Al-Jurf v. Scott-Conner
| Decision Date | 27 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-094,No. 10-1227,1-094,10-1227 |
| Parties | ADEL AL-JURF, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CAROL SCOTT-CONNER, M.D. and SUSAN JOHNSON, M.D., Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Fae Hoover-Grinde (summary judgment) and Douglas S. Russell (trial), Judges.
A plaintiff appeals and the defendants cross-appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the defendants. AFFIRMED.
Martin Diaz and Elizabeth Craig of Martin Diaz Law Firm, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and George A. Carroll, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., Eisenhauer, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
In this action for damages based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Dr. Adel S. Al-Jurf claimed that Dr. Susan Johnson and Dr. Carol Scott-Conner violated his constitutionally-protected property interest in his tenured employment at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) by seeking his termination for arbitrary and capricious reasons. Following a trial and jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Dr. Al-Jurf appeals and Dr. Johnson and Dr. Scott-Conner cross-appeal. Because we find the jury was properly instructed regarding Dr. Al-Jurf's due process claim and there was no error in the introduction of evidence, we affirm. Consequently, we do not need to reach the issues raised by the defendants on cross-appeal.
In the 1970's, Dr. Al-Jurf became a surgeon and professor of surgery at the UIHC. He was granted tenure by the University of Iowa in 1981. In 2003, formal complaints regarding Dr. Al-Jurf's conduct toward colleagues and students were filed and hearings were held, ultimately resulting in Dr. Al-Jurf's termination on January 20, 2005. Dr. Al-Jurf's termination was upheld through the administrative and judicial review process. See Adel Al-Jurf, M.D. v. Bd. of Regents, No. 7-409 (Iowa Ct. App. July 12, 2007).
On January 18, 2007, Dr. Al-Jurf filed a petition naming employees of UIHC as defendants—Susan Johnson, M.D., and Carol Scott-Conner, M.D.1 He alleged the defendants sought out and documented incidents that are normallyoverlooked and encouraged others to file complaints against him, which ultimately led to his termination. He claimed the defendants' conduct violated his rights under § 1983 by depriving him of his liberty and property interests guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. On February 5, 2007, the defendants filed their answer, denying Dr. Al-Jurf's claim and raising several affirmative defenses, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, failure to mitigate damages, qualified immunity, res judicata, and statute of limitations.
On July 22, 2009, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Dr. Al-Jurf resisted, and asserted a § 1983 claim based upon a violation of his First Amendment rights. On September 20, 2009, the district court issued its ruling. As to the First Amendment claim, the court found Dr. Al-Jurf did not plead this theory in his petition, did not move to amend his petition, and should not be permitted to assert this claim at this stage of litigation. Additionally, the district court found that the First Amendment claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Consequently, any alleged First Amendment violation could not serve as a basis for Dr. Al-Jurf's § 1983 action. As to the substantive due process claim, the court found there were genuine issues of material fact regarding this claim and the claim was not barred by res judicata or the statute of limitations. Finally, the court found there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, the district court granted the motion as to the First Amendment theory and denied the defendants' motion as to the Due Process theory.
A jury trial was held May 17 to 25, 2010. At the close of the evidence, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, asserting Dr. Al-Jurf's claims were barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and Dr. Al-Jurf did not present substantial evidence to support his claim. The district court reserved ruling and the case was submitted to the jury. The jury found that Dr. Johnson and Dr. Scott-Conner did not violate Dr. Al-Jurf's constitutional rights and rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants.
On June 3, 2010, Dr. Al-Jurf moved for a new trial, asserting the court erred by: (1) admitting evidence of the administrative proceedings; (2) admitting Jan Waterhouse's testimony that she recommended that Dr. Al-Jurf be terminated; and (3) instructing the jury as to substantive due process in instructions numbered 8, 9, and 10. On June 7, 2010, the defendants renewed their motion for a directed verdict and requested the court enter judgment as a matter of law. On July 2, 2010, the district court ruled on the parties' motions, denying both. Dr. Al-Jurf appeals and the defendants cross-appeal.
42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Christenson v. Ramaeker, 366 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa 1985). Section 1983 does not create independent substantive rights, but provides a vehicle by which a plaintiff may bring suit against an individual acting under color of state authority that has deprived him of a constitutional or statutory right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A plaintiff in a § 1983 action must establish (1) that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, (2) that the defendant acted under color of state law, (3) that the conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damage, and (4) the amount of damages.
Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Iowa 1996). The first element is the only element of Dr. Al-Jurf's § 1983 claim implicated on appeal.
Dr. Al-Jurf first asserts the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on his § 1983 claim based upon the First Amendment. We review a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. Summary judgment should be granted when the entire record demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981 (3).
In January 2007, Dr. Al-Jurf initiated this suit and pled his § 1983 claim based upon a violation of due process. He did not plead his § 1983 claim based upon a violation of freedom of speech, nor did he move to amend his pleadings at any time during the proceedings.
He argues the defendants were aware of his claim. In 2007, the parties had a dispute about discovery, during which Dr. Al-Jurf sought a large number ofdocuments and ultimately filed a motion to compel. In a December 19, 2007 filing in support of his motion to compel, he explained that he believed these documents would support a § 1983 claim based upon a First Amendment violation. On January 23, 2008, the district court granted his motion, with the documents subject to a protective order and Dr. Al-Jurf bearing responsibility for the costs. After discovery was complete, Dr. Al-Jurf did not move to amend his petition to allege a § 1983 claim based upon a violation of his First Amendment rights and did not pursue this claim.
In September 2009, the district court ruled on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Dr. Al-Jurf was effectively requesting that he be permitted to amend his petition, although he had not actually moved to do so. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.402(4); Whalen v. Connelly, 545 N.W.2d 284, 293 (Iowa 1996) (). In light of the fact that Dr. Al-Jurf did not move to amend his pleadings, we find the district court did not err in granting the defendants' summary judgment motion as to Dr. Al-Jurf's § 1983 claim based upon the First Amendment.2
Dr. Al-Jurf next asserts the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004. During trial, he timely objected to the complained of evidence and jury instructions, and then also moved for a new trial based upon those grounds. On appeal, he again claims a new trial should havebeen granted because (1) the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the administrative hearings process; (2) erroneously admitted Jan Waterhouse's testimony that she recommended his employment be terminated; and (3) erred instructing the jury as to substantive due process in instructions numbered 8, 9, and 10.
"The standard of review of a denial of a motion for new trial depends on the grounds for new trial asserted in the motion and ruled upon by the court." WSH Props., L.L.C. v. Daniels, 761 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Iowa 2008). If the motion and ruling were based on a legal question, our review is on error. Clinton Physical Therapy Servs., P.C. v. John Deere Health Care, Inc., 714 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Iowa 2006). In contrast, if the motion and ruling were based upon a discretionary ground, our review is for an abuse of discretion. Vaughan v. Must, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 533, 542 (Iowa 1996). Evidentiary rulings are based upon discretionary grounds, whereas hearsay and jury...
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