Justice v. Austin Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 13 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | A-20-CV-1063-RP |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER MIGUEL JUSTICE, v. AUSTIN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court is Pro Se Plaintiff Christopher Miguel Justice's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1); Defendant Travis County's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5) or in the Alternative, Motion to Quash (Dkt. No. 24) and City Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay Proceedings (Dkt. No. 25). The District Court referred the motions to the undersigned for report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), FED. R. CIV. P. 72, and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules.
Plaintiff Christopher Miguel Justice, proceeding pro se, asserts complaints against the Austin Police Department, APD Officer Seth Model, Travis County, and the State of Texas. Justice's claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and arise from his arrest for driving under the influence on September 28, 2020.1 Justice pleads that after changing lanes without signaling ("the plaintiff made his way over to the far right lane without signaling, to turn right on to 6th Street"), he waspulled over by APD Officer Seth Model and required to take a field sobriety test. After the field sobriety test, Justice was asked to take a breathalyzer test, which he refused. He was then arrested and taken to Travis County Jail, and his car was searched and impounded. After obtaining a search warrant from a judge, Justice's blood was drawn by a Travis County officer. Justice was eventually released on bond.
Justice complains that his constitutional rights were violated by the State of Texas because it has laws allowing for restrictions to be placed on Justice in violation of the Due Process Clause, prior to a determination of guilt. Specifically, Justice complains about a requirement that an alcohol interlock device be placed on his vehicle, the potential revocation of his driver's license, and the placement of restrictions on his current license. Justice asserts that these unidentified "laws or rules" constitute a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Justice additionally claims that Officer Seth Model and his partner, whom he did not name in this suit, lacked probable cause to arrest him or seize his vehicle, and argues that he was "racially profiled" because the custom rims, illuminated grill and other custom features of his vehicle. Justice claims that at six feet two inches and 275 pounds, he was too large to perform a filed sobriety test, and thus subjecting him to the test violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justice also asserts that Model failed to read him his Miranda rights.
Justice additionally argues that the search warrant for his blood was issued without probable cause, that his blood was contaminated, and the fact that the blood test was performed by an officer and not a registered nurse violated his Eighth Amendment Right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, along with his Due Process rights. Justice argues that he was placed in a cell with handcuffs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
For relief, Justice requests a Temporary Restraining Order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction, "ordering the State of Texas to dismiss, expounge [sic], and delete this DWI charge permanently from Plaintiff's record, return Plaintiff's drivers license, refrain from ordering Plaintiff to get an interlock device installed on his vehicle [and a]n order preventing the Austin Police Department from any further harassment of Plaintiff Justice." Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Justice further requests monetary damages in the amount of $25,000,000 from Austin Police Department, $60,000 from Officer Model, $100,000 from Travis County, and $1.00 from the State of Texas.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when factual context is pled that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See id. A pleading that offers mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertions" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Id. However, courts must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2019).
The Austin Police Department argues that the claims against it should be dismissed as it is not an independent entity subject to suit. Plaintiff Justice has not responded to this argument. Thecapacity of an entity, such as a police department or a county jail, to sue or to be sued is "determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held." Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1991). For a plaintiff to sue a department of a city, that department must enjoy a separate legal existence. Id. Unless the political entity that created the department has taken "explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural authority," the department lacks the capacity to sue or to be sued. Id. Federal courts in Texas have uniformly held that entities without a separate jural existence, including the Austin Police Department, are not subject to suit. See, e.g., See Neal v. Flanery, 2021 WL 164555, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2021) (); Potts v. Crosby Indep. School Dist., 2005 WL 1527657, at *6 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2005) (); Westfall v. City of Schertz Police Dep't, 2005 WL 1168427, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 18, 2005) (). Because the Austin Police Department is not a separate legal entity amenable to suit, Justice's claims against APD should be dismissed. See Barrie v. Nueces County Dist. Attorney's Office, 753 Fed. Appx. 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2018).
Model moves to dismiss Justice's claims against him, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the claims, because Justice has failed to plead facts sufficient to establish a violation of a constitutional right, as required to make out a § 1983 claim. To state a cognizable claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) "that some person deprived him of a federal right"; and (2) "that the individual who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Qualified immunity is a common-law doctrine that "protects government officials from civil damages liability when their actions could reasonably havebeen believed to be legal." Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011). To avoid dismissal on this basis, Justice must show: "(1) that [Model] violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Id.
Justice alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Model pulled him over, and that he was arrested without probable cause. A citizen has a right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from arrest unless the arrest is supported by either a properly issued arrest warrant or probable cause. Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 2004). "Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest is reasonable if supported by probable cause." Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006). In order to prevail on his Fourth Amendment claims, Justice must identify factual allegations supporting a reasonable inference that Officer Model lacked probable cause for the arrest or intentionally made material misstatements in the warrant application affidavit, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Justice has not done so.
Probable cause exists "when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense. " Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001). In this case, Justice admits in his Complaint that he changed lanes without signaling, which is a violation of Texas state law. TEX. TRANSP. CODE. ANN §§ 542.401, 545.104(a). Therefore, Model had probable cause to pull Justice over, and his stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Justice further complains that Model administered a field sobriety test, which Justice claims was improper because of his height and weight. Justice cites the "DWI Manual" as the basis of this claim. The Court finds no basis for Justice's claim that the administration of a field sobriety testbased upon a person's particular height and weight constitutes a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Under Texas law, evidence that would logically raise an inference that a person was intoxicated at the time of driving includes erratic driving, post-driving behavior such as stumbling, swaying, slurring or mumbling words, inability to perform field sobriety tests or follow directions, bloodshot eyes, and any admissions by the defendant concerning what, when, and how much he had been drinking. See Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Impor...
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