Juneau v. Department of Justice

• Decision Date: 29 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2009-8002.,2009-8002.
• Citation: 583 F.3d 777
• Parties: Susan JUNEAU, Kevin Juneau, Ryan Juneau, and Steven Juneau, As Surviving Spouse and Children of John Ross Juneau, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

583 F.3d 777

Susan JUNEAU, Kevin Juneau, Ryan Juneau, and Steven Juneau, As Surviving Spouse and Children of John Ross Juneau, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent.

No. 2009-8002.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

September 29, 2009.

Joseph P. Durham, Jr., Langley & Lee, LLC, of Albany, GA, for petitioner.

Jeffrey A. Regner, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him on the brief were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Todd M. Hughes, Deputy Director.

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge MICHEL. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN.

MICHEL, Chief Judge.

The Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) denied the claim of Susan Juneau and her three children (Claimants) for benefits under the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act (the PSOB Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796 et seq. Because the BJA correctly determined that Mrs. Juneau's deceased husband did not suffer a "personal injury" as contemplated by the PSOB Act, this court affirms.

I. BACKGROUND

The City of Albany, Georgia, employed John Ross Juneau as the Safety Chief at the Southwest Georgia Regional Airport, a position that required Mr. Juneau to be a law enforcement officer certified by the State of Georgia. In addition to his employment as the airport Safety Chief, Mr. Juneau also worked part time as a security guard for Dillard's, Inc., a department store located in the Albany Mall.

On March 2, 2003, while working at Dillard's, Mr. Juneau noticed two people who he believed were shoplifting. As Mr. Juneau approached the suspects, they began to flee, and a chase on foot ensued. After chasing the suspects out of the store and across the Albany Mall parking lot, Mr Juneau caught one suspect and brought him to an interview room at Dillard's for interrogation. After sitting down, Mr. Juneau slumped over in his chair and lost consciousness. Mr. Juneau was taken to a hospital, but he was pronounced dead shortly after arriving there.

Mr. Juneau's death certificate lists his cause of death as "[c]omplications of coronary atherosclerotic disease ... in a background of insulin dependent diabetes mellitus." An autopsy was performed by Dr. Anthony Clark, the same doctor who completed the death certificate; Dr. Clark's autopsy report listed the same cause of death as the death certificate and stated that "no evidence of significant recent or remote traumatic injuries" was present.

After Mr. Juneau's death, his wife and children applied to the Georgia State Indemnification Commission, which ultimately held that, because Mr. Juneau had died in the line of duty, his estate should receive benefits from the State of Georgia. Key in the Georgia State Indemnification Commission's decision was an opinion from the Georgia Attorney General considering whether "an off-duty law enforcement officer [who] is working as a security guard and [who] dies from a heart attack pursuing shoplifters" could be said to have died "in the line of duty."

The Claimants also applied to the BJA for benefits under the PSOB Act, which provides a one-time cash payment to survivors of "a public safety officer [who] has died as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty." 42 U.S.C. § 3796(a). In October 2004, the Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) Office denied this claim on two grounds: (1) Mr. Juneau was serving as a private security guard rather than as a public safety officer at the time of his death, and (2) Mr. Juneau's death was not the result of a traumatic injury. On the latter point, the PSOB Office relied on the decision of this court's predecessor in Smykowski v. United States, 227 Ct.Cl. 284, 647 F.2d 1103 (1981), to find that Mr. Juneau's death, resulting from "a chronic, congenital, or progressive disease or other condition," was not a death resulting from a "personal injury," as that term is used in the PSOB Act.

In February 2005, Claimants appealed the initial determination to a hearing officer. The hearing officer heard testimony from Mr. Juneau's wife and from employees of Dillard's and the Southwest Georgia Regional Airport. He also received documentary evidence from Dr. Clark, who had performed the autopsy on Mr. Juneau; Dr. Laurence T. Crimmins, Mr. Juneau's family physician; and two physicians from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Dr. Dzuy Nguyen and Dr. Craig Mallak. Dr. Nguyen and Dr. Mallak agreed with Dr. Clark that "Mr. Juneau died from atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, a natural process." Dr. Crimmins, though, argued that he believed that Mr. Juneau "died as a result of trauma, specifically the trauma to his body caused by the chase and apprehension of the shoplifting suspect in the minutes before his collapse."

