Juillerat v. United States
| Decision Date | 21 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-cv-00276-TBR |
| Parties | MAKI JUILLERAT PLAINTIFF v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et. al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant United States of America's ("United States" or "Defendant") Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). [DN 25.] Plaintiff has responded. [DN 29.] Defendant has replied. [DN 30.] Fully briefed, this matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is DENIED.
The relevant facts as set out in the complaint [DN 1-1] are as follows. Plaintiff Maki Juillerat ("Juillerat") is a United States Army veteran who, in March 2015, was receiving treatment at the Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center ("RRVAMC") in Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky. [DN 1-1 at ¶¶ 2-3; 23.] Juillerat was obtaining treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which was the result of his seventeen years of military service. [Id. at ¶ 31.] On or around March 20, 2015, Juillerat had a counseling session with Dr. Mary Sweeny, during which Juillerat and Dr. Sweeny discussed confidential matters, including Juillerat's mental status, judgment and insight, and risk factors. [Id. at ¶¶ 32-36.] Additionally, Juillerat and Dr. Sweeny discussed a recent encounter Juillerat had with Louisville Metro Police Department ("LMPD") Officer Greg Mudd during a traffic stop and during which Officer Mudd issued Juillerat a citation. [Id. at ¶¶ 37, 40.] During the conversation with Dr. Sweeny, Juillerat reported that he had "'thoughts' of shooting Officer Greg Mudd," but further stated that he did not plan to carry out such a shooting. [Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.] Juillerat also informed Dr. Sweeny about an upcoming court appearance that was scheduled as a result of the citation. [Id. at ¶ 40.] Juillerat told Dr. Sweeny that if his thoughts "progressed further toward action," he would call emergency services or go to a hospital. [Id. at ¶ 41.]
On or around March 27, 2015, Sonny Hatfield, a Veterans Outreach Specialist at RRVAMC, attended a risk management meeting where he learned of Juillerat's statements regarding his thoughts about Officer Mudd. [Id. at ¶¶ 5; 42-43.] Upon learning this information, Hatfield sent an email to the LMPD stating [Id. at ¶¶ 44-45.] On or around March 31, 2015, Hatfield noted the sending of this email in Juillerat's file. [Id. at ¶ 46.] Hatfield wrote that he " '[i]nformed Off. Jack that this writer was the second hand report' and he 'did not hear the 'HI' (comment) directly.' " [Id. at ¶ 47.] Hatfield additionally provided LMPD with Dr. Sweeny's telephone number and noted this in Juillerat's file as well. [Id. at ¶¶ 48-49.] The LMPD did not attempt to contact Dr. Sweeny, however. [Id. at ¶ 50.] Also on or around March 31, 2015, Dr. Sweeny made an entry in Juillerat's file stating "Patient never said anything about killing the officer or anybody else," that "He (Patient) said he 'thought about shooting' the cop," but that Juillerat "went on to say he had no intentions of doing this." [Id. at ¶¶ 51-54.] Dr. Sweeny also wrote that Juillerat had promisedto "go to the ER or call 911 if he felt he was losing control over his impulses to hurt self or others." [Id. at ¶ 55.]
On April 2, 2015, Juillerat attended the hearing on his traffic citation, and the next day, on April 3, an electronic arrest warrant was issued charging Juillerat with terroristic threatening. [Id. at ¶¶ 56-57.] The arrest warrant was executed on April 5, 2015 by an unnamed LMPD officer, who arrested Juillerat and took him into custody. [Id. at ¶¶ 58-59.] Juillerat remained in LMPD custody until being discharged on April 15, 2015. [Id. at ¶ 60.] On May 7, 2015, the terroristic threatening charge was dismissed on the merits "on grounds that the charge was 'insufficient on its face to be terroristic threatening.' " [Id. at ¶¶ 61-62.]
Plaintiff originally filed the instant tort action in Kentucky state court on or around April 5, 2016. [DN 1.] Among multiple other defendants, Plaintiff brought suit against Sonny Hatfield and Jamie Watts, employees of the Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center, a facility operated by the Department of Veterans Affairs. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges negligence, gross negligence, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. [DN 1-1.]
Under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (the "Westfall Act"), the United States is to be substituted in a civil action for money damages brought against a federal employee who is alleged to have committed a common law tort while acting within the scope of his employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1); Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 127 S.Ct. 881, 887-88, 166 L.Ed.2d 819 (2007); RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1142 (6th Cir. 1996).
Dolan v. United States, 514 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Dolan v. United States, No. 3:06-CV-208, 2007 WL 784351, at *5-6 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2007)). If the United States is substituted, "[t]he litigation is thereafter governed by the FTCA," or the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. (quoting Dolan, 2007 WL at *6).
Pursuant to § 2679(d)(1), United States Attorney John E. Kuhn, Jr. certified that Hatfield and Watts "were acting within the scope of their employment with the United State Department of Veterans Affairs at the time of the conduct alleged in the complaint." [DN 1 at 2.] Hatfield and Watts were accordingly dismissed from the action, and the United States was substituted as the proper party. [Id.] It removed this case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky on April 16, 2016. [Id. at 3.]
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may assert by motion the defense of "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in which case all allegations of the plaintiff must be considered as true, or it can attack the factual basis for jurisdiction, in which case the trial court must weigh the evidence and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists." DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2004). "A facial attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction alleged in the complaint questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading." Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Steel Peel Litig., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). In a challenge to the factual basis, however, the court "is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case . . . no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1977)). Therefore, while, "when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is converted to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, the court, upon finding genuine issues as to material facts, must deny the motion; . . . on a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to subject matterjurisdiction, the court is empowered to resolve factual disputes." Id. (quoting Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986)). Finally, "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Bauer v. RBX Indus. Inc., 368 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2004).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must "plead enough 'factual matter' to raise a 'plausible' inference of wrongdoing." 16630 Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim becomes plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must presume all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1983)). "The court need not, however, accept unwarranted factual inferences." Id. (citing Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987)). Should the well-pleaded facts support no "more than the mere possibility of misconduct," then dismissal is warranted. Iqbal, 556 U.S at 679. The Court may grant a motion to dismiss "only if, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, the complaint still fails to allege a plausible theory of relief."...
To continue reading
Request your trial