the court's refusal of the motion.

William F. Moyes, of Lawrence, for plaintiff.

Austin M. Pinkham, of Boston, for defendant.

CROSBY, J.

The plaintiff, an elderly woman, went to the office of the defendant in Lawrence about a quarter past 9 o'clock in the morning to get a parcel. She entered the door from the street, went to the farthest counter and asked for the parcel that had come the night before; she was told it was there. She testified that she stood at the counter about five minutes and then went to the clerk in the next cage and asked him to keep the parcel a few days; that she then turned to leave, took three steps, and fell upon the floor, receiving injuries for which she seeks to recover in this action. After falling she was picked up and placed in a chair. She further testified that she looked where she had fallen ‘and saw that she had ‘slurred’ right along on both feet. ‘There was a mark with [her] heels down where [she] had fallen.’ The floor was very greasy and sloppy, very slimy, at the point where she fell.' That while she was sitting in the chair she saw a man mopping the floor, but did not observe him or that the floor was being cleaned before that time.

A witness called by the plaintiff testified that he was the cashier of the defendant at that office; that the floor was washed that morning by an employee of the Lawrence Window Cleaning Company at the expense of the defendant. It did not appear whether the place where the plaintiff fell had been mopped before she entered the office or while she was at the counter.

The plaintiff was rightfully in the defendant's office by its invitation and it owed her the duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for her use in accordance with the invitation. She could properly assume that the floor was safe for her to walk upon. The fact that she did not observe its condition before she fell is not conclusive against her right to recover. She testified that, while it was light when she went in, when she got to the counter it was dark; that there were no artificial lights there. From the fact that she did not look at the floor until after she fell, it could not have been ruled that she was careless; she was not bound to keep her eyes upon the floor before her. Whether she was in the exercise of due care was correctly submitted to the jury. Woods v. City of Boston, 121 Mass. 337;Hendricken v. Meadows, 154 Mass. 599, 28 N. E. 1054;McDermott v. Sallaway, 198 Mass. 517, 85 N. E. 422,21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 456;Marston v. Reynolds, 211 Mass. 590, 98 N. E. 601;Blease v. Webber, 232 Mass. 165, 122 N. E. 192; St. 1914, c. 553.

The question of the defendant's negligence also was for the jury. Its contention that it had a right to wash its floor cannot be doubted. It does not follow, however, that this could be done at a time when persons were invited to walk over it, and when it could have been found to be ‘very greasy and sloppy’ and ‘slimy’ and no warning was given of such condition. It could have been found that, by reason of the washing and without sufficient time having...