June Sand Co. v. Devon Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1945
• Citation: 23 So.2d 621,156 Fla. 519
• Parties: JUNE SAND CO. v. DEVON CORPORATION.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

23 So.2d 621

156 Fla. 519

JUNE SAND CO. v. DEVON CORPORATION.

Florida Supreme Court

November 2, 1945

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; George W Tedder, judge.

Davis & Lockhart, of Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Julian E Ross, of Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., and Lamar Warren, Asst. Atty. Gen., amici curiae.

SEBRING, Justice.

David G. Jenkins was formerly the owner of a subdivision lot in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On June 9, 1939, the property reverted to the State of Florida for nonpayment of taxes by virtue of the provisions of chapter 18296, Acts of 1937, F.S.A. § 192.35 note, sometimes known as the Murphy Law. On June 19 1944, Julian E. Ross purchased the property at public sale from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund pursuant to notice of sale duly given the former owner. On October 11 1944 the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund conveyed its interest in the property to Ross, who recorded the deed in the public records of Broward County, Florida, on October 30, 1944. Thereafter, on April 26, 1945, Ross and wife conveyed the property by quit claim deed to Devon Corporation. On the same date the corporation recorded the deed in the public records of Broward County. On March 8, 1945, David G. Jenkins, the former owner, joined by his wife, as grantors, executed a quit claim deed to the property to June Sand Company. The deed was recorded in the public records of Broward County on May 5, 1945.

On May 10, 1945, Devon Corporation instituted suit in the Circuit Court of Broward County against June Sand Company for the purpose of quieting and confirming its title as against the claim asserted by the latter arising out of the quit claim deed which it had procured from Jenkins. It is alleged in the bill of complaint, and admitted by the answer, that the land is wild, unimproved and unoccupied and not in possession of anyone; that the plaintiff has had the land surveyed and staked; that plaintiff derives its title or interest in the land from Ross who, in turn, had acquired the property from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund. It is likewise admitted that the land reverted to the State of Florida under the Murphy Law; that the sale of the property by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund to Ross was held pursuant to notice duly given the former owner; and that in all other respects the sale was held in accordance with law and the rules and regulations adopted by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund for the sale of such property. Testimony taken before the chancellor sustained the allegations of the bill of complaint, and a final decree was entered in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal from the final decree, the defendant asks us to define the nature of the title acquired by Ross from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, and whether Devon Corporation as grantee of the title may maintain its suit against the successor in title of the former owner.

It is our view that when Jenkins allowed his property to revert to the State for nonpayment of State and County taxes under chapter 18296, Acts of 1937, the fee simple title to the property became absolutely vested in the State. By reason of the provisions of section 9 of the act, F.S.A. § 192.38, every right, title or interest of every kind or nature of the former owner of the land, his privies, and private lien holders thereupon ceased, terminated and came to an end; and the right of such persons to redeem the lands or claim any interest therein by virtue of a prior title, interest or lien became extinguished. See Bice v. City of Haines City et al., 142 Fla. 371, 195 So. 919. Thereafter, the State of Florida was free to sell or otherwise despose of such property upon terms prescribed by the legislature. By section 9 of chapter 18296, supra, the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund are designated by the legislature as the state functionaries to hold lands that have reverted to the State for nonpayment of taxes under the Murphy Law, and are empowered to sell such lands to the highest and best bidder for cash 'at such time and after giving such notice and according to such rules and regulations as may be fixed and adopted from time to time by the said Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.'

The sale of the lands by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund to Ross was held and conducted in full accordance with the statutes, rules and regulations controlling such matters. This being true, we are of opinion that the title acquired by Ross from the State of Florida was a fee simple title to the lands sold, divested of any claim of right, title or interest of the former owner or his privies, and free from liens of private lien holders, and subject only to such liens in favor of other taxing units as existed under valid taxation statutes at the time the land became the property of the State of Florida under the Murphy Law. See Jackson v City of...