Junker v. Mascoutah Cmty. Sch. Dist. 19 Bd. of Educ.

• Docket Number: 3:22-cv-1962-DWD
• Decision Date: 31 July 2023
• Parties: BROOKE JUNKER, Plaintiff, v. MASCOUTAH COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 19 BOARD OF EDUCATION and TODD GOBER, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

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BROOKE JUNKER, Plaintiff, v. MASCOUTAH COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 19 BOARD OF EDUCATION and TODD GOBER, Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-1962-DWD

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

July 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN District Judge:

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) (Docs. 22 & 23) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. 24) to the Motion. For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.

I. Background

Plaintiff is a female who, during the fall of 2021, was a senior on the Mascoutah High School girls' volleyball team. (Doc. 1 pgs. 1, 4). According to the Complaint, during that season and in prior seasons, Defendant Gober, who had been the varsity head coach since 2014, allegedly subjected the team members to “demoralizing and degrading activities” at practice. (Doc. 1, pgs. 1-2, 4-6). Plaintiff eventually met with a counselor at Mascoutah High School about her experience on the team. (Doc. 1, pgs. 2, 6). Defendant Gober allegedly became aware of that meeting, and of the meetings of three other seniors with the counselor, then “scolded” the four seniors and imposed conditions on their ability to remain on the team. (Doc. 1, pgs. 8-10). Despite Plaintiff's parent's reports to and meetings with Defendant Gober and/or other Mascoutah High School officials, the Mascoutah Community School District 19 Board of Education (“District”) allegedly failed to take action to protect Plaintiff or discipline Defendant Gober. (Doc. 1, pgs. 2, 8, 11-15).

Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) against Defendants, alleging: (1) violations of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, due to sex discrimination and retaliation by the District (Counts I & 2); (2) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to sex discrimination and infringements of the right to free speech by the District (Counts III & IV); (3) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to sex discrimination and infringements of the right to free speech by Defendant Gober (Counts V & VI); (4) violations of the Illinois Civil Rights Act (740 ILCS 23/1 et seq.) due to sex discrimination and retaliation by the District (Counts VII & VIII); and (5) the intentional infliction of emotional distress by each Defendant under Illinois law (Count IX & X). Now, Defendants seek a dismissal of the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff's specific factual allegations, as well as each party's arguments in relation to the Motion, are incorporated into the analysis section below.

II. Analysis

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint for the failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. See Firestone Fin. Corp., 796 F.3d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014)). To survive such a motion, which tests the sufficiency of the complaint but not the merits of the case, a plaintiff must allege enough facts to state a facially plausible claim for relief. See Kloss v. Acuant, Inc., 462 F.Supp.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2012)); Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility means a plaintiff pled enough facts to draw reasonable inferences as to liability. See Fosnight, 41 F.4th at 922 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A complaint need not allege “detailed factual allegations,” but it must state enough facts to lift the claim above the speculative level. See Kloss, 462 F.Supp.3d at 876 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals” of the elements, supported by mere conclusions, do not suffice. See Trivedi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 609 F.Supp.3d 628, 631 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). When ruling, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all inferences for Plaintiff. See id. (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008)); accord Kloss, 462 F.Supp.3d at 874-75.

A. Sex Discrimination and Retaliation by the District Under Title IX (Counts I & II) and the Illinois Civil Rights Act (Counts VII & VIII)

Section 1681(a) of Title IX states: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Similarly, Section 5 of the Illinois Civil Rights Act provides: “No unit of State, county, or local government in Illinois shall.exclude a person from participation in, deny a person the benefits of, or subject a person to discrimination under any program or activity on the grounds of that person's.gender.” 740 ILCS 23/5. When interpreting this provision, the Illinois courts look to cases relating to alleged violations of federal civil rights statutes. See Central Austin Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 123041, ¶ 11; see also Howard v. Cook County Sheriff's Office, 989 F.3d 587, 609 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting, with respect to state-law claims, it was “perfectly acceptable” for the district court to accept the plaintiffs' invitation to treat as parallel and not separately analyze state and constitutional claims).

Further, there are two requirements for institutional liability under Title IX. See C.S. v. Madison Metro. School Dist., 34 F.4th 536, 541 (7th Cir. 2022); accord Trentadue v. Redmon, 619 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2010). First, a school official with authority to take corrective action must have actual knowledge of the sex discrimination. See C.S., 34 F.4th 541-44 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 542 U.S. 274, 290 (1998)). The school official acquires actual knowledge by learning misconduct, rising to the level of sex discrimination, occurred. See id. at 540. The misconduct “must be ‘so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.' ” See id. at 542 (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999)); see also Jauquet v. Green Bay Area Catholic Education, Inc., 996 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2021) (stating a Title IX violation requires a systemic and substantial disparity amounting to a denial of equal opportunity); Doe v. Bd of Educ. of City of Chicago, 611 F.Supp.3d 516, 527-28 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (noting courts have recognized harassment by a teacher inherently harms students and affects the educational experience). If the misconduct does not amount to sex discrimination, the school cannot be on notice that it is liable for failing to act. See C.S., 34 F.4th at 541-42.

Second, the school official's response must amount to a deliberate indifference to the sex discrimination, such that it represents an official decision not to remedy the Title IX violation. See id. at 541-42. A school district must respond with measures aimed to end the known sex discrimination and to limit additional sex discrimination. See id. at 542 (quoting Gebser, 542 U.S. at 289). However, the response need not be perfect or successful as long as “it is not so unreasonable, under all the circumstances, as to constitute an ‘official decision' to permit discrimination.” See id. at 543 (quoting Gebser, 542 U.S. at 290).

1. Sex Discrimination

A claim of sex discrimination under Title IX requires the plaintiff to allege (1) the educational institution received federal funding, (2) the plaintiff was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of an educational program, and (3) the educational institution discriminated against the plaintiff based on sex. See Jauquet, 996 F.3d at 810 (quoting Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chicago, 933 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2019)); see also Smith v. Metro. School Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding a teacher's sexual harassment of a student constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX).

Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to allege any misconduct was sexual or due to her being female, as her allegations suggest certain female teammates were treated better than the four seniors. (Doc. 23, pgs. 3-4). Healthy teammates were allegedly treated better than injured teammates and teammates on the winning side of scrimmages were treated better than teammates on the losing side of scrimmages. (Doc. 23, pg. 4). Defendants also argue Plaintiff merely states general allegations about the treatment of male athletes at Mascoutah High School, which does not suffice under Title IX. (Doc. 23, pgs. 4-5).

In response, Plaintiff argues she adequately pled sex discrimination based on theories of both differential treatment and harassment. (Doc. 24, pg. 3). In terms of differential treatment, Plaintiff argues male athletes at Mascoutah High School were not subjected to the same “demoralizing and degrading activities” at practice. (Doc. 24, pg. 3). Further, male athletes could expect that their communications with a counselor would remain confidential, they would not be punished for speaking to a counselor, and they could participate on their teams without conditions. (Doc. 24, pg. 4). Relating to alleged harassment, Plaintiff argues her participation in the “demoralizing and degrading activities” at practice was unwelcomed, “unquestionably sexual,” and a condition for team membership. (Doc. 24, pgs. 3, 5). Under these theories, Plaintiff argues it is inconsequential that other females were subjected to better treatment. (Doc. 24, pg. 5).

Here Plaintiff alleged the District received federal funding for its educational programs and activities. See Jauquet, 996 F.3d at 810; (Doc. 1, pgs. 16-17). Plainti...