Jumper Creek Drainage Dist. v. State ex rel. Davis

• Decision Date: 06 March 1945
• Citation: 155 Fla. 669,21 So.2d 459
• Parties: JUMPER CREEK DRAINAGE DIST. et al. v. STATE ex rel. DAVIS et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

21 So.2d 459

155 Fla. 669

JUMPER CREEK DRAINAGE DIST. et al. v. STATE ex rel. DAVIS et al.

Florida Supreme Court

March 6, 1945

Rehearing Denied April 10, 1945.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sumter County; J. C. B Koonce, judge.

Carroll W. Fussell, of Bushnell, and Clarence A Boswell, Jr., of Bartow, for appellants.

Erle B Askew, Richard T. Earle, Jr., and Clair A. Davis, all of St Petersburg, for appellees.

ADAMS, Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment for relator notwithstanding respondent's answer in mandamus. This case has, heretofore, been before us. See State ex rel. Davis v Jumper Creek Drainage District, 153 Fla. 451, 14 So.2d 900.

When our mandate went down, an answer was filed substantially admitting the allegations of the alternative writ and also set up, by way of an affirmative defense, that several years prior to this suit the drainage district was in the custody of a receiver of the United States District Court and pursuant to express authority of the Court the receiver had received the district's bonds in lieu of cash payment of 98% of the total taxes when accompanied by the remaining 2% in cash; that after the discharge of the receiver the district supervisors had followed the same practice until the whole of the taxes assessed was cancelled out and discharged, save and except the tax lien on a 3500 acre tract which was held by the district.

From the factual background it appears that the district was organized in 1923, at which time it issued $450,000 bonds to finance its reclamation. The assessed benefits were fixed at $1,359,076.50. The total taxes assessed to discharge the debt were $940,500. About 1932, the district became involved in debts and a federal court receiver was appointed. Over a period of about six years the receiver handled the affairs of the district and during that time he retired well over $300,000 obligations of the district pursuant to court authority by accepting bonds in lieu of cash to pay taxes. After his discharge the supervisors followed the same practice and actually cancelled out the total taxes assessed except those on a 3,500 acre tract which had been foreclosed upon for delinquent taxes and then owned by the district.

The position of the district may be summarized as follows: That appellees purchased their bonds at almost a nominal consideration when the market was greatly depressed and stood by without a protest while all things above recited transpired, that the receivership proceeding in the federal court was in reality a class suit which had the effect of binding all the bondholders and the effect of the decree of the federal court was to cancel the total taxes assessed and those which could be assessed under and by virtue of the assessed benefits. It is urged that the effect of this writ is to collaterally invalidate the decree of the federal court in the receivership case. Finally, it is claimed that appellees have not been diligent and laches would preclude the granting of relief.

We will dispose of the question of laches first. It is fundamental that laches will not avail a litigant when the delay has resulted in no injury, embarrassment or disadvantage. Lightsey v Lightsey, 150 Fla. 664, 8 So.2d 399. The...