Julia v. McKinney

Decision Date31 October 1833
Citation3 Mo. 270
PartiesJULIA (A WOMAN OF COLOR) v. MCKINNEY.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST LOUIS COUNTY.

MCGIRK, C. J.

This was an action commenced under the statute for freedom. Verdict and judgment against Julia, the plaintiff. The bill of exceptions shows the following case: that McKinney, the defendant, bought the plaintiff as a slave from one Lucinda Carrington; that in the year 1829 Mrs. Carrington lived in the State of Kentucky; that she then had in her possession the plaintiff, Julia, as a slave; that she then and there determined and declared her intention to be to remove and take with her Julia to the State of Illinois; that a witness in this cause applied to her to buy Julia, telling Mrs. Carrington that she could not hold Julia in Illinois as a slave; that if she took her there she would be free. Mrs. Carrington refused to sell Julia; said she would not keep Julia in Illinois, but intended to hire her out in Missouri. Accordingly Mrs. C. moved to Illinois, brought with her said Julia, arrived in Pike county, Ill., about 27th or 28th of October, settled herself there, purchased land, &c. She kept Julia there with her till about the 1st of December in the same year, exercising the ordinary acts of ownership and dominion over her which are usually exercised by masters over their slaves; that in the meantime Mrs. Carrington hired Julia about two days to some person to work, which work was performed, and that she received pay therefor; that about the 1st of December in the same year Mrs. Carrington sent Julia to Louisiana, Missouri, a distance of about thirty miles, and hired her out; that Julia lived in Missouri some time, became sick, and that Mrs. C. then sent for Julia, took her home into Pike county, in Illinois, where she was kept till she recovered her health; that Mrs. C. then took or sent Julia to St. Louis, and sold her to S. McKinney, the defendant. Several instructions were asked by the defendant, which were given and excepted to. The plaintiff also moved for a new trial, which was refused.

The first instruction given by the court is that if the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, Julia, was taken into the State of Illinois by her owner without any intention on the part of such owner to make that State the residence of Julia, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this action. We will consider this instruction before we notice the others. The plaintiff's claim to freedom is based on the 6th article of the constitution of the State of Illinois, which declares that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall hereafter be introduced into this State otherwise than for the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. The article then goes on to make some provision with regard to hiring persons bound to service in other States, and concludes by saying any violation of this article shall effect the emancipation of such person from his obligation to service. We see by this constitution that the very introduction of slavery works an emancipation of the slave, and it is argued that if we give this constitution a literal construction no one can travel through that State with his slaves without emancipating them. It is true that a literal construction would lead directly to this result. Every law should be adjudicated on with a view to the end and object thereof. The object of the constitution of Illinois was not to prevent persons owning slaves in Kentucky from passing through Illinois with their slave property to Missouri, but to prevent the relation of master and slave from existing in that State by an inhabitant and resident thereof. We are, furthermore, of opinion that all persons who are citizens of any of the States have a right by the constitution of the United States to pass through Illinois with any sort of property that they may own in the State where they migrate from. The 2d section of the 4th article of the Constitution of the United States says that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the seveal States. We are of opinion that it is the undoubted right of every citizen of the United States to pass freely through every other State with his property of every description, including negro slaves, without being in any way subject to forfeit his property for having done so, provided he does not subject his property by a residence to the action of the laws of the State in which he may so reside. Another view of the subject is that out of the general words of the Illinois constitution of necessity exceptions must be raised. Though it is true that slavery shall not be introduced into that State nnder penalty of forfeiting the property, yet it can be so introduced as to permit persons passing through the State, as emigrants or mere travelers, to carry with them their slave property and to retain in them their right to such property, while they retain the character of emigrants or travelers, otherwise there could be no emigration through the State with slave property, which is a thing it cannot reasonably be supposed the Constitution of Illinois intended to forbid. How long the character of emigrant or traveler through the State may last, cannot by any general rule be determined; but it seems that reason does require it should last so long as might be necessary, according to the common modes of traveling, to accomplish a tranait through the State. If any accident should happen to the emigrant which in ordinary cases would make it reasonable and prudent for him to suspent his journey for a short time, we think he might do so without incurring a forfeiture, if he resumed his journey as soon as he safely could. Something more than the mere convenience or ease of the emigrant ought to entervene to save him from a forfeiture. Something of the nature of necessity should exist before he would or ought to be exempt from the forfeiture. If swollen streams of water which could not be crossed without danger should intervene, serious sickness of the family, broken wagons, and the like should exist, there would be good...

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6 cases
  • Watson v. Alderson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • December 6, 1898
  • Ex parte Thornton
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • June 22, 1882
    ...430; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 49; Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 607; Ex parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147; Willard v. People, 5 Ill. 461; Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 270; State v. Medbury, 3 142. [E1] Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 430; Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268.......
  • Deegan v. Conzelman
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • March 31, 1862
    ...14 Mo. 498.) II. The instructions prayed for by plaintiff should not have been granted. They were not supported by the evidence. (Hines v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 270; O'Fallen v. Boisvenu, Id. 286; Williams v. Harrison, 3 Mo. 290; McLean v. Thorpe, 4 Mo. 256.) They presented mere abstract legal pr......
  • Coughlin v. Lyons
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • March 31, 1857
    ...A. J. P. Garesché, for respondent, cited Floyd v. Whyley, 1 Mo. 458; Johnson v. Strader, 3 Mo. 254; Sparks v. Purdy, 11 Mo. 219; Hines v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 270; Mathew v. Johnson, 9 Mo. 232. RYLAND, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court. This court does not apply the formal technical rule......
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