June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert
| Decision Date | 16 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 3:14-00525-JWD-RLB |
| Parties | JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES LLC, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. KATHY H. KLIEBERT, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, for Expedited Consideration, and for Temporary Stay ("Motion for Stay"), (Doc. 229), as well as the Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Her Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, for Expedited Consideration, and for Temporary Stay ("Supporting Memorandum"), (Doc. 229-1) (collectively, "Defendant's Motions"). These documents were filed by Doctor Rebekah Gee ("Gee," "Secretary," or "Defendant") in her official capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals ("DHH"), who has replaced her predecessor, Ms. Kathy H. Kliebert ("Kliebert").1 To the request sought in the Motion for Stay and the points made in the Supporting Memorandum, Plaintiffs—June Medical Services LLC, d/b/a Hope Medical Group for Women ("Hope"); Bossier City Medical Suite ("Bossier"); Choice, Inc., of Texas, d/b/a Causeway Medical Clinic ("Causeway");2 Doctor John Doe 1 ("Doe 1"); and Doctor John Doe 2 ("Doe 2"), (collectively, "Plaintiffs")—have responded with the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal ("Opposition"). (Doc. 232; see also Doc. 216 at 5, 9.)
So as to win her requested stay, Defendant bore the burden of proving four separate elements: (1) a strong showing that she will likely prevail on the merits, (2) proof that she will be irreparably harmed in a stay's absence, (3) the relative unlikelihood that other parties and persons interested in the proceeding would be substantially injured, and (4) that the public interest favors a stay's issue. Generally, a stay is an extraordinary remedy, and the burden to demonstrate that a stay is warranted is rather heavy, with the need to balance equities paramount. Having evaluated the arguments raised by Plaintiffs and Defendant (collectively, "Parties"), both at the telephonic conference held on February 10, 2016, and in their most recent filings, this Court concludes that Defendant has not shown she is likely to prevail. The Court's application of the undue burden test is amply supported by existing precedent and the weight of the evidence. Her other ground for reversal, that this Court must grant absolute deference to Defendant's statutory interpretation at odds with the plain and unambiguous wording of the statute, islikewise unlikely to succeed. With her showing on these two points insufficiently convincing, precedent compels the preservation of the status quo, "the last, peaceable, noncontested status of the parties," Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). The harm to all persons and parties will thereby be minimized, substantial injuries to many likely prevented, until a final legal determination regarding the proper application of a well-established constitutional right can definitively be made.
For these reasons, as more fully stated below, this Court DENIES the Defendant's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, for Expedited Consideration, and for Temporary Stay, (Doc. 232).
On January 26, 2016, this Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Ruling"). (Doc. 216.) Briefly put, after reviewing the Parties' extensive evidentiary submissions and six days' worth of testimony, this Court preliminarily enjoined Defendant from enforcing Section A(2)(a) of Act Number 620 ("Act" or "Act 620"), which amended Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1299.35.2. (Id. at 5.) The Court did so upon finding Act 620 to violate "the substantive due process rights of Louisiana women to obtain an abortion, a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973) . . ., and pursuant to the test first set forth in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674(1992), and subsequently refined by the Fifth Circuit." (Id. at 8.) The Supreme Court's major cases total three: Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 167 L. Ed. 2d 480 (2007); Casey, 505 U.S. 833; and Roe, 410 U.S. 113. The key Fifth Circuit cases number at least five: Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015); Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2014); Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014) ("Abbott II"); and Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013) ("Abbott I").
(Id. at 1-2.)
On that same day, Defendant filed two separate documents. The first—Defendant's Notice of Appeal ("Notice")—simply gave the required notice that the Defendant has appealed the Judgment and the Ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. (Doc. 228.) The second was the Motion for Stay and the Supporting Memorandum, its requests three innumber: (1) "for a stay of the Court's judgment (Doc. 227) and ruling (Doc. 216)," pending their appeal; (2) "for expedited consideration" of the Motion for Stay; and (3) "for a temporary stay pending the Court's disposition" of the Motion for Stay and, if denied, "pending disposition of any stay motion filed in the court of appeals." (Doc. 229 at 1.) At the telephonic conference held on February 10, 2016, bearing in mind both Plaintiffs' explicit opposition as well as the expiration of the temporary restraining order—and thus any protection that it afforded any and all parties and persons—upon the Ruling's release, (Doc. 233 at 8-9), this Court denied Defendant's request for a temporary stay pending consideration of the Motion for Stay. (Doc. 231 at 1-2.) In addition, with Defendant's consent, this Court authorized Plaintiffs to more formally respond to the Motion for Stay and the Supporting Memorandum on or before February 12, 2016, (Id. at 2), effectively denying Defendant's second request for a ruling on its recent motions on or before that date, (Doc. 229 at 1).
Following the hearing, one issue, the subject of this order, remained: whether this Court should stay its own Ruling and Judgment. (See, e.g., Doc. 229-1.)
The Defendant correctly states the four factors which must be considered in determining whether a stay should issue —"(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies," Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 410 & n.10 (internalquotation marks omitted)—and now maintains that all four favor her request. (Doc. 229-1 at 5-14.)
Initially, Defendant contends reversal of the Ruling and Judgment on "either of two grounds" is "likely." (Id. at 6.) First, as she has read the Ruling and this circuit's precedent, this (Id. at 6.) In making this conclusion, Defendant describes this Court's two alternative methods for calculating large fraction in the following terms. At first, the Court took the annual number of abortions provided in 2013 by the four Louisiana-based doctors who have yet to obtain the admitting privileges required by Act 620, divided by the total number of abortions provided in Louisiana in 2013 ("Method 1"). As an additional calculation, this Court then took the number of Louisiana women of reproductive age, minus the number of abortions performed in 2013 by non-privileged Louisiana doctors, divided by the Louisiana reproductive-age women ("Method 2"). (Id. at 7-8.) The controlling standard, by Defendant's reckoning, mandated that this Court "determine[] the fraction of women burdened by an admitting privileges law by (1) taking the number of women who must travel significantly farther to reach a qualified provider, and (2) dividing by all women of reproductive age in the state." (Id. at 6 ().
Defendant discerns fatal flaws in the Court's two methods. (Id.) In her view, this Court's Method 1 employed an "incorrect" numerator as well as an "incorrect" denominator. (Id. at 8.) The numerator should not have incorporated the actual and documented number of abortions provided by the relevant doctors in 2013. (See Doc. 216 ¶¶ 308, 311, at 82.) Instead, it should have used the number of abortions that these doctors could theoretically provide while working "at a considerably higher rate" and at a "higher capacity." (Doc. 229-1 at 8.) Next, thedenominator should not have been the total...
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