In March 2007, the hearing officer reversed the October 2004 determination, finding both that "the physical nature of the lengthy chase ... as well as the energy exerted while chasing the suspect ... were substantial factors contributing to John Ross Juneau's death" and that, "when Mr. Juneau exited the doors of Dillard's, he was acting within the scope of his duties as a State of Georgia law enforcement officer, not as a security guard." Having thus disposed of both problems found in the initial determination, the hearing officer held that Mr. Juneau's survivors were "eligible for coverage under the [PSOB] Program."

In October 2008, the director of the BJA reviewed the hearing officer's decision. The director agreed with the hearing officer that Mr. Juneau was a "public safety officer" within the meaning of that term as used in the PSOB Act, but the director reversed the hearing officer's determination that Mr. Juneau died as a result of an "injury," as that term is used in the PSOB Act. Because the director's finding that Mr. Juneau did not die as the result of an injury required denial of benefits, the director did not make any finding regarding whether Mr. Juneau was acting in the line of duty at the time of his death.

Claimants have appealed the director's final decision that Mr. Juneau did not die as a result of an "injury," as that term is used in the PSOB Act. This court has jurisdiction over Claimants' appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 3796c-2.

II. DISCUSSION

Our review of a denial of benefits under the PSOB Act by the BJA is limited to three inquiries: "(1) whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements and provisions of implementing regulations; (2) whether there has been any arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the government officials involved; and (3) whether substantial evidence supports the decision denying the claim." Amber-Messick v. United States, 483 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed.Cir.2007).

The BJA has promulgated regulations implementing the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 3796(a) that it pay a benefit of $250,000 to survivors of any public safety officer who "die[s] as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty." Among Claimants' arguments is that, in determining that Mr. Juneau did not die of an "injury" within the meaning of the PSOB Act, the BJA improperly applied versions of its regulations that were not promulgated until after Claimants filed their claim. In particular, Claimants argue that the BJA should have applied the versions of 28 C.F.R. § 32.4, providing that "any reasonable doubt arising from the circumstances of the officer's death" should be resolved "in favor of payment of the death ... benefit," and 28 C.F.R. § 32.5, providing that the BJA should "give substantial weight to the evidence and findings of fact presented by State, local, and Federal administrative and investigative agencies," that were in effect in 2004, rather than applying the versions of these regulations presently in effect, which do not contain these provisions. Chiefly, Claimants believe that, had the BJA applied the 2004 version of 28 C.F.R. § 32.5 to give "substantial weight" to the findings of the Georgia State Indemnification Commission, the BJA could not have then found, as it did, that Mr. Juneau's death was anything other than the result of an "injury." Claimants also suggest that, had the BJA applied the 2004 version of 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 to resolve reasonable doubt in Claimants' favor, the disagreement between Mr. Juneau's family physician and the three pathologists who presented opinions on the cause of Mr. Juneau's death would have been resolved by agreeing with Dr. Crimmins that the trauma experienced by Mr. Juneau constituted an "injury" within the meaning of the PSOB Act.

We disagree on both counts. First, the findings of the Georgia State Indemnification Commission were irrelevant to the BJA's decision regarding whether or not Mr. Juneau suffered an "injury." The Georgia State Indemnification Commission focused entirely on the question of whether Mr. Juneau died in the line of duty, no surprise given that the relevant Georgia statute contains no requirement that an officer have died as the result of an "injury," but rather only a requirement that the officer have been "killed in the line of duty." Ga.Code Ann. § 45-9-82(a)(1). Thus, the state agency made no findings relevant to any issue other than whether Mr. Juneau died in the line of duty, an issue not presented by this appeal. Regardless of whether Claimants are correct that the 2004 version of the BJA regulations should have been used instead of the present version, the outcome of the BJA's analysis would have been identical either way. Given the irrelevance of this issue to the appeal, the Court need not reach the question of which version of 28 C.F.R. § 32.5 should have been used.

A similar problem exists with respect to Claimants' argument that the BJA should have applied the 2004 version of 28 C.F.R. §